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THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF INSTINCT

BY

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PREFACE

In submitting this essay on *The Social Philosophy of Instinct* to the public, I am full of hope that it may prove helpful to classes in Ethics, Sociology, and Psychology; for all of these are interested in one way or another in the relation of *original nature* to the values, motives, and impulses of the adult. Above all, I am hopeful that this essay may prove illuminating to our social theorists, who talk so confidently about the expression, thwarting, and repression of original nature by our customs and institutions. If it serves to introduce a more critical attitude regarding the dogmatic claims of evolutionists, which in many cases are supplying the bases of the above sciences, it will have served admirably its purpose.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank my teachers at Columbia University for the aid they have given me in making this study. Especially do I feel under obligation to Professors Woodworth, Woodbridge, and Ogburn.

CHARLES CONANT JOSEY.

HANOVER, N. H.

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THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF INSTINCT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Conceptions of human nature and behavior have a profound influence on Social Philosophy. When the behavior of man is regarded as determined largely by the play of mechanical and impersonal forces Social Philosophy is quite different from what it is when the behavior of man is regarded as determined by the influence of ancestral spirits or by innate impulses longing for expression. Views regarding the source of human values also exert a profound influence on Social Philosophy. When the source of values is regarded as external to the individual, that is, when values are regarded as sentiments impressed on the individual by his group and culture, Social Philosophy is quite different from what it is when the source of values is regarded as internal. To an even greater extent do conceptions regarding the value of the individual influence Social Philosophy. For, obviously, the Social Philosophy that rests on the assumption that the individual is of value principally as a means to help achieve the ends of some transcendental power, say that of the State, is quite different from the Social Philosophy committed to the view that the State is of value only as a means to help realize the instinctive ends of the individual.

This is as it should be. It is good that conceptions of human nature are regarded as determining what is good for man. If human nature is not to determine what is good for man, what is? The relation pointed out between views of human nature and Social Philosophy is what we should wish. Writers, then, who seek to build their Social Philosophy on their conception of human nature follow the right method and are not to be criticised for this. Yet the writings of many of our Social Philosophers seem to indicate that they should be criticised for not exercising due care and criticism in reaching their conclusions regarding human nature. The writers to whom I refer are found for the most part among the group which may be called the biological sociologists.

Under the influence of evolutionary thought and the accompanying emphasis placed on genetics, many writers in this group have reached very definite conceptions regarding human nature and the motives which determine human behavior. In many circles it is assumed that, as a result of the evolution of the species, we possess certain inherited or innate forces in virtue of which we act and which largely determine how we act. Our behavior, according to this view, is determined—not by the give-and-take relations existing between us and our environment—but by *forces which we inherit as a result of the give-and-take relations our ancestors sustained to their environment.*

Conceptions of this nature have deeply colored the

Social Philosophy of to-day. Indeed, one who reads current discussions of social problems cannot fail to be impressed with the significance that is attached to supposedly innate determinants of human behavior. It is hoped that by various manipulations of these *forces*, or instincts—that is, by sublimation, repression, suppression, thwarting, expression, and so forth—the good and evil of our society will be explained. It is also hoped that through a knowledge of these innate characters we shall be able to give a psychological interpretation of our moral ideas and sentiments, of our institutions and customs, and of culture in general. In spite of the prevalence of these tendencies and hopes, the assumptions on which they are based seem in many cases to have been accepted uncritically. It is too readily assumed that our values, desires, impulses, and emotions are determined by *forces* which we inherit as a result of the behavior or environmental conditions of our ancestors.*

This conception of *force* in terms of which phenomena can be explained has disappeared from the physical sciences. That it should still persist in the

* This assumption does not rest necessarily on the practically abandoned theory of the inheritance of acquired characters. It may be based as well on the theory that certain spontaneous variations in the germ are preserved by the selective influence of the environment. The result is the same. In both cases the individual is regarded as coming into this life with a mass of preformed impulses, emotions, and instincts that arose or were selected as a result of the relations the species sustained to its environment. These impulses are regarded as largely determining present behavior.

biological and social sciences is not hard to understand. It is due to a great extent to the origin of our conception of *force*. Our notion of *force* is deeply rooted in overcoming obstacles. At such moments we feel ourselves animated by a great *force*, which is putting forth every effort to accomplish the desired end. Likewise in our moments of inspiration and enthusiasm we feel ourselves lifted up and ennobled by a power or *force* which holds us in its grasp. It is not unnatural that a notion thus acquired should be held fast as an explanation of the very experiences in which it was discovered. It is because we experience forces directly or immediately in our behavior that we wish or hope to interpret our behavior in terms of a *force*. It is for this reason that this old notion of force, though abandoned in physics, continues to play an important part in our explanation of social and organic behavior.

The explanation of the abandonment of this use of *force* in the physical sciences will make clear another reason for its persistence in the biological sciences. It is not hard to understand why it should have been abandoned in the physical sciences; for there we can calculate forces exactly and balance one against the other. As soon as we are able to do this, we begin to treat them as functions of the situations in which they appear, rather than as *forces* independent of the situation and in terms of which the situation can be explained. Forces thus come to be regarded as results of the situation, and hence cannot be used to account

for the situation or activity in which they appear. This is not so easily done in the biological sciences. There the data are much more complex, and we find greater difficulty in viewing the forces as products of the situation in which they appear.

This difficulty, however, should not be allowed to mislead us. An illustration drawn from one of the purely physical sciences will make clear how we should regard all forces. For example, let us take the activity that is involved in the precipitation of a chemical from a solution. In an activity of this sort we feel no need of a "crystalline force" to bring about the precipitation or crystallization. Yet in this activity force is beyond doubt involved. But the force, like the activity, is quite naturally regarded as a function of the situation in which it appears, and no one thinks that it is to be regarded as a sort of agency in virtue of which the activity takes place. The phenomenon of crystallization or precipitation is consequent upon variations in the temperature of the solution, or upon some other change in the total situation. Hence, there is no need of a *force* to account for the activity. Given certain conditions, the chemical crystallizes, and any force that may be involved is merely an aspect of the phenomenon rather than an entity or power manifesting itself in the process of crystallization.

This seems very obvious when we are dealing with purely physical processes. Yet we find it difficult to view the forces manifested in the behavior of organ-

isms in the same way. This is due in part to the complexity of the behavior. It is also due in part to the fact that we seem to feel a necessity of accounting for the fact that organisms not only act as they do but that they *act* at all. Activity itself seems to require in the opinion of some an explanation. To view activity as consequent upon antecedent conditions and upon the total situation* is not regarded as satisfactory by many. Such explanations are held to be inadequate, since they do not tell us *in virtue of what force* the organism acts. This inadequacy is met by the simple device of positing in the organism various *forces* corresponding to the behavior observed. Thus the inadequacy is met, and the needs felt for a *real* explanation are satisfied.

Formerly physicists, in answer to similar metaphysical needs, were led to posit in a falling stone a *force* which impelled it to seek its proper place. Yet obviously the force manifested in the fall of the stone is a product of the situation, and cannot be used to account for the phenomenon. That is to say, given a stone placed in a certain position, it will fall, and with its fall force will be generated. It does not fall, however, because of the force. Rather there is force because it falls.

In the same way the forces experienced in the be-

* *Total situation* as here used includes the structure, physiological condition, and experience of the organism, as well as the stimuli which affect the organism. *Situation* will be used frequently to include all these determiners of behavior.

havior of organisms should be regarded as due to the situations in which they appear. It must be recognized that many of our experiences seem to involve *forces* that exist independently of the situation in which they are felt. This, however, should not mislead us. For the apparent independence of these forces is due largely to our inability to correlate them sufficiently exactly with the known and variable elements in the situation, and to the fact that the same *force* or instinct or emotion may be aroused by different stimuli. Yet we may rest assured that the *forces* experienced in our behavior are no less determined by the variations that are constantly taking place in the relations that we sustain to our environment than the forces that are brought into existence by purely physical conditions. Given an organism with a certain structure, physiological condition, and mass of experience in a certain environment, there will be generated out of this situation forces which are as strictly determined as any force generated in the physical world. Outside of such situations there are no *forces* affecting the organism and impelling it to various activities or desires.

Our metaphysical prepossessions make it difficult for us to regard behavior in this way. The questions inevitably arise: In virtue of what agency or *force* does the organism act? Why does the organism act in this way rather than in some other? It is because we are not satisfied to regard the forces experienced

in behavior as arising here and now in the situations in which they function and to view activity as consequent upon antecedent conditions and activities that these questions arise. It is for this reason that we posit in the organism ready-made *forces* called instincts. Thus we learn not only why organisms act, but also why they act as they do!

This need is not felt in accounting for perception and sensation. When an organism in a certain physiological condition is placed in a certain environment it perceives or is sensitive. No necessity is felt of accounting for this as the result of a *force* of perception or sensation. It is regarded as sufficient to account for this as the result of the relation of the organism to its environment. This is true no matter what the nature of the organism may be. In some the perception is different from what it is in others. But, whatever the nature of the perception may be, we feel no necessity of accounting for it as the result of a *force* of perception. Yet, if the perception or sensation should have an emotional character or be accompanied by an impulse, a necessity is felt of accounting for these latter as the results of certain *forces* or instincts within the organism.

Thus, for example, if a man perceives that he has been insulted, there is felt no need of a *force* of perception. But if, as a result of this, he should become angry and attack the person offering the insult, there is felt a need of accounting for this as the result of a

force. This need is satisfied by the instinct of pugnacity. Likewise, if he sees a boy being abused, and he again becomes angry and attacks the person abusing the boy, the same explanations are given.

This difference between our explanations of perception and our explanations of emotions and impulses may be regarded as due to the fact that our perceptions are definitely correlated with certain organs, whereas our emotions and impulses are not. Thus we see because we have eyes; hear because we have ears, etc. No corresponding organs can be assigned to our emotions and impulses. Hence arises the need of something analogous to the organs of perception to account for our emotions and impulses.

If, however, the absence of sense-organs gives rise to the necessity of positing in the organism *forces* to account for mental states which are not definitely correlated with particular organs, vision and audition must likewise be regarded as due to such *forces*; for in simple organisms there are no sense-organs, yet they are sensitive to both light and noises. Perception in such organisms, therefore, must be due to a corresponding instinct of perception. But if a *force* is required to account for perception in simple organisms, a *force* is also required in organisms no matter how great the complexity; for complexity does not do away with the necessity of *force*. It may diminish the amount required, or use more efficiently the *force* placed at its disposition, but it cannot operate without it.

In fact, this is the position of those who emphasize the importance of instincts. Structure is not a sufficient explanation of the organism's behavior. Without the driving power of an instinct, they tell us, the structure would lie motionless and inert. Though one does not stress the necessity of a *force* of visual perception, in virtue of which the eye sees, one does stress the necessity of a *force* in virtue of which the organism experiences strong emotions and impulses. Many seem to think it is because there are pent up in the organism various *forces* that the organism performs many of its characteristic activities.

A certain degree of reality is attached to these *forces*, because, as illustrated above, the same emotion may be aroused by many stimuli. We are no more able to correlate the emotion with a definite class of stimuli than we are to correlate it with a definite organ. As a result, the emotions and impulses seem to have an independence which invites us to account for activities as their expressions. This is not altogether in error. The behavior of the insulted man, as well as his behavior on observing the abused boy, would probably have been quite different had not the emotion of anger and impulse to fight been aroused. This says little more, however, than that the behavior would not have been the same had it been different. The fact that the emotion was aroused by different situations should not be regarded as an indication that the emotion has an existence of an independent nature any more

than the fact that the precipitation of a chemical may be produced by lowering the temperature of the solution or by evaporating part of it should cause us to regard the precipitation as due to a *force* existing independently of the situation. In both cases the behavior is determined by the total situation. Just as precipitation occurs under certain conditions, so the emotions which are experienced come into existence under certain conditions. If an emotion should arise under a thousand different conditions, it would, none the less in each case, be an aspect of the situation without an independent existence of its own.

It is because we neglect to see that emotions and impulses are generated in the situations in which they appear that we are confronted with difficulties regarding their origin. It is because they are assigned an existence of their own that it becomes necessary to explain how they came into existence. Men at all levels of culture have felt this necessity. The primitive man, the theologian, and the modern biologists and psychologists have each advanced numerous theories to account for the existence of the various *forces* in virtue of which organisms are able to act and which cause them to act as they do.

As may be supposed, these theories have fundamental differences. In many respects, however, they are quite similar. A mere statement of the theories will make clear the similarity. Any act which the primitive man cannot account for in terms of the usual

experiences of the individual is regarded by him as due to an impression or urge from an ancestor or some other hidden *force*. Similarly, any act which the theologian cannot explain is regarded by him as due to an impression from God. The evolutionist goes a step further. He explains not only the unusual acts but the usual also as due to impulses or tendencies that have been impressed on us by the species.

No one need deny that there are fundamental differences between these views. There is, however, a fundamental similarity, which may be briefly stated: they agree that the origin or source of our impulses or motivating forces lies outside of the situation in which they appear, and that the impulse or force is of such a nature that it can be regarded as the *impulsive force* back of the behavior.

The conception of such determiners of behavior, whether regarded as coming from an ancestral spirit, or from Deity, or from the species, exerts a profound influence on social practices and theories. This is not hard to understand. Behavior that is due to impressions from a powerful ancestor or from God must be given a right of way over all other considerations, and one need but urge that he is acting in accordance with such an impression to win universal approbation. For who dares to question the advisability of an act that is so determined! If the good in such a course is not apparent, so much the worse for our power of perception and understanding. The good is there. We need only to discover it.

The influence of *instinct* as used by many is as profound. *Instinct* by many is clothed with the hidden goods that formerly adhered to transcendental purposes. According to this view, it is held that the individual inherits a mass of psychic tendencies which have proved their fitness and value as guides to behavior by their faithful service to the species. The good that inheres in their expression may not be apparent to us, but it is there. Otherwise the race could not have survived. If we do not see the good, the fault is ours. Its existence is guaranteed by the evolutionary process itself. We need only to discover it.

The discovery of the good is in many cases difficult. It is generally held, however, that the good lies in the *natural* functioning of the instinct. Accordingly, the *natural* functioning is greatly emphasized. But, in spite of this emphasis, and of the ambiguity of the term *natural*, no one takes the trouble to define clearly its meaning. Sometimes it seems to be identified with the desires and impulses which follow most closely bodily structure and needs. At other times it seems to be identified with the *primitive*. At still other times it seems to be identified with the *fundamental*.

One can readily understand that the exalting in this way of such an ambiguous and indefinite principle of activity should provide the ready means of justifying the most egoistic and selfish desires. For desires of an egoistic nature answer best the various descriptions of the natural. Such desires are closely related to bodily needs. They are primitive and they are

fundamental. On the other hand, the desires that are born of social contacts become highly unnatural. These do not follow so closely the lines laid down by physiological needs. They are not necessarily primitive, nor are they fundamental. Hence, the extolling of the instinctive and the emphasis placed on the *natural* expression of instinct tend to justify one in satisfying or indulging every egoistic whim and to condemn the demands of society as repressive and as designed to crush the free and unimpeded expression of the best that the race has been able to evolve.

The interpretation of behavior and development in terms of innate *forces* brings about the same result in another way. Since behavior is due to independent *forces* existing within the organism irrespective of its experience, there is the tendency to look upon development and behavior as the mere unfolding of innate characters. The adult becomes simply an enlarged edition of the embryo. All that is required for development is that the innate characters be given a free hand to unfold themselves *naturally*. The most that society can do is to give the individual full freedom to express the *forces* within him. The best society is the one that interferes least in this process. Society, instead of being regarded as the source of values, sentiments, emotions, and impulses, is opposed to the individual as a great repressive force that prevents the individual from realizing his fullest possible development.

To say that the present unrest, discontent, and assertion of egoism are the results of our conceptions regarding the nature of the individual and society would be an exaggeration. These phenomena are too general to be attributed to the Social Philosophy of Western Civilization. The quieting effect of financial and industrial depression indicates that the causes are largely economic. Industrial progress and economic well-being make for individualism. Men must be secured to take care of the surplus; with the increase in wealth consumers must also be found. In this way the dependence of man upon man is largely destroyed, and each feels that he is a self-sufficient individual.

This development has been made possible largely by our scientific progress. But scientific progress has in another way tended to destroy the bases of communal solidarity. A comparison of the fears of primitive man with those of the modern will make this clear.

Reared in a country of plenty, free from the superstitious fears that formerly made life a burden, it is hard for us to realize the forebodings and fears that made life for the primitive man a terrible experience. Surrounded, as he was, on every hand with real dangers and subjected to the uncertainties of a precarious existence, he added to these dangers a world of hostile spirits—perhaps a reflection of the real dangers that he had to encounter, but unlike most reflections many times more terrible. On every side were ghosts, gob-

lins, and demons of all kinds. At their mercy the individual felt himself, and usually they were hostile. How else could one regard them when his miserable existence was interpreted as a result of their whims!*

By proper ceremonies and rites, however, it was possible to persuade them not to injure the group, and at times to induce them to favor the group in a small way. As a result of these hopes and fears the community was knit together in vast co-operative enterprises to win the favor of the spirits or to free the settlement from them. In such ceremonies all were compelled to take part. Neither the community nor Fate would overlook absence.

Similar rites have been practised by all European peoples, and can be found in certain isolated districts of France to this day.† The rites as practised by our forebears were not only for protection against magic. They served to insure bountiful crops. These superstitions have been banished by science, but science, in relieving us of these fears and in teaching us better methods of insuring bountiful harvests, has removed one of the pillars of communal solidarity. When the community is gathered to perform the one essential ceremony in which all must take part, there is engendered in each individual a feeling of at-oneness and dependence on the group, and, in addition, he experiences a certain exaltation and enthusiasm born of the

* Cf. Frazer, *Golden Bough*, vol. III, 2d edition, 39.

† Frazer, *ibid.*, 323. Based on report in *Athenæum*, 1869.

common purpose and of the strength of a united community back of the enterprise.

Science has removed these bonds of social dependence. We no longer entertain the fears which formed their basis. Our fears are quite different. The primitive man feared positive evils. We fear that we may miss our share of the good. These fears have opposite effects. The one engenders a feeling of dependence and co-operation; the other, a spirit of suspicion and hate. The fear of evils brings the group together. The fear of missing goods arrays each man against his fellows in the determined assertion of his "rights."

Thus many of the antisocial tendencies manifested in our society may well be regarded as liabilities of our industrial and scientific progress.

While economic and scientific progress has made for the assertion of individualism, psychological development has in many cases, through its interpretations of behavior, tended to a denial of individual responsibility. If one's actions are the result of heredity or of environmental conditions, for what should one blame himself? The individual becomes a mere puppet of forces beyond his control. Who can blame him for his desires, or for acting in accordance with them? At the worst he is only their victim. Why should he repress them?

In this way the denial of individual responsibility brings about antisocial tendencies. Strange as it may seem, such opposites as the assertion of individuality

and the denial of individuality bring about the same development. On the one hand, there is the stirring up of strife and unrest as a result of the assertion of the "rights" of the individual. On the other hand, the duties of the individual to the group are denied through the denial of individual responsibility. Thus, at the same time that we erect the deep-seated desires and impulses of the individual into "rights" that are not to be questioned, we tend to destroy the feeling of responsibility which should go with deep feelings of personality by telling him that he is not responsible for his desires and impulses or for acting in accordance with them. In this way we teach the individual that his deep-seated desires are his best guides to conduct, and when he acts in a way regarded as undesirable we tend to make excuses for his behavior by attributing his antisocial acts to a corrupting environment.

Thus psychological theories of almost opposite assumptions combine with economic and scientific progress to lead us in the narrow assertion of egoism and individualism that is proving so disruptive to our existing social order.

When I say, therefore, that the conception of instincts as *forces* entitled to *natural* expression is exerting a powerful influence in bringing about the present chaotic conditions in society and in Social Philosophy, I am not unmindful of many other factors that are helping to bring about the same result. In fact, it

should be recognized that the rôle of instinct in this development is of a secondary nature. Its chief rôle is to lend justification to antisocial tendencies brought about by other factors by exalting these into principles of conduct.

It is true there is considerable disagreement among social writers regarding the value of instincts for moral and ethical guidance. Indeed, another element of confusion is introduced by this lack of agreement. By some it is held that instincts are indefinite, and that they, therefore, fail to furnish us with ethical principles. By others it is insisted that instincts are the ineradicable products of long ages spent in savagery. They are, therefore, regarded as a great liability to the moral life, which makes impossible the realization of "The Good Society." By others it is insisted with as great emphasis that the instincts are guides which have proved their worth in the long evolutionary struggle, and that we need but follow their guidance to achieve the truly moral and good. Accordingly, the last group holds that the evils of society are due largely to the repressions that it practises. To eliminate these evils, they tell us, we need but allow our instincts to function *naturally*.

It might seem that some doubt should be entertained regarding the reality of *forces* about which there is such disagreement. This is the view of the present essay. It is necessary, however, that an explanation of the almost universal recognition of these *forces* be

given; for it is natural to suppose that such a widespread conception must have at least a basis in reality. This basis is not hard to discover. The wonderfully adaptive behavior of organisms apart from any knowledge of the end that is being reached requires an explanation. The sublimity of man's moral ideas, his clear vision of right and wrong, the nobility of his impulses, likewise require an explanation. What better explanation can be advanced than to regard them as due to *instincts*, or the accumulated wisdom of the species? In brief, what other explanation can be given in a world of cause and effect?

Thus, the old superstitions founded on belief in metempsychosis and theological speculations give place to "scientific" explanations based on the assumption of ancestral memories, or of wisdom and habits acquired by the species.

To discuss the transition from superstition to "science" is the first task of this treatise. The connecting link is the feeling that certain activities cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of the individual's experience and capacities. To supplement explanations in these terms, various conceptions are invoked. However different these conceptions may be, all of them have this in common: instead of solving the problems connected with behavior, they transfer them to another realm. In one case the problems are transferred to a psychology of ancestral ghosts or spirits; in another, they are transferred to the realm

of Divine psychology; and in another, they are transferred to the psychology of the species. Yet in no case have we reason to suppose that the new fields are more available for research than the field presented by the individual acting here and now in our very presence.

The study of the similarities found in the belief in metempsychosis and in instinct will serve also to show the sources of the powerful sanction of instinct. It is on account of this sanction that both conservatives and radicals seek to win the support of instinct for their social views. To discuss the significance of instinct for ethical and social guidance will be the task of the second chapter.

The criticism of the use of instinct as a sanction in the second chapter will be of a general nature. In the third and fourth chapters I shall examine the very explicit psychological assumptions on which this sanction rests. This examination, I hope, will make apparent that interpretations of behavior in terms of *forces* are not only unnecessary and unilluminating, but actually prevent a factual study of behavior on account of the mass of psychological impedimenta, whose origin furnishes such a fruitful cause for controversy. Behavior, I shall point out, should be interpreted not in terms of *forces* but in terms of the relations the organism sustains to its environment. By so doing one gets close to the facts which should enable him to correlate the activities of an organism with the variable

factors which determine that the organism shall act as it does rather than in some other way. At the same time, by so viewing behavior one is spared all the difficulties involved in the origin of instinct, and the many sublimations and repressions which instincts are supposed to undergo in making clear the behavior of the organism.

The concluding chapter will be devoted to a brief statement of the point of view of the essay and to pointing out certain differences which should follow in social practices when the behavior of the individual is interpreted in terms of the give-and-take relations he sustains to his environment, rather than in terms of hidden *forces* that are released by a multitude of stimuli and that express themselves in a variety of responses.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL ORIENTATION

According to Durkheim the reality on which all beliefs in magic and religion are based is the experience of being profoundly influenced by a power external to ourselves felt to be more powerful and abiding than the powers that we feel to be strictly our own. As he points out, it is necessary for us to have an experience of this sort before we can wish to account for it. Given an experience of this power, which Durkheim holds comes inevitably as a result of man's group relations, numerous explanations of its nature and origin are possible.

Obviously a great many mistakes are made in the attempt to account for the source of the power or force. But there can be no mistake regarding its reality; for it is true that man, as a gregarious animal, is deeply sensitive to the feelings of the group in which he lives. It is from the group that many of his noble and altruistic impulses, as well as much of his power and enthusiasm, come. It is the group that compels him to act in the manner approved and cherished by the group, and when he so acts he has a feeling of increased vitality. As Durkheim says:

"Social action does not confine itself to demanding

sacrifices, privations, and efforts from us. For the collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act upon us wholly from without; but rather, since society cannot exist except in and through individual consciousness, this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our being and by that very fact this is elevated and magnified." "For society, this unique force of all that is sacred, does not limit itself to moving us from without and affecting us for the moment. It establishes itself within us in a durable manner. It arouses within us a whole world of ideas and sentiments which express it but which, at the same time, form an integral and permanent part of ourselves."*

There should be no doubt of the existence of the force we wish to account for. The power of the group to fill the individual with enthusiasm, to inspire him, to ennoble and exalt him is real. Real also is its power to crush him, to make him feel his unworthiness and insignificance, and to make him acquiesce in his own punishment and even annihilation.

This great power the primitive man interprets in terms of influences from his ancestors, or in terms of a vague impersonal force commonly called *mana*. It is true that he is wrong in his interpretations. But his mistakes are regarding the *source* of the power only. He makes no mistake in recognizing the existence of this power. The experience of this power is

* *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, 209, 262.

genuine. No error regarding its source can invalidate it. We are deeply affected by powers that cannot be regarded as strictly our own. It is for this reason that many of our enthusiasms and inspirations seem due to external forces that have taken their abode within us.

One of the hypotheses most widely held among primitive men to account for the existence of these powerful influences holds that the urges or impressions come from a disembodied ancestor. For, according to primitive conceptions, departed ancestors do not lose all interest in the living. On the contrary, from time to time they return and take their abode in the body of the living in order to befriend or injure him.

It is easy to understand that explanations of behavior in terms of interest of ancestors provide a ready-made explanation for whatever may occur. Should the individual do anything unusual or supernatural, it is because an ancestor has taken his abode in him and is directing and inspiring him to perform his wonderful acts. Or, if the behavior is not of this sort, the ancestor may be offended and is punishing the individual for displeasing him. Thus one has an easy explanation for misfortune, happiness, success, failure, sickness, madness, and all strong urgings and impulses that seem in any way unusual. As a result of thus ascribing various phenomena to the souls of the dead, true causes are overlooked, and men find themselves

dependent on the hidden entities, which they themselves create.

Primitive peoples are not the only ones who have used theories of preexistence to account for the behavior of the living. The Greeks, likewise, believed that each soul went through a plurality of existences. It was no idle fancy of theirs, for since their conception of causality committed them to the view that Like produces Like, they thought that only soul could give rise to soul. Hence, each birth meant the reincarnation of a disembodied spirit. It is this belief that gives significance to the feast of Anthesteria, at which time the departed souls were entertained and purified preparatory to taking again their abode in the realm of the living. It is this that also gives significance to the Athenian's prayers, on marrying, to his ancestors' ghosts. The hope of children depended on the action of departed souls. On departed souls, or ghosts, the reproductive processes depended, and in addition the character of the offspring depended largely on that of the ghost and on the rites that were supposed to free and purify it from contamination with the underworld or realm of the dead.

So much has been written about the beauty of Greek life that we do not attach sufficient importance to the praise Lucretius showered upon Epicurus for dispelling the mass of superstitious fears that made the life of his age a terrible experience. So little seriously do we take the superstitions of the Greeks that when

Plato uses them we like to think that he used them simply as illustrations to emphasize his teachings. So we pass them by with the excuse or apology that they furnished him with means to persuade the masses to accept his ethical teachings, that they helped him to banish and explain difficult problems, or that they rounded out in perfect fulness his ethical ideals. Yet we should remember that the masses did not need such legends or myths. The popularity of the Orphic Cult and the grossness of many of its rites attest sufficiently well to this fact. Nor was Plato directing his teachings to the masses. His teachings were for the *intelligentsia* of his day, and his hesitancy in using the myths shows how he hated and feared their ridicule.

The myths of Plato form an integral part of his teachings. They cannot be banished lightly. It is very probable that he accepted them, or something similar to them, as the truth. Thus the difficulty of accounting for learning drives him to the theory of reminiscence, or to regard learning as the recollection of experiences undergone in a previous incarnation. His difficulties seem real, and his explanation seems sincere. Because we hold them lightly we should not presume that Plato did.*

The same is true of his explanation of the joy we experience at beholding a beautiful object. This joy is but a survival of the great joy we experienced as a

* *Meno*, 81-86; *Phædrus*, 247-251.

disembodied spirit on beholding beauty in its eternal verity. The wandering soul does not forget all it has seen in its heavenly home. It is for this reason that objects on earth cause some of us to recollect the true beauty in the heavens. Recollections of this sort cause an ecstasy, which seems madness to those who do not experience such recollections.*

It thus seems certain that Plato took seriously the current beliefs in preexistence and metempsychosis. Indeed, he took great pains to substitute an ordered world of the dead for a disordered one. That is to say, he wished to banish from the world of the living the vast array of disembodied souls, and to assign them a home of their own. In this way he hoped to free the living from the fear of being molested by the dead, as well as from their feelings of dependence on departed ancestors. The dead could not affect the living; nor could the living affect the dead. Hence, the various rites to purify the ghosts before they were to become reincarnated became unnecessary. The living were instructed to attend to their own affairs and leave the dead to attend to theirs.

The world, thus freed from the interference of ghosts, offered a more fitting place for the influence of the Olympian gods. However these, like the souls of the dead, were assigned an abode of their own. It is true they were permitted to interfere occasionally in the affairs of men, but this interference took place for the

* *Phædrus*, 249-251.

most part in the remote past. Indeed, at one time, in the very remote past, they lived with men, and this was the Golden Age. But now they have departed, leaving men largely free to work out their own destiny with the aid of the various arts and virtues given by the gods.*

As a result of this change, the marvellous deeds that had formerly been regarded as the work of a wonderful ancestor were now regarded as due to certain capacities which the gods had implanted in man. It is in this way that Plato accounts for the existence of the political virtues in the Protagorean Myth, and for virtues in general, when he says: "Virtue is neither natural nor acquired but an instinct given by God to the Virtuous."†

It is not necessary that we make much of the fact that Plato took seriously his myths. It is more important to know that they were taken seriously by many. That they were is shown beyond all doubt by the cult practices of the Greeks. Nor are there lacking to-day believers in the conceptions on which they are founded. There have been from the early dawn of culture believers in metempsychosis. In the Orient they run into the millions. In the Occident similar beliefs form the foundation of various "New Thought" cults. From primitive man they have come to us in an unbroken chain, and philosophers have not been lacking to defend them. Thus, from Plato,

* *Statesman*, 269-275.

† *Protagoras*, 321-322; *Meno*, 99.

Origen and Justin Martyr accepted them, holding that in the beginning God created the souls of all men, which subsequently as punishment for sin were incarnated in bodies until discipline rendered them fit for spiritual existence.

Poets have also found this a favorite theme. It is the belief in preexistence and metempsychosis that gives point to Wordsworth's *Ode on the Intimations of Immortality*:

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting!
The soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come,
From God, who is our home."

The same conceptions are expressed by Browning in *Evelyn Hope*:

"I claim you still for my own love's sake!
Delayed it may be for more lives yet,
Through worlds I shall traverse not a few;
Much is to learn, much to forget
Ere the time be come for taking you."

More seriously John and Ellis M'Taggart in their recent book—*Human Immortality and Preexistence*, have attempted to defend the belief in preexistence on the ground that preexistence is necessary to account for the behavior of man. How else, according to these

writers, can we account for love at first sight? What can be more reasonable than to assume that the lovers had grown attached to each other in a previous existence? Love at first sight is really not love at first sight. It is the result of a long period of intimacy in another existence and the joy at seeing a familiar face. An explanation of the same nature is advanced to account for the fact that some men are wiser than others, that some men are prudent and some are not. These traits, the M'Taggarts tell us, were acquired in a previous existence by their possessors. Those who lack them here failed to acquire them in a previous existence.

Explanations of this sort make behavior and individual differences wonderfully simple. No matter what a man may be or may do, there is no want of an explanation ready-made.

While the belief in metempsychosis is still to be found in Western Thought, it has not had a profound influence. It should be regarded more as a side current, which has perhaps colored our thinking unconsciously, than as a conception consciously embraced. The more influential conception invoked to explain the activities of organisms that seem to lie beyond their capacities and experience is the thought Plato gave expression to in saying that virtues are the gifts of God.

There can be discerned in this transition from the primitive beliefs in magic and spirits and preexistence to that of gods, and finally to God, a tendency to re-

lieve man always of fears of the spirit world. The dark world of goblins becomes less dark. The fears of spirits become less. The gods become less petty and malicious, while God leaves man in comparative freedom after the creative act. Yet man retains many of the solutions of earlier conceptions. Primitive man regards himself as having sprung from a race of superior beings, who gave rise to a number of lesser beings, among whom he counts himself. Sparks of the divine, however, occasionally flash within him, and around him are still vast numbers of superior ancestors, whose good-will he must win or else suffer the consequences. Later these conceptions give place to a more ordered rule of the gods. The strange or the unusual is not the work of an ancestor or spirit. It is the work of a god. Finally, the wonderful acts are regarded not as the result of the direct action of a god on man. They are regarded rather as due to the endowments given man by God.

This is the point Thomas Aquinas reaches in his explanation of the existence of certain habits in man which seem to lie beyond the natural capacities of man. Thomas seems puzzled that there should be in man the disposition to seek ends which cannot be justified in terms of his egoistic desires. He therefore raises the question: Are there habits infused into man by God? This he answers in the affirmative. The reason he gives for his answer is what interests us. In addition to the scriptural authority which he cites in

support of his answer, he holds that there are some habits in man which exceed the goodness of human nature, for they impel man to seek ends which are beyond his nature. Therefore, he concludes, "Such habits can never be in man except by divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues." *

Bacon also seems to have felt that some of man's moral ideas are too sublime to be the result of his natural powers. Instead of regarding them, however, as habits or dispositions infused by God, he prefers to regard them as survivals of a former state of purity, that is, of the state of man before his fall. At that time man was much more wonderful than now and lived on a higher moral plane. Hence, what seems to lie beyond the natural powers of man to-day may well have been within his powers during the Golden Age. The experience of man at that time may accordingly be used to throw light on his present ideas. Thus Bacon seems to have thought when he held that certain of man's moral ideas are too sublime to have been acquired by his natural powers, and substituted for this method of acquiring them the operation of an "internal instinct" or of the spark which remains of "primitive and pristine purity." †

So far had the most progressive philosopher of his day advanced beyond primitive notions of occasional flashes of the divine within us!

* *Summa*, Part II, First Part, Q 51, Art. 4.

† *Advancement of Learning*, Ninth Book.

This conception of instincts as impressions from God, or as habits infused by him, or as remains of a primitive state of purity, has been a popular one to account for anything unusual or mysterious in behavior. It is this conception that Alciphron complains of when he says: "I am for admitting no inward speech, no holy instincts, or suggestions of light and spirit." *

It is not only the unusual that has invited explanations in mystical terms. Even the commonplace in a theological age may be used to show how necessary recourse to divine agencies is in explaining human behavior.

Thus Malebranche held that even the connection between the pleasurable and beneficial could be accounted for only on the assumption of divine interposition. Why should they be connected? Why should we feel pleasure when we experience the beneficial? † The fact that we do reveals the hand of Deity. Man does not seek pleasure, but pleasure is attached to the objects of the natural inclinations, because the natural inclinations are impressions from God. It is, therefore, in obedience to God's voice when we yield to our instincts in order to satisfy our senses and passions. "Le plaisir est un instinct de la nature, ou parler plus clairement, c'est une impression de Dieu même, qui incline vers quelque bien." ‡

* Berkeley, *Alciphron*, 4th Dialogue, section 7.

† The numerous exceptions may be regarded as invalidating Malebranche's explanation.

‡ *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, 43, 499, quoted from Drever, *Instinct in Man*, 27.

The spirit of inquiry became too strong, however, to permit such explanations and conceptions to pass unquestioned. Hobbes reacted vigorously against them. Whatever man did was by that fact demonstrated to be within the power of man to do. What we should seek to know, therefore, are the principles regulating his behavior. These principles, Hobbes held, could be reduced to the principle of self-interest. Each man seeks what he regards as his own good. If this serves also the good of others, and has the appearance of sacrifice, so much the better. The appearance of sacrifice, however, should not mislead us. It is a deception. If we could only see the motives lying back of all activity, we should see that all are selfish.

In this attempt to make man's behavior intelligible without recourse to hidden agencies, Hobbes seems to have neglected to take into account the fact that man is profoundly influenced by his group, and that much of his psychic energy comes from society, that is, from sources external to himself. If he had recognized these facts, he would have seen that man is not the calculating machine that he had supposed. He would have found that the intensification of life and the thrills and enthusiasms that result from coming into contact with the group can never be accounted for as the result of hedonistic calculation. He would have found the same true regarding the feeling that back of one there is a force more noble and less selfish directing and helping the individual to ends prized by

the group. In his reaction against the mysticism and theological speculations, Hobbes failed to give due consideration to the existence of social forces which make the individual act in a way that is clearly not to the advantage of the individual. Social forces of this nature cannot be reduced to selfish calculation. The reality of these forces consists in the reality of form as opposed to that of matter.

There is no wonder, then, that the explanations of Hobbes aroused a storm of opposition, and that they were attacked as libels on human nature. For man is not the calculating machine Hobbes would make of him. The depths of his personality can never be exhausted in this way. He is a creature of impulse, a creature in whom there are innate moral ideas, a creature whom God directs to noble acts and fills with enthusiasms. So the moral philosophers following Hobbes reacted.*

The old conception of innate moral ideas, of instincts implanted by God, of impressions from God, afforded welcomed means for protecting the moral worth of man against the "libels" of Hobbes. These conceptions served admirably to throw around man's activities a mystery, which can but be satisfying to the individual who feels that no matter how he is analyzed there remains something of his personality unaccounted for. This feeling is the stronghold of the objector of analysis. It is felt that personality is too intimate to

* Notably Cudworth, Clarke, Cumberland, and Shaftesbury.

be spread out in concepts. The heart of a person cannot be learned in this way. It is only dissipated in the process. Hence the feeling that explanations do not explain. Rather they destroy the reality for which an explanation is sought. Analysis does a violence to personality that is distasteful. It is much more comforting to lock the secrets of one's inner being in a mysterious concept that is not open to investigation than to lay bare one's inmost soul to the gaze of those who cannot appreciate or understand.

It is for these reasons that the attempts of the physiologists to account for behavior in terms of structure encountered, along with the rationalistic attempts of Hobbes and other hedonists, a storm of opposition, which clearly reveals the love of man for the hidden and obscure when his acts and motives are in question.

The physiologists, like Hobbes and Locke, were wearied of explaining the observed in terms of the less well known. They therefore made the attempt to account for the behavior of organisms in terms of structure and physiological condition. They rightly held that, if behavior cannot be explained in this way, there is no use of making an appeal to innate guides or impressions from Deity. The organization of the creature is the best key available to its behavior. This is the position of Reimar and Herder.

Cabanis went further in his recognition of the profound influence of the physiological condition of the

structure on the behavior. Variations of behavior are not due to variations in structure but to variations in the condition of the structure. This is obviously the method physiologists must take, for the structure may be constant, as far as any one can tell, and yet the behavior be different. This Cabanis clearly recognized. He accordingly attempted to trace variations in behavior to variations in the physiological condition of the organism.*

One may not be inclined to accept the explanations of Hobbes or of the physiologists and yet admit that these explanations furnish us with illustrations of the kind of explanations that should guide us in our efforts to understand the behavior of organisms. Explanations, to be satisfactory, must be in terms of this nature, rather than in terms of obscure and hidden entities. Yet these attempts could not be tolerated by the age in which they were advanced. They denied the mysterious side of activity; they failed to explain in virtue of what *force* or *agency* the organism acted. They therefore stood condemned.

*Lewes quotes an interesting observation of Cabanis: "In my own province and some of the neighboring provinces, when there is a scarcity of sitting hens, a singular practice is customary. We take a capon, pluck off the feathers from its abdomen, rub it with nettles and vinegar, and in this state of local irritation, place the capon upon the eggs. At first he remains there to sooth the pain, soon there is established within him a series of unaccustomed and agreeable impressions, which attaches him to the eggs during the period of incubation, and the effect is to produce in him a sort of factitious maternal love, which endures like that of the hen, as long as the chicks have need of aid and protection." (Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, vol. II, 374.)

As Lewes says: "The profounder view of Cabanis, which regarded mind as one aspect of life, was replaced by the old metaphysical conception of *le Moi*—the Ego—the immaterial entity playing upon the brain as the musician plays upon an instrument. Instinct was no longer regarded as determined by the organism* changing with its changes, rendered abortive by mutilations, and rendered active by stimulation; but as a 'mysterious principle' implanted in the organism; a 'something' which although essentially mysterious and unknowable, appeared perfectly well known to the metaphysicians." †

Lewes might well have had Hancock in mind when writing the above, for the views he complains of are the ones defended vigorously by Hancock.

After an examination of the views of the physiologists, Hancock summarizes them as follows: "Some have considered that a material structure or simple arrangement of organs endowed with the principle of life or living organic structures possessing vital properties give rise to all the phenomena of which we see the brutes to be capable, and that it is not necessary to have recourse to a principle which they affirm to be mysterious and inexplicable like that of instinct." ‡

These views he could not tolerate. For they not only attacked the justice of God, but, much worse,

* Here Lewes seems to seek support for his views from earlier ones, but as we have seen, the reaction he complains of is simply a reversion to older metaphysical conceptions.

† *Ibid.*, vol. II, 375.

‡ Hancock, *On Instinct*, II.

they made for scepticism. To think that God would put man in this world and hold him responsible for his deeds, without an innate moral guide, is but to question the justice of God; while the implication that the organization of an animal is self-sufficient to account for its behavior makes the interposition of God no longer necessary, and as a result makes for scepticism and perhaps even atheism.*

When naturalistic interpretations are regarded in this way, it is easy to understand that they would arouse a storm of opposition. The view which regards behavior as due to divine guidance, or as the result of mysterious principles that are open to no investigation, is more heartily accepted. These are the explanations that Hancock prefers. He therefore quotes Addison with approval:

"For my own part, I look upon instinct as upon the principle of gravitation in bodies, which is not to be explained by any known quality inherent in the bodies themselves, nor from the laws of mechanism, but, *according to the notions of our greatest philosophers*, is an immediate impression from the First Mover and Divine energy acting in the creatures."

In a like manner Reid explains the wonderful work of hive-building by the bees as God working through the bees: "We must therefore conclude that, although the bees act geometrically, yet they understand neither the rules nor the principles of the arts which they prac-

* *Ibid.*, 265, 130.

tise so skilfully; and that the geometry is not in the bee, but in the great Geometrician who made the bee, and made all things in number, weight, and measure.”*

This is the conception of instinct that Hancock defends. Thus, he writes: “We shall have the opportunity of referring *instinct* to its proper source—the pervading influence of Deity in his works.” No wonder he quotes with approval from Boyle’s dissertation on *The Soul of Brutes*: “Deus est anima brutorum.”

At first glance it seems strange that man’s feelings of worth should be magnified through acclaiming his inability to account for the behavior of brutes along with his own. It seems that he should take pride in knowing. Yet he takes delight in proclaiming his impotence to fathom the springs of behavior. It would seem that he delights to humble himself.

This humility, however, is more apparent than real, for it consists largely in attributing his ignorance to the fact that those things of which he is ignorant are locked in the secrets of Divine mystery. At the same time he claims considerable knowledge about the secrets of God’s mind. Thus man at one stroke humbles himself in order that he may be exalted. For the difficulties of investigation are substituted acts of faith. But acts of faith seem even more heavily laden with feelings of satisfaction than knowledge itself. His delight in proclaiming his inability to know saves him the labor of investigation, and at the same time pro-

* *Ibid.*, 20.

vides him with an opportunity to enjoy the exhilarating effects of a devout act of piety.

An illustration of this is furnished in the delight Garratt takes in declaring the worthlessness of speculations regarding the nature of instincts, and his willingness to leave all problems of this nature where they should be left by all men of faith: "Much has been written by the ablest pens, and no less profuse by the most profound in philosophy, as to the nature or essence of instinct, and the manner by which it operates; and we think all to no purpose. Both subjects are exceedingly obscure, and we have seen no light thrown upon it, nor shall we expect to see any, for our belief is that it was never intended that the human mind should explore them. We shall have little to say upon these questions which shut up all investigators to despair." "And though they bewilder the sceptic, their mysteries are no source of worry to the man of faith. He knows where to rest them in safety."*

I have presented in the foregoing the explanations of behavior in terms of metempsychosis and in terms of impressions from an ancestor or from God. The first is founded on belief in reincarnation. According to this view, the individual in the course of his many incarnations acquires a mass of wisdom and impulses which are manifested in this life. Consequently, any difficulty that may be encountered in understanding the behavior of the individual in question is easily

* *The Marvels and Mysteries of Instinct*, 28, 267.

banished by regarding it as due to the experiences undergone in another existence. The latter explanation is based on the assumption that ancestors or God from time to time assume control of the individual. According to this conception, the strange or unusual behavior is regarded as due to an impression from a spirit or from God. Both conceptions provide a fund of ready-made explanation to meet any possible difficulty.

It is hardly necessary to point out objections to these interpretations of behavior. In the first place, we encounter the same difficulties in attempting to account for the experiences of another incarnation that we do in accounting for experiences in this one. Nor is it any easier to understand the mind of spirits than our own. In the attempt to answer the question, Why does the ancestor give this impression at this time? we are led to transfer the problems of psychology to another realm without any appreciable advantage. In fact, it should be apparent that explanations of this nature consist largely in explaining one Unknown by another Unknown raised to the n th power. Nor do explanations of this nature provide us with the means to control and predict behavior. Spirits may be persuaded, but at best they are notional, and we can never tell whether they will act as we wish or not. Hence, they are not satisfactory as an explanation, for what we should seek in an explanation are the factors which will provide us not only with the key to prediction but also, if possible, to control.

For these reasons explanations of this order have ceased to exert any great influence on Western Thought. With the exception of the poets and the adherents of "New Thought" cults no one regards the individual as bringing with him into this world a mass of experience acquired by him in a previous incarnation. Nor is it longer felt in scientific circles that explanations in terms of impressions from God are satisfactory. The inadequacies of these explanations have resulted in their abandonment. But we still cling to conceptions closely akin. These latter conceptions have sprung up around the theory of evolution.

Instead of regarding the individual as acquiring a mass of psychic dispositions as the result of *his* experience in other worlds, the individual is regarded as born with a mass of ready-made impulses acquired by the *species*. The species makes the acquisitions, but they influence no less profoundly the behavior of the individual. The individual is no longer regarded as remembering the experience, but he acts the experience none the less. Hence, as far as the behavior is concerned, there is still assumed back of it a mass of experience indefinitely extended, which serves to provide a fund of ready-made explanations as great as that provided by metempsychosis.

Or, to compare the evolutionary interpretation of behavior with the theological, there has been substituted for the wisdom of God the wisdom of the species, and for the impressions of God have been substituted

impulses acquired by the species in the course of its adaptations to conditions long since passed.

Substitution of this order may be seen even in Darwin's writings through his acceptance of the theory of the inheritance of acquired characters. It is more clearly seen, however, in the writings of some of his followers. Maudsley's explanation of the spider's web furnishes an excellent example, which may be brought out most clearly by a comparison of Maudsley's explanation of the spider's web with Reid's explanation of the beehive.

It is to be recalled that when Reid found himself unable to account for the hive-making activities he referred them to the influence of "the great Geometrician" in the bee. When Maudsley is confronted with similar difficulties regarding the spider's web, he banishes them by making an appeal to the experience and wisdom of the species. Thus he writes:

"If the spider's web be not the accumulated design of past structural adaptations time out of mind, whence in a world of natural causes and effects has the achieved design come? Whence every animal instinct if it be not the fit and rational adaptations of self and not-self now fixed in structure—the incorporate memory in the individual of ancestral experiences through the ages?"*

This substitution may be clearly seen also in a comparison of Spencer's account of the innate moral ideas

* *Organic to Human: Psychological and Sociological*, 43.

with the conception of innate moral ideas as God-implanted.

This latter view Spencer criticises. Not because he does not believe there are innate moral ideas. He insists that they exist. It is the source of them that he questions. For the intuitionist, they were implanted by God; for Spencer, they are the result of the accumulated experience of the species. This substitution is clearly seen in the following: "Nor is it otherwise with the pure intuitionists, who hold that moral perceptions are innate in the original sense—thinkers whose view is that men have been divinely endowed with moral faculties; not that these have resulted from inherited modifications caused by accumulated experience." *

Perhaps one of the best examples of this substitution is provided in a comparison of the explanation of the connection of the pleasurable with the beneficial as advanced by Malebranche and by Sutherland.

According to Malebranche, it is to be remembered, the connection is a God-given one. Sutherland also feels that the connection requires an explanation. Why should we feel pleasure when benefited? A connection can be here only as a result of the slow process of adaptation of the species. So Sutherland insists. It is as a result of such adaptations that we feel pleasure when benefited. "Every pleasure," he says, "that we experience implies a sensation which, having always

* *Data of Ethics*, section 20.

been beneficial, we are inclined to continue or repeat, because our organisms as a necessary preservative quality have become adapted to respond to them in that way. The more ancient the date of the beginning of the adaptation, the more deeply and mysteriously implanted is the capacity of emotion that is connected therewith."*

How bleak must have been the existence of organisms before the species had accustomed themselves to react with pleasure to beneficial stimuli!

In the same paragraph from which the above is quoted, Sutherland makes use of conceptions similar to those of Plato in accounting for the pleasure we feel on seeing certain beautiful scenes.

According to Plato our joy at seeing a beautiful object is due to the recollection of the joy we experienced at seeing true beauty in heaven. According to Sutherland the joy we feel at seeing beautiful woodland scenes is due to the experiences of our ancestors in the woodland. Thus he writes: "Strange yearnings fill the soul at the deep rustle of the forest, unaccountable impulses at the sight of clear waters through which the sun glimmers up from sandy or pebble bottom. Those instincts of beauty to which the poet so constantly appeals are often somewhat latent; and, when they are at touch awakened, they leave the impression of echoes of a time when our race spent all its time in the open air, echoes vaguely recorded, per-

* *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, 92.

haps in the nerve adaptations from the time when man's progenitors dwelt in the forest or sea-margin."

Thus, if we should ask Plato why we feel pleasure on seeing a beautiful forest scene, he would tell us that it is due to the fact that it causes us to recollect our joy at beholding beauty in its eternal essence. If the same question should be asked Sutherland, he would reply that it is due to the fact that our ancestors spent a great deal of time amid such surroundings, and that as a consequence our organisms have grown accustomed to regard them with feelings of pleasure. For Plato the joy is due to our experience in another incarnation; for Sutherland it is due to our ancestors' experience.

If we accept the theory of plurality of incarnations, Plato's view becomes intelligible, for it is a common experience for us to feel joy and pleasure at the sight of an object which arouses in us certain memories or associations. It is natural to suppose that our own experience should at times be recalled and that it should affect us. Sutherland's view, however, is not so intelligible; for it is hard to understand how our ancestors' experience can affect us*—save, of course, as stimuli may be provided as a result of our ancestors'

* If one wishes to follow Samuel Butler in his bold defense of the thesis that each member of a species inherits memories of past vital processes and adaptations of the species, he may possibly make Sutherland's position intelligible. But short of this it is hard to make Sutherland's position intelligible. For statement of Butler's position see his *Unconscious Memory*.

activities. Both explanations are the result of artificial problems. Neither solves the problems satisfactorily.

The explanation of Plato seems to be due to an exaggeration of the difficulty so commonly experienced in trying to picture a true beginning or novelty. How can things begin to be? How can we acquire knowledge? How can we experience joy at beholding a beautiful object? These experiences can take place only as the result of reminiscences. What the mind experiences or gives rise to, must have been in the mind. The stimuli only call it forth. So Plato held.

A little thought, however, shows us that this does not help us over the difficulty. How did the soul make its acquisitions in a previous existence? The knowledge must have been acquired somewhere. The experience of joy must at one time have been novel. If they are regarded as originating in a previous existence, we wish to know at once why the experience should have given joy in that existence. The answer to this question would probably make it clear that the joy was then aroused for the same reason that the recollection of the joy is now supposed to give pleasure. But if this is true, then we may well abandon the conception of reminiscence, and explain the joy in terms of causes that are operative here and now. For there is no reason to suppose that joy and pleasure cannot begin in this incarnation. On the other hand, we know that they do begin here, for even pleasures

due to recollections have a beginning. This beginning must be due to causes that are operating here and now. Hence, the scene which is supposed to arouse pleasure by recollection may be regarded as amply sufficient to arouse the pleasure without the assumption that it had been experienced before.

The conception of Sutherland suffers from the same difficulties. There is no reason to suppose that the delight we experience at beholding a beautiful woodland is due to the fact that our ancestors experienced such delight, or even saw a forest. Such assumptions are quite worthless; for if our pleasure is due to the same causes that aroused it in our ancestors, there is no need to invoke ancestral experiences, since in both cases the same causes produce the same effects. On the other hand, if our pleasure is not due to the same causes, it is difficult to understand how the pleasure of our ancestors, induced in one way, can be used as an explanation of our pleasure induced in another.

In spite of these difficulties, which are common to all attempts to deny true beginnings here and now, whether they take the form of appeals to other incarnations or to ancestral experience, many appeals are made to phylogeny in the vain hope that the behavior of the individual may be explained in terms of the experience of the species.

Thus Frink explains the roughness of the lover as due to the period in the history of man in which it was necessary that he capture his bride.* Hall advances a

* *Morbid Fears and Compulsions*, 12-13.

similar explanation of the stages of bashfulness in boys and girls,* and lays down "the general psychonomic law, which assumes that we are influenced in our deeper and more temperamental dispositions by the life habits and codes of conduct of we know not what unnumbered hosts of ancestors, which like a cloud of witnesses are present throughout our lives, and that our souls are echo-chambers in which their whispers reverberate." †

Sometimes, according to Patrick, these whispers break out and we have the howl of glee. Indeed, these whispers or ancestral memories are used by him as an explanation of laughter. It is when these memories break through social conventions that we have laughter. Laughter, he holds, "is a form of release, release from the galling grip of social claims. It is the ex-

* "While boys in general are more prone to showing off, they often incline in early adolescence a little toward modesty, and girls, usually a little more retiring at this period, now for a time become less so. Possibly this may be reminiscent of the time when the human female, formerly, like the female in the animal world, less beautiful than the male, by ornament or new access of attraction from nature became more so, and the initial forwardness of girls may be a rudiment of the age when the woman was the active agent in domesticating man and developing the family in the way Bachofen and Drummond suggest. On this view woman must once have had courtship proclivities for a long period, after as well as before motherhood. Her endeavor was to hold man by her attractions to his duties and responsibilities in the long years that preceded marriage, which clinched the obligations. Thus the inherited effects of the primeval desire to hold are now added, perhaps by tachygenesis, to the maiden desire to win him. If this be correct, modern woman's wish to please is a survival of the not yet spent momentum of her culminating achievement in the great work of domestication." (*Psychology of Adolescence*, vol. II, 372-373.)

† *Ibid.*, 61.

pression of glee when we feel the cogs of civilization slip a little. It is the 'subconscious satisfaction' which we have in old racial memories by the perception of social lapses of all kinds."*

The assumption that ancestral memories of this sort profoundly influence the behavior of the present generation is the basis of Patrick's explanation of the play of children and many of the desires and impulses of adults. Thus he writes regarding the play of children:

"The mental habits of the child seem like echoes from the remote past, recalling the life of the cave, the forest, the stream. The instinct exhibited in infancy to climb stairs, ladders, trees, lamp-posts, anything, reminds us of forest life. The hide-and-seek games which appeal so powerfully to even the youngest children recall the cave life of our ancestors, or at least some mode of existence in which concealment from our enemies, whether human or animal, was the condition of survival; while the instinct of infants to gravitate to the nearest pond or puddle, the wading, swimming, fishing, and boating proclivities of every youngster, seem like the reminiscences of the time when our fathers lived near or by means of the water."†

* *Psychology of Relaxation*, 107. This explanation is closely akin to Bergson's, which he quotes with approval. According to Bergson, to laugh "seems as if an appeal had been made within us to certain ancestral memories belonging to a far-away past—memories so deep-seated and foreign to our present life that the latter seems something unreal and conventional, for which we shall have to serve a fresh apprenticeship." (*Laughter*, 157.)

† *Ibid.*, 54.

To interpret the behavior of the individual in terms of the race's experience, the behavior need not be similar. Thus Patrick accounts for the pleasure we have in speeding cars as a result of the fact that speed was necessary when man had to escape dangers by flight and catch his food in pursuit. In the same way, Wallas, when he wishes to account for the fear that is experienced on coming suddenly into the presence of a sovereign, makes use of the happy thought that if our ancestors had not shown the paralyzing effect of fear of this sort on coming suddenly upon a bear, lion, or cuttlefish, they would have been devoured. Our ancestors when they came upon a cuttlefish suddenly were unable to move on account of fear. Therefore, when the modern man comes upon his king suddenly he too is paralyzed by fear!*

One of the great hopes that lie back of the use of our ancestors' experience to account for our behavior is that our behavior may be made intelligible through the intelligible adaptations of the species. That is to say, many impulses and acts of man appear to us irrational. We cannot understand them. If they could only be rationalized in the light of a greatly extended experience, we could understand. If the acts that appear to us irrational were once necessary, then they would become clear.

Thus the play impulses of children are accounted for as the necessary responses of man to primitive

* *Human Nature in Politics*, 34.

conditions of living. The love of racing in high-power cars becomes intelligible when we remember that fleetness was once a condition of survival. The courtship proclivities of women become intelligible when we remember that formerly woman had to win the man. The fear a man experiences in the presence of his king becomes intelligible when we remember that fear was the condition of survival in the presence of the cuttlefish. The love of man for hunting and fishing, his tendency to tease and bully, become intelligible when we remember that hunting and fishing were once the means of providing self and family with food, and so on. It is thus as a result of the experience and adjustments of our ancestors that we have come into possession of a store of impulses which cause us to act in all sorts of irrational ways.*

The use of intelligible adaptations to account for acts that seem irrational is admirably illustrated by the use that Crile makes of the necessity which compelled our ancestors to hunt and fish to account for the pleasure that we experience in such "irrational" modes of behavior.

That a man of wealth should face the discomforts

* It is in line with this that Wallas holds that man is born with a mass of dispositions related intelligibly to a world of tropics in which he spent so large a part of his existence. (*The Great Society*, 61.)

All writers do not recognize that, even though our instincts may be the "rational" and intelligible responses to certain conditions, they are not necessarily the "rational" responses to present conditions. For example, according to Parker, they are the tried and efficient guides to conduct—no matter how irrational and embarrassing they may appear. (*The Casual Laborer*, 133.)

involved in hunting or fishing seems to Crile irrational. Such irrational behavior requires an explanation. Instead of looking for it, however, in the experience of the individual, he makes an appeal to the history of the race. He thus finds that at one time hunting and fishing were necessary in order to procure food. Consequently, as a result of this necessity, he holds that man still takes pleasure in these pastimes, and feels the same excitement on catching a fish that his remote ancestor did, even though the ancestor's life may have depended on the catch, and even though the modern man may be in no need for food.

"How suggestive is it that man, possessing vast fortunes and surrounded by every luxury, frequently yearns to hunt and to fish, to be dirty and hungry and wild, to stalk and to kill, caring not at all for the discomfort or the flight of time—that thus easily his civilized veneer may be dispossessed by the spirit of the savage recall. It is the savage in him that is throwing all his resources into the task of catching and killing his prey; and when at last the salmon or trout is hooked, what a display of excitement over the conquest! It is as if a life were at stake.

"This is not strange when we recall that on innumerable occasions the life of the fisherman's progenitors must have depended upon the catching of a single fish. Those individuals who did not exert themselves sufficiently to provide food for themselves were destroyed by the more industrious beasts and left no progeny.

The almost universal excitement of man in the presence of wild game testifies to the tragic seriousness of the ancestral hunt. It is, indeed, a strong and deep savage instinct that can with ease dispossess the brain of business, ambition, worry, and care.”*

A somewhat similar use of impulses that are the results of the “rational” behavior of the species is made by Thorndike to account for the seeming “irrational” behavior of men to-day. This is seen in the use he makes of the hunting instinct, which he holds grew up under conditions that made hunting, if not necessary, at least an appropriate method of securing food, to explain such irrational acts as teasing, bullying, cruelty, hounding of Quakers, and so on.

It seems as if he feels it strange that children should wish to tease each other. Since he cannot give a rationalistic interpretation of such behavior in terms of the individual’s experience, he makes use of the species’ experience in order that he may rationalize it in the light of this greatly extended experience. These are the assumptions that seem to underlie the following explanation of teasing, bullying, etc.:

“The presence of this tendency in man’s nature under the conditions of civilized life gets him little food and much trouble. There being no wild animals to pursue, catch, and torment into submission or death, household pets, young and timid children, or even aunts, governesses, or nursemaids, if sufficiently yield-

* *A Mechanistic View of War and Peace*, 53-54.

ing, provoke the response from the young. The older indulge the propensity at great cost of time and money in hunting beasts, or at still greater cost of manhood in hounding Quakers, Chinamen, scabs, prophets, or suffragettes of the non-militant variety. Teasing, bullying, cruelty are thus in part the results of one of nature's means of providing self and family with food; and what grew up as a pillar of human self-support has become so extravagant a luxury as to be almost a vice." *

Thus Crile explains the love of hunting and fishing in terms of the necessities of our ancestors. Thorndike uses the same necessities to account for the teasing of children and the hounding of Quakers!

In spite of the ridicule Thorndike heaps upon the use of instincts as "magic potencies," which have the power of being aroused by a multitude of situations and of expressing themselves in many ways,† the use he here makes of the hunting instinct seems to be a recall of "magic potencies" in its worst form. Elsewhere he very rightly maintains that there is no advantage in invoking various agencies to connect various stimuli with various responses. This, however, is what he here does. The hunting instinct, which grew up in the race as a rational adaptation, now becomes an agency to connect many stimuli with many *irrational* modes of behavior.

* *Educational Psychology*, vol. I, 53.

† Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, vol. I, 12-15; 210.

The use McDougall makes of instincts as explanations of behavior is more far-sweeping. All activity, he holds, is the result of instincts. Thus he writes: "Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose main-spring had been removed, or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that *maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies*, and in them are we confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will."*

It is in line with the above that McDougall holds that for each activity there must be a corresponding instinct. Thus he tells us that we can never explain "why" men are at times bashful or show shame, unless we assume the existence of *an instinct of self-abasement*. The same necessity of an instinct is felt to account for the fact that we sometimes adopt the suggestion of others and at other times act counter to the suggestion. Behavior of this sort, he says, makes it necessary that we assume the existence of an instinct of suggestion and one of counter-suggestion. He does not tell us what *instinct* is responsible for intermediate courses which are neither according to the suggestion nor counter to it. Perhaps there should be an instinct of non-suggestion.

The question naturally arises regarding the source

* *Social Psychology*, 44.

or origin of the powerful drives McDougall posits. McDougall, in answer to this, makes use of two conceptions, namely, the evolutionary and an account based on vitalism. The latter may be regarded as supplementary to the former, for naturally, according to McDougall's view, if instincts are adaptations of the species, the species must have possessed certain *forces* in virtue of which it could act before the adaptations had taken place. This can be clearly seen in McDougall's account.

In his *Social Psychology* McDougall tells us that instincts are "innate specific tendencies of mind that are common to all members of any one species, racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of the species to their environment, and that can neither be eradicated from the mental constitution of which they are innate elements nor acquired by individuals in the course of their lifetime." *

To this account of the origin of the "powerful impulses that are necessary for activity," the obvious objection is that it fails to account for activity before the species had made their acquisitions. Before the evolution of the impulses, in virtue of what did the organism act? To answer this question, McDougall makes use of his vitalistic conceptions. Instincts are not merely adaptations of the species; they are the *forces* in virtue of which the organisms made their adaptations. In brief, instincts are for McDougall

* *Social Psychology*, 22.

differentiations of the Elan Vital, and it is as a result of their activities that the species have come to be what they are. Thus he writes:

"I hold that instincts are differentiations of the 'Elan Vital,' by means of which it pushes along diverging paths, creating by their agency the various great families of the animal kingdom; each animated by the great instincts common to all: the tendencies to seek food and to reproduce their kind; each also animated by special instincts characteristic of the group; each creating for its own service the bodily organs and nervous structures best suited to serve it as an instrument by means of which it may secure the satisfaction of its conative impulses."*

This control likewise plays an important part in the development of the embryo: "The embryo seems to be resolved to acquire a certain form and structure, and to be capable of overcoming very great obstacles placed in its path. There is something analogous to the persistence of any creature to achieve its ends or purposes, and the satisfaction of its needs under the driving power of instinctive impulse or craving. In both cases mechanical obstacles turn aside the course of events from the normal or direct path; but in whatever direction or in whatever manner the turning aside is caused, the organism adjusts itself to the changed conditions, and, in virtue of some obscure directive power, sets itself once more upon the road to its goal;

* *British Journal of Psychology*, vol. III, 259.

which, under the altered conditions, it achieves only by means of steps that are different, sometimes extremely different, from the normal.” *

We thus have a complete account of the origin of instincts: They are adaptations of the species. They are differentiations of the *Elan Vital*, which have directed the course of evolution. They are *obscure directive powers*, which watch over the development of the individual. How simply difficult problems are banished! The primitive man banishes them into the world of ancestral spirits; the modern, into “differentiations of the *Elan Vital*.”

Instincts are not only used by psychologists to rationalize the behavior of the individual by indefinitely extending his experience to embrace the experience of the species and to account for activity as a result of the *Elan Vital*. They are also used by social writers as guides to conduct and social programmes. Indeed, there is a wide-spread belief that the impulses which we possess as a result of the species' adaptations are of greater value than the impulses which we possess as a result of the adaptations that we ourselves have made. As a consequence it is widely held that we need only to follow the promptings of our instincts in order to live most satisfactorily.

Justification for this attitude is based on the assumption that we inherit a number of impulses, which have survived a long process of elimination in which

* *Body and Mind*, 242.

all the unfit have been rejected. The existing innate impulses are, therefore, regarded as the best that the species has been able to produce. Accordingly, they furnish us with the needed guides for ethics. That these impulses are of value is further evinced by the fact that we who possess them have been able to survive. If they had not been of value, we as a species would probably have disappeared. Hence, they may well be regarded as the true and tried companions of man during his long period of struggle.

The validity of this position does not rest on the assumption of the inheritance of acquired characters. It assumes only that there have been slight variations in man's innate characters. Some of these were good, others were not. The characters that were good, or which proved of value, survived. The others did not. As a result of this process of variation and selection going on for hundreds of thousands of years, man finds himself in possession of innate characters that have proved beyond reasonable doubt their genuine value.

We can in the light of the foregoing understand that there should have arisen in the species pleasurable sensations on doing the beneficial. The connection between the beneficial and the pleasurable becomes clear. What pleases us is what the species values. If this be true, then our natural inclinations receive a powerful sanction—for the species in its long history should certainly have learned what is good for its members. We need not be surprised, therefore, that the

competency of instincts to furnish us with true motives for conduct should be strongly urged.

This McIndoo does; according to McIndoo, the instincts represent the best tendencies that the past has been able to produce. They should, therefore, be taken as the keys to the good life, and should form the basis of our education. Thus he writes: "The highest laws of life, and therefore of education, are the laws whose foundations are on the bed-rock of instinctive tendencies, which represent the very best that the past has to offer the present; for these race tendencies are those courses that made for good in the lives of our forebears. Therefore a true knowledge of how best to educate the child must be obtained through a study of instinct as related to education."

In another place he declares that instincts "are the sum total of the survival values that have been selected from the spontaneous variations, through natural selection, in the struggle of the race for existence. They are the best that the past has to offer the future. On the stage of consciousness each one of these race tendencies or instincts must play its part and stamp its impress upon the life of the child. Thus the best that has survived from the experience of the race is recapitulated and laid down as the permanent stratification in the life of the child."*

In the above, instincts become *forces* which must leave their impress upon the child. It is not deter-

* *Instincts as Related to Education*, 62, 2.

mined just how these *forces* will make their impression. They may be thwarted and repressed in various ways, but none the less their force is going to be exerted. If it can be expressed naturally so much the better. It is in line with this that Hall holds: "The deep and strong cravings in the individual to revive the ancestral experiences and occupations of the race can and must be met, at least in a secondary and vicarious way."*

Of all the writers who are greatly impressed with the significance of instinct for ethics and the social sciences, none are more impressed than Parker and Veblen. According to these writers the instincts are all that the species has considered worth saving, and accordingly, "nothing falls within the human scheme of things desirable to be done except what answers to these native proclivities of man."†

Conceptions of this nature seem to rest on the assumption so clearly and boldly stated by Spencer, that, since all functions and bodily needs are the products of evolution, they must not only be of value, but that it is the duty of the moral man to give them due exercise or expression. "The truth that the ideally moral man," he writes, "is one in whom the moving equilibrium is perfect, or approaches nearest to perfection, becomes, when translated into physiological language, the truth that he is one in whom the functions of all

* *Psychology of Adolescence*, vol. II, 64.

† Parker, *The Casual Laborer*, 134; Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, I.

kinds are duly fulfilled. Each function has some relations, direct or indirect, to the needs of life: the fact of its existence as a result of evolution being itself a proof that it has been entailed, immediately or remotely, by the adjustment of inner to outer actions. Consequently, non-fulfilment of it in normal proportion is non-fulfilment of a requisite to complete life. If there is defective discharge of function, the organism experiences some detrimental result caused by the inadequacy. If the discharge is in excess, there is entailed a reaction upon the other functions, which in some way diminishes their efficiency.”*

On the basis of this he boldly declares: “Strange as the conclusion looks, it is nevertheless a conclusion to be here drawn, that the performance of every function is, in a sense, a moral obligation.”†

In the above I have presented briefly three interpretations of behavior that are quite different. Yet in these three interpretations, there are three striking similarities which should be pointed out. In the first place, all agree that in order to understand behavior it must be explained or interpreted in terms of experience somewhere acquired or undergone. In the second place, in each of these explanations of behavior, there is the tendency to regard the activity as the result of an *impulse* or *force*, manifesting itself in the observed behavior. And in the third place, the activities which are regarded as expressions of these *forces*—whether

* *Data of Ethics*, section 31.

† *Ibid.*, section 32.

the *force* be regarded as *mana*, an ancestor's spirit, impression from God, or a product of evolution does not matter—are endowed with a sort of sanction, which tends to justify them irrespective of their consequences.

The fact that the evolutionary interpretation of behavior shows these resemblances to more primitive explanations should not be regarded as detrimental to it. It may as well be regarded as an indication of the fact that man has for a long time been groping in the neighborhood of a true interpretation, and that he has only recently discovered it. The resemblances should be taken as an indication of general truth rather than of general error. To separate the true from the false is our task.

As has been said, where there is so much agreement we should expect to find a great deal of truth. In regard to the need felt to interpret behavior in terms of experience, this need is rightly felt. To understand purposive behavior, behavior which is the result of conation, it is necessary that we suppose back of the behavior a mass of ideas and desires born of the experience of the organism. Ideas and purposes presuppose experience. Apart from sight we have no idea of color. Apart from hearing we have no idea of sound. So it is with all ideas and with purposes. Back of them must lie a mass of experience. There is no mistake, then, in assuming that behavior, to be rendered intelligible, must be explained in terms of experience.

The mistake that is made is in extending the field of experience to include the experience the individual may have had in a previous existence, or to include the experience or wisdom of God, or to include the experience of the species. Such an extension of the range of experience is unwarranted. Granted that behavior must be interpreted in terms of experience, it must be in terms of the experience of the individual existing here and now. We have not at our call an unlimited mass of experience. We must confine ourselves to the experience about which we really have knowledge and which we can control. It is through knowledge of experience of this sort that we may hope to discover the true determiners of behavior.

The tendency to interpret behavior in terms of a *force* or impulse is not altogether in error. It has a basis in reality. It is true that forces and impulses are experienced in behavior. The mistake is in regarding the force in behavior as a *force*, apart and independent of the situation in which it is experienced.

The primitive man felt that nature was full of such *forces*, which existed in the form of *mana* or spirits. Whatever occurred could be viewed as the manifestations of these. The modern man no longer views nature animistically. Nature is robbed of her *forces*. Human behavior is no longer regarded as due to the influence of *forces* without the organism; it is viewed as the expression of *forces* within man. Without these *forces*, it is held, the human organism would lie as inert as

a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn. It is through the various *expressions of these forces* that behavior is to be understood. But the variety and uncertainty of these transformations and expressions become so great that we can tell little more regarding them than we can tell regarding the manifestations of the primitive man's spirits.

Both the primitive and modern man are wrong. There are no *forces*, which manifest themselves in various ways. The forces that are experienced are the forces that are born of the relation of the agent to his environment. The experience of the social forces of the group is of this sort. The force which the individual here feels is born of his contacts with his group, which, like all contacts, profoundly influence him, and bring into existence a world of new emotions and ideals.

Emotions and ideals of this sort are not to be regarded as individual products or as adequately accounted for as purely one's own. The mistake is not, then, in seeking the origin of these impulses outside of the individual. It is true that the origin is, in a sense, outside the individual; for they are due to the relations the individual sustains to his environment. The mistake is in regarding them as impressions from an ancestor or from God. The evolutionist makes a mistake equally as great when he regards them as due to impulses acquired by the species. There is no reason to regard the impulses as acquisitions of the species which are handed down to us. For in the last analysis they

must come into existence at one time, and there is no reason to limit this time to the remote past. The present affords as many opportunities for their origin as the past. Why should the stimuli in the past be endowed with such an efficiency that they bring into existence impulses, while the stimuli of the present act only to arouse them?

Plato's account of the æsthetic appreciations is interesting in this connection.

The third similarity found in explanations of behavior based on beliefs in metempsychosis, impressions from God, and in instincts is the deference paid to the hidden entities supposed to lie back of the behavior, regarded as a manifestation of the hidden entity.

When the *forces* lying back of behavior are regarded as urges from an ancestor, it is not surprising that they should be regarded reverently, and should carry great weight on account of their "pathos." Expediency also demands that such urges be given full consideration, for ancestors are powerful beings who are quick to resent any slight.

The speculations of Durkheim are interesting in this connection. If, as he points out, the experience that largely underlies religious conceptions is that of being influenced by a power or force that is recognized as nobler and more praiseworthy than those felt to be our own is true, there should be no difficulty in understanding that the acts which cannot be adequately interpreted in terms of the individual's capacities and

experiences should be regarded in a different way from those that can. For the power that is felt in these experiences is the power of the group. Accordingly, it carries the social approval, and is the power that causes the individual to consider the interest and good of the group rather than the concerns that are more nearly an expression of his egotistic desires. If, then, the enthusiasm and noble zeal for the social welfare, or if the intensification of life that results from contact with one's fellows, are the experiences that first aroused wonder and demanded an explanation in terms other than those of the individual's capacities and powers, it should not appear strange that the activities that seem to lie beyond the range of the individual's capacities should be reverently regarded. In fact, we have here, according to Durkheim, the distinction between the sacred and the profane.

If these speculations are taken seriously, we can readily understand that Plato, marvelling at the political virtues, should regard them as gifts of Zeus, and that moral philosophers, until quite recently, should have held that the individual at birth possesses a store of moral principles or ideas implanted by God. Since these moral principles are irreducible to selfish considerations, and since the individual to act in accordance with them sacrifices his own interest, if need be, they demand our respect, and they must be assigned a source other than in the selfish desires and interests of the individual.

Thus there is a genuine basis in reality for ascribing

to the activities that seem to lie beyond the individual's capacities and experiences an approval all their own. As long as they were regarded as due to impressions or habits infused by God, one did not go far wrong; for as such they were born of the social consciousness, and for the most part were reflections of the best moral tone of the age.

The same cannot be said of instincts when used to take the place of impressions of God to account for a certain class of our activities. Nevertheless, instincts have inherited a considerable share of the approval that formerly went with the interpretation of behavior in terms of ancestral or Divine interposition. Yet, as far as social conceptions and consequences are concerned, this use of instinct has effects that are quite the reverse of the effects that followed from the use of the discarded theories. The conceptions that have been abandoned exalted the social; for an impression from God had to show a certain label. Otherwise it was regarded as an impression from the devil. And, as has been said, they were usually the expression of the best moral consciousness of the age. The present use of instincts, on the other hand, exalts the incommunicable, the personal, the individual. For the chief mark of the instinctive is its deep-seatedness and persistence. To look to them for guidance, therefore, tends to lend justification to the satisfaction of the egoistic desires rather than to encourage the expression of the social virtues of man.

In the beginning the social virtues of man excited

his admiration and demanded an explanation. In time they came to be associated with instincts, with innate moral ideas implanted by God. The interpretations tended to exalt instinct and to give it a certain sanction and weight, and, in spite of the fact that the use of instinct has given rise to quite different effects from those it gave rise to in the beginning, it continues to enjoy the sanction thrown around it when it was associated primarily with the social virtues.

The sanction of instinct need not, however, be regarded as resting on speculations of this nature. The history of its use shows clearly many reasons for its strong appeal. The love of man for the mysterious, the desire to protect his moral worth against naturalistic interpretations, provides instinct with a great appeal. Not only is the moral worth of man safeguarded in this way, but the use of instinct, an unknown, an inscrutable, provides a safe basis for those feelings of personality which seem violated by analysis. Many seem to feel that personality becomes less valuable, that it becomes less real, if it is broken up into concepts, and its secrets exposed to the gaze of the public. Hence, the satisfaction that is found in a mysterious somewhat, an entity which cannot be analyzed but which notwithstanding provides a concept in terms of which behavior may be explained.

The conception of instinct has also grown to have a religious significance. When activities cannot be accounted for, it is held that they must be due to the

guidance of God. Hence, instincts were once popularly regarded as evidences of the controlling hand of Deity in all his works. The more difficulties that could be placed in the way of really understanding behavior, the more room for the guidance of God. Naturally, if instincts were regarded as impressions and direction from God, they carried a powerful sanction. What better guidance can one wish than direct guidance from Deity!

In addition to the "pathos" that has thus been thrown around instinct, science has stamped its approval on instincts as guides to conduct. It is true instincts are no longer regarded as impressions from God, but their guidance is none the less sure and trustworthy for this. They are the *forces* that have made for good in the lives of our forebears, they are the best that the past has to offer the present, they are the tendencies that have proved their worth by their long survival. Consequently, if we follow them, we cannot go far wrong.

Thus religion, philosophy, and science have united to throw around instinct a sanction so powerful that at times we are inclined to value an activity as an "expression" of an innate tendency, rather than in terms of its consequences. Or, if we fall short of this extreme position, we are so convinced that the "expression" of an instinct is good that merely the assertion that an activity is instinctive gives it a certain standing that goes a long way to silence all objection.

There is no wonder, then, that advocates of social programmes should seek the support of this powerful sanction. Nor is there any cause to wonder, in view of the indefiniteness and hidden nature of instinct, that contrary programmes may with a good deal of plausibility be defended by an appeal to instinct. Thus both the radical and conservative with equal assurance justify their attitudes and programmes as being in harmony with man's supply of instincts.

In the following chapter I shall undertake a discussion of instinct as a sanction, and criticise this use, granting the assumptions on which it is based. In the following chapters I shall proceed to an examination of the psychological assumptions that underlie this sanction. Through an examination of the fallacies of these assumptions I hope to remove from ethical discussions the "expression of an instinct" as a criterion for good, and to emphasize the truth that an act is good because of its effects, rather than because it is an "expression" of something or in obedience to a categorical imperative.

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CHAPTER III

INSTINCT AS A SANCTION

Moral responsibility is a pain and burden man has in vain sought to escape. Anything seems preferable to the assumption of moral responsibility. In his efforts to escape it man has invented many conceptions to lull his social consciousness to sleep. It is this desire that gave rise to the old conception of tribal responsibility. The individual could feel himself free—free in the sense of freedom from moral responsibility—since his acts and fate had already been determined by the acts and fate of his family. The same desire is largely responsible for the popularity of fatalism in the Orient. This desire is without doubt one of the great factors that make for the passive satisfaction and ease that go with the rigors of army discipline. The most rigid determinism seems preferable to the assumption of responsibility.

This desire to escape responsibility has also led man to invoke sanctions of various sorts. If he can only find something that will determine once for all what he should do in order to shift the responsibility of his acts to “sanctions,” “categorical imperatives,” or “moral principles,” he will have relieved himself from a great

load. It is so much easier to act in this way than to discover what is good.*

The desire of man to discover sanctions or unquestioned values and to act in accordance with them is not without advantages. Perhaps most of us act in a nobler way when we act in accordance with these values than when we try to determine the value of an act for ourselves; for "categorical imperatives" are usually the pronouncements of the best moral consciousness of the age. When one acts in accordance with them, he acts usually in accordance with the best principles of conduct that society has discovered.

"Categorical imperatives," sanctions, or unquestioned values not only have this advantage. In addition they save man the unbearable burden of forever deciding issues as they arise. Life would be needlessly complex and difficult if each issue had to be decided as it arose. "Moral principles," therefore, not only make for a high moral tone in our activities, but they aid us greatly in simplifying life's problems.

While this is true, "categorical imperatives" are full of dangers. In this they share a characteristic that is common to all commands that come to us from a hid-

* The tendency to place responsibility on some sanction or ethical concept finds an excellent illustration in the present use that is made of "democracy." "Democracy" is rapidly becoming a value that is not to be questioned. Since the above was written we have had furnished us a clear example of this in the speech of President Harding at Birmingham on the race question. The general attitude of that speech seems to have been: We must preserve our democracy regardless of consequences. Democracy has come to be such a treasured possession that all other values are sacrificed to it if need be.

den source, and that are obeyed irrespective of the consequences involved. It is in obedience to such commands that many of the worst crimes are perpetrated. In obedience to such commands nations have set out to extend their religion or culture to all the others, and have left in the wake of their armies only horror and desolation. It is in obedience to such commands that nations resent to the last man a slur on their "honor." It is in obedience to such commands that the "respectable" members of a community draw their clothes tightly around them as they pass the unfortunates who have committed a breach of their immutable law.

In these ways "categorical imperatives" have made for chauvinism, bigotry, narrowness, and lack of sympathy. They give such an assurance to one, regarding the rightness and justness of his acts, that it is hard for him to evaluate his activities in terms other than in those of a fulfilment of the supposed law. It thus happens that the development of the moral consciousness of an age is often hindered by premature crystallizations into immutable laws. One, therefore, should be very careful of all "categorical imperatives" and should use them with a considerable degree of caution.

In view of this great desire to escape moral responsibility by shifting it to moral principles and sanctions of various sorts, it is not surprising that the powerful sanction given instincts by common usage, religion, philosophy, and science should be used as a moral prin-

ciple to determine right and wrong. This use of instinct as a sanction shares in the evils that have been pointed out regarding the use of sanctions in general in so far as we tend to justify a course of behavior because it is instinctive, or an institution because it is regarded as rooted in or moulded by instinct, rather than in terms of the effect of the activity or institution.

In many respects, however, the use of instinct as a sanction gives rise to effects quite different from the effects that follow from the use of categorical imperatives. Categorical imperatives, as the products of reflection, are clear cut; and can be understood by all who will listen. Consequently, they make for definiteness and even narrowness in one's judgments. With instincts it is the reverse. Instincts are indefinite. There is no clear definition of the instinctive, much less is there clear understanding of what *instincts* would have. They are usually identified with the deep-seated, and are regarded as the sources of those activities that are the expressions of our real personality. They therefore exalt the personal and the incommunicable. As a consequence, they make sanctions too personal and indefinite to afford the common ground necessary for the building of a harmonious body of social practices and ideals.

This is admirably illustrated by the opposite justifications the radical and the conservative get from this use of instinct. The conservative sees in instinct the

justification of the existing order: the radical, a call to battle for the reconstruction of society.

This should not be surprising in view of the hidden nature of instinct. Since there is no definite criterion of the instinctive, and since instincts are supposed to be the deep-lying motive forces that form the basis of one's real personality, we should expect that this use of instinct should turn out to be more a justification to one's prepossessions than a guide to new ideas and conceptions.

Hence, the conservatives satisfied with existing institutions and customs regard them as expressions of instincts; for they are in answer to the cherished values and purposes of the conservative. Since existing institutions are what they have found of value and satisfactory, they hold the institutions are what human nature has found satisfactory. They are thus inclined to close their eyes to obvious evils in them; for they are willing to admit that the existing order is not perfect, but they insist that it is better than it would be if we dared to change it for an order less natural to human nature. Hence, they reject all innovations as contrary to human nature, and as likely to produce greater evils than those that are produced by the existing order, which is so clearly rooted in man's original nature.

With this confidence of the conservatives that institutions are rooted in original nature, there goes a supercilious toleration of reformers, and a calm as-

surance that their cherished institutions are assured perpetuation since they are rooted in original nature, safe and secure against any attack of the agitator. If one wishes to find an illustration of this he need but engage a small group of intellectuals in a discussion of the vital questions of to-day. If a radical change is suggested, there is sure to be some one in the group to pity the one making the suggestion for his ignorance of human nature, and to attempt to rule out the suggestion as counter to human nature. If this person happens to be inclined toward conservatism, he will at the same time prove conclusively to himself that the existing order will continue to exist—since human nature does not change.

In so far as this attitude rests on the assumption that our institutions are rooted and grounded in human nature, it is possible to invoke in its support the views of men whose opinions carry considerable weight. McDougall is a vigorous champion of this position. Indeed, McDougall does not hesitate to claim that all the complex mental life of society is determined and shaped by man's native equipment of instincts and capacities.* In line with this, he tells us that we may be quite sure that in a nation of long-settled population the customs and institutions will be a reflection of the innate tendencies of the people, for the innate characters of a people, so situated, may be regarded as exerting a selective influence on all cultural modifica-

* *Social Psychology*, 18-44.

tions and variations which have taken place. The variations that were distasteful were eliminated, while those that were pleasing were favored and were allowed to evolve further. As a result of this process of cultural variation and selection by the innate characters of the race, the institutions at last come to represent to a great extent the innate tendencies of the population.*

The authority of Thorndike may likewise be invoked in support of the thesis that institutions and customs are rooted in our original nature. According to Thorndike, "The behavior of man in the family, in business, in the state, in religion, and in every other affair of life is rooted in his unlearned original equipment of instincts and capacities."† "Human intercourse and institutions are as surely rooted and grounded in original nature as man's struggle with the rest of nature for food and safety."‡

Marshall is perhaps of all writers the most firmly

* *The Group Mind*, 157. McDougall's conception here is quite similar to that of Sumner's regarding the natural selection of customs and taboos: "It is never correct to regard any one of the taboos as an arbitrary invention or burden laid on society by tradition without necessity. Very many of them are due originally to vanity, superstition, or primitive magic, wholly or in part, but they have been sifted for centuries by experience, and those which we have received and accepted are such as experience has proved to be expedient." (Sumner, *Folkways*, Par. 440.) Both conceptions must carry comfort to the conservatives.

† *Educational Psychology*, vol. I, 4.

‡ *Ibid.*, 181. It should be pointed out that, in the first statement, Thorndike probably means little more than to emphasize the fact that whatever a man does his behavior will be the result of his innate characters and training, and that as a consequence whatever we wish to do to

convinced that our institutions and customs are reflections of our innate tendencies. According to him men naturally and automatically obey laws against murder, adultery, and theft. "It is clear, then," he writes, "that these ethical impulses against lying, theft, murder, and adultery are of instinctive origin, although they are of late origin and have arisen only co-ordinately with the advance of higher civilization." * There are even instincts of patriotism and for a monogamous marital life. Yet in spite of the instinctive foundations for our moral and ethical attitudes, he tells us that some writers have found it easy to make men believe they act as they do from motives of self-interest. For this reason it is difficult to show men that "the laws they follow would not exist did they not fit in with the social impulses of instinctive origin." †

If our institutions, customs, moral ideas, and culture in general are in answer to innate tendencies and desires, they may well be regarded as amply justified. For what further justification can we wish for them than that they answer to human desires and needs? After all, that is their purpose. They are to serve human needs, and what serves them is, at least from the

society or the individual should be done with reference to original nature. It is the point of view of the present essay that in view of the great variety of cultures there is little advantage in *rooting* them in original nature. Since, however, the behavior of man is profoundly modified and determined by the institutions and customs of his group, it follows there is no great advantage in *rooting* the individual's behavior in his original nature.

* *Instinct and Reason*, 150.

† *Ibid.*, 172.

human point of view, satisfactory; for we as human beings can have only human likes and dislikes. Nor should we wish our morals and customs to be otherwise. They should be in answer to our needs—just as the morals and customs of a lion should be in answer to the needs and desires of a lion.

In so far as it is held that institutions and customs should express our innate tendencies, the reformer or radical agrees with the above. He takes exception, however, to the statement that institutions are so rooted. In fact, instead of regarding them as an expression of our innate tendencies, he regards them as repressions of them. It is on account of these repressions that social evils exist and the individual is denied the full development that is his by right. As an antidote to these evils, he urges a full release of the instinctive energies of man, and a working over of our social organization so that this may become possible.

The radical has no difficulty in making a very plausible protest against existing culture as being ill adapted to our supply of innate characters. In fact, the same argument which shows the relevance of instincts for ethics may be used to show that man is not adapted to existing culture. The conclusion of the radical seems the natural one to draw from the argument.

This argument, it is to be remembered, rests on the assumption that man inherits, as the result of long periods spent in subhuman stages of development and in states of savagery, a number of instincts, and it holds that as a result of this long process of adapta-

tion (whether brought about by the direct adaptation of the species to its environment or by the selective influence of the environment on the spontaneous variations within the heredity chromatin) the instincts of man have at last been limited to those characters that are adapted to the conditions of living in which he has spent practically his whole career.

The environment of man has undergone profound changes during the last hundred years or so. Civilization is still young. As a result of the rapid change in culture, man finds himself with a culture that is far removed from the instincts that proved their fitness for survival in an environment extremely different from that in which they are expected to function. Since, however, it is not possible for us to change our instincts, it is urged that our institutions must be changed in order to suit our stock of innate and inherited impulses.

If our instincts are regarded as adaptations, or as adapted, to a life of savagery, it is not surprising that grave fears should be expressed regarding the fitness of human nature for civilization.* It is also easy to see

* "What is known of the earlier phases of culture in the life history of existing races and peoples goes to say that the initial phase in the life of any given social type, the phase of culture which prevailed in its environment when it emerged, and under which the stock first proved its fitness to survive, was presumably some form of savagery. Therefore the fitness of any given type of human nature for life after the manner and under the conditions imposed by any later phase in the growth of culture is a matter of less and less secure presumption the further the sequence of institutional change has departed from the form of savagery which marked the initial state of life history of the given racial stock." (Veblen, *Instinct of Workmanship*, 19-20.)

that, since instincts are supposed to be *forces* and guides that have made for good in the lives of our ancestors, the evils of the present society should be regarded as due to the thwarting and repression of instincts. Accordingly it is urged that we should allow our instincts to function *naturally*.*

Above all things, it is held that the thwarting or repression of them must be prevented.† The creative energies of man must be released. If this is done, human nature may be trusted to express itself in the ways that will be most satisfactory to the human race.

This attitude finds an excellent illustration in Parker, who holds that man inherits all his motives and desires. "Man is born into this world accompanied by a rich psychical disposition, which furnishes him ready-made all his motives for conduct, all his desires economic or wasteful, moral and depraved, crass or æsthetic. He can show a demand for nothing that is not prompted by this galaxy of instincts." ‡

In spite of the claim that all motives are furnished by instincts "ready-made," he does not hesitate to claim that all instincts have value no matter how unreasoning and irrational they may *appear to us*—for they are the modes of conduct that have made for good in the lives of our ancestors.§

* See Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, and Parker, *The Casual Laborer*.

† See Laski, *The Pluralistic State*, *Philosophical Review*, 1919, and Follette, *Community as a Process*, *Philosophical Review*, 1919.

‡ *The Casual Laborer*, 133.

§ *Ibid.*, 135.

He admits that at times it may be necessary to repress one of these instinct motives. This, however, is highly unfortunate, as it is sure to entail a loss somewhere. In fact, we may infer from his writings that the repression has become necessary as a result of the corrupting influence of society. It is as a result of the injustices and thwarting influence of society that men act criminally.*

It is when society attempts to balk the expression of the instinctive tendencies that there is aroused in man an unreasoning revolt, which upturns if possible the restrictions.† How seriously he regards the evils of repression and the consequent revolt may be seen in the following:

“The instincts and their emotions coupled with an obedient body lay down in scientific and exact description the motives which must and will determine human conduct. If a physical environment sets itself against the expression of these instinct motives, the human organism is fully and efficiently prepared for a tenacious and destructive revolt against the environment, and if this antagonism persist, the organism is ready to destroy itself and disappear as a species if it fails of a psychical mutation, which would make the perverted order endurable.”

Quite similar views are expressed by Wallas. According to Wallas man suffers from a state of “balked” disposition, because the impulses, inherited from a

* *Ibid.*, 95.

† *Ibid.*, 159.

previous stage of culture, are not adequately stimulated. For example, in savagery there was an abundance of fear-exciting stimuli. In modern society there are few. Consequently, man suffers from a store of pent-up fear impulse, which should be released. As a result man has to invent many situations in order that this state of "balked" disposition may be relieved. Hence, the popularity of the aerial railways, which serve as an admirable release for the expression of the fear impulse.*

Another illustration of "balked" disposition, Wallas thinks, is afforded in the unsatisfactory condition of children in charity schools. Children so reared are denied the gratification of the instinct for property. As a consequence of this thwarting of an instinct, *the children suffer from bad health and character*. To improve these, one need but allow the children to own trinkets of various sorts. But if this is not done we may be sure the ill effects that arise from a state of "balked" disposition will continue.†

Taking this a step further, Hocking bases the right of society to exist on the assumption that its existence is necessary for the full development of the instinct of the will to power. Putting this in Wallas's language: Without society the instinct of will to power could not be satisfied. Consequently, states of "balked" disposition would arise. Therefore society has a right to exist. Thus society is endowed with the right to exist

* *The Great Society*, 89.

† *Human Nature in Politics*, 36.

because it acts as a suitable stimulus to bring about the complete development of the individual.* To such an extent has been the group opposed to its members!

The foregoing attitudes seem to be based on the following assumptions:

(1) The evils of society are largely due to the repressions that are practised.

(2) If instincts were allowed to function *naturally* most evils would be eliminated.

(3) The maximum development of one's innate capacities and tendencies is desirable.

I wish to examine these assumptions in the order given.

On account of our romantic conceptions regarding original nature, repression has come to have an ugly sound. When an impulse is repressed we are inclined to believe that stubborn and blind society is blocking the expression of a tendency that would be of great worth if allowed to function *naturally*. On the other hand, if it is not allowed this expression, we are taught to believe that it becomes a hidden evil, which works its harm and destruction in the dark.

It does not seem to occur to many of us that the repressions of innate impulses may be necessary on account of the evil nature of the impulse—so convinced are we that the evil is due to the repression.

Perhaps Freud has done as much as any one to make us realize the evils of repressions. Yet he clearly

* *Human Nature in Its Remaking*, 208.

recognizes the necessity of them for the moral life, and those who are inclined to charge all our evils to repressions would do well to ponder the following statement by him:

"Whenever the community suspends its reproach, the suppression of evil desires also ceases, and men commit acts of cruelty, treachery, deception, and brutality, the very possibility of which would have been considered incompatible with their level of culture."*

It is because we did not recognize the social nature of the moral, and the rôle that the repressions of society plays in maintaining the moral life of the community, he says, that we became so shocked at the deeds of soldiers. We felt that the soldiers had degenerated, that they had fallen, when as a matter of fact they acted as they did only because they were encouraged "to withdraw for a time from the existing pressure of civilization and to sanction a passing gratification of their suppressed impulses."†

Parker acknowledges a debt of gratitude to Freud for his insight into the labor unrest among the I. W. W.'s. He makes a similar acknowledgment regarding the works of Thorndike. Yet he does not seem to have been affected in the least by the warnings of these writers against his romantic conception of human nature. The warning of Freud has already been indicated. That of Thorndike is equally as strong.

* *Reflections on War and Peace*, 15.

† *Ibid.*, 29.

Thorndike does not hesitate to state that some innate impulses should be crushed and if possible eliminated, for some innate characters are good and some are evil. Sufficient proof of this statement he thinks is to be found in the fact that original nature includes such tendencies as maternal love, curiosity, and cruelty.*

When one thinks of the great variety in the tendencies in original nature, the tendency on the part of young children to torture young animals, to tease each other, the cruel impulses in adults, the impulses to lie, steal, and kill, one should not hesitate to conclude that the repressions are practised on account of the evil nature of innate impulses rather than evil being the result of the repressions. If all our impulses were good, there would be no greater attempt to suppress them than there is now to suppress maternal love. It is only because some impulses are evil that society practises repressions.

We should not be too hasty to conclude from this that repressions are invariably the repressions of evil instincts. It is quite possible that some instincts are repressed which should not be, and that others are repressed in unwise ways. On the other hand, it is certain that, if all impulses were allowed full freedom, the resulting evils would be many times greater than those that are caused by repressions.

It is, however, the claim of those who put great em-

* *Educational Psychology*, vol. I, 271.

phasis on the evils of repressions that evil results, even though we may not be able to detect it, and that the need of the expression of innate tendencies is real, even though the expression may *appear* irrational and even harmful. The fact that the tendencies are products of evolution is sufficient proof of their value. If we are unable to detect their value, this is not to be taken as an indication of the fact that they are of no value, but rather as an indication of the fact that our knowledge is limited and powers of perception dull. So believers in a Universe ordered by a Transcendental power making for good have always held. We may well be unable to pierce the veils of mystery and see the good behind phenomena that appear to us evil, but we may be quite sure that the good is discoverable if we could only see through the mystery.

This is the attitude of the evolutionist, who seems to think that the operation of the law of the "survival of the fit" has been so perfect that all the unfit have been eliminated. It is from such assumptions that instincts get a powerful sanction. But such assumptions should not be accepted uncritically. Nature does not seem so economical in her works as to make all her modifications and products of use. It seems true rather that she makes millions of products for the mere love of creation, and far from it being true that only the useful survive, all tend to survive unless driven to the wall by competition or by an insurmountable obstacle. Of what use is the tendency or instinct

of certain ants to rear the larvæ of beetles, in spite of the fact that the beetles eat the young ants, or the tendency of the moth to fly into the flame and to death?

We cannot infer therefore that a tendency or impulse is good because it has survived. Of what use are the paroxysms of fear which we experience when confronted suddenly with an overwhelming danger? They serve only to inhibit effective response to the situation. Yet they have survived. All we can infer, then, from the fact of survival is that the survivors have not been loaded too heavily with harmful tendencies, that they have not been confronted with competition too severe or obstacles which proved insurmountable. All we can say regarding a tendency, on the basis of survival, is that it was not sufficiently harmful to bring about the destruction of the species. Let no one urge, therefore, that since the tendencies have survived they are useful.*

Such considerations as these, however, have little

* J. B. Watson gives an excellent criticism of the views here criticised. He writes: "With the discovery on the one hand that Darwinian fluctuations are not inherited, and on the other that new characters appear suddenly, due possibly to the direct action of the environment upon the germ cells, there has come about necessarily a marked change in our conception of the function of natural selection. In the first place, the mutation hypothesis has relieved the investigator of the burden of attempting to find adaptative value in the various activities of animals, and has allowed him to examine his behavior without preconceived notions. It is now admitted that adaptation, the fitness of the organism for the conditions of life, is by no means so perfect as has been supposed; more and more characters, studied in natural surroundings, are found to be quite indifferent, to offer no discoverable advantage to the organism possessing

weight with the romanticist. If the expression of innate tendencies result in evil, it is because they have been placed in an artificial environment, and prevented from expressing themselves *naturally*. If we would permit them to function *naturally*, then the good for which they exist would become apparent.* It is therefore urged that the instincts be given an opportunity to function *naturally*.

The difficulty here is that there is no clear definition of the *natural*. Some seem to mean by it the primitive adaptations of the organism, that is, the adaptations of the organism to primitive conditions of living. Others seem to mean by it the needs and desires which are most intimately related to our bodies. By others it is regarded as the fundamental. Still others seem to regard the *natural* expression as the undirected response—a *laissez-faire* attitude.

Though there may be this lack of agreement regard-

them. What does it matter whether the snail's shell is twisted to the right or to the left; whether the pigment of the elytra of the beetle be arranged in continuous or broken lines; whether the young noddy is gray or white? The answer of the extreme selectionist has always been: 'I do not know the value of the character, but it must have worth. Otherwise it could not exist.' But the discovery that in the species of butterflies two distinct types of females, widely different in color, may live side by side, each breeding true in Mendelian ratios, quickly raises the question whether the coloration of these insects has any protective or selective value. Such cases of seemingly indifferent characters might be multiplied indefinitely." (Watson, *Behavior*, 167-168.)

* This is not a valid conclusion, for it does not follow that since evil results from one mode of expression that good will follow from another. This conclusion would not be warranted if there were only two modes. It is all the less warranted on account of the numerous ways an instinct may function.

ing the meaning of the *natural*, there is general agreement among this group of writers that the evils of our society are due to the artificial setting of our instincts; and that in order to remedy the evils we must provide a more *natural* setting for them. That such programmes suffer from indefiniteness should be apparent from a consideration of the lack of agreement regarding the *natural*.*

The tendency to identify the *natural* with the primitive is seen in many of the writers referred to in the above. It is the assumption that Wallas makes when he states that the instincts are related intelligibly to the conditions that confronted our remote ancestors. It is the assumption that Veblen makes when he expresses fear of the fitness of present institutions, since man is *naturally* adapted to a state of savagery.

The tendency to identify the *natural* with the primitive finds expression in Hall's attitude toward what he terms the artificiality of manhood and the naturalness of youth. One can almost hear in the following a "back to nature" plea—or at least the stuff out of which such pleas are made:

* "When traditional custom or constituted authority comes to be unsatisfactory to certain more reflective minds, there arises a discrepancy between it and what seem to be the natural instincts or feelings of the individual, a discrepancy between law and conscience; and so, as we have seen, reformers try to go back to an authority more venerable than parliaments and kings; more venerable even than immemorial usage; they 'appeal from tyranny to God,' from the mere custom of the multitude to the feelings that nature has implanted in the breast of each of us. The unfortunate thing is that these instinctive feelings differ so much in different persons." (Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, 85.)

"Our sentiments are oversubtilized and sophisticated and reduced to puny reactions to music and appreciation of art, that are nine parts of criticism and one part of appreciation. What we have felt is second-hand, bookish, shop-worn, and the heart is parched and bankrupt." "Happily for our craft, the child and youth appear at the truly psychological moment, freighted, as they are, body and soul with reminiscences of what we were so fast losing. . . . Despite our lessening fecundity, our overschooling, 'city-fiction,' and spoiling, the affectations we instil and the repressions we practise, they are still the light and hope of the world especially to us, who would know more of the soul of man and would penetrate to its deeper strata and study its origins." *

It would seem, then, from the above views that man is better adapted to primitive life, that is, to a life of savagery, than to our own. What we should do, then, is to modify our culture in such ways that it will provide once more the environment to which our instincts adjusted themselves in the remote past. We should not settle this question by *a priori* reasoning. For on the one hand there are the reasons just stated. On the other hand, it seems unreasonable to suppose that man is better adapted to a culture which he leaves than to one which he has created. The fact that he abandons one way of living for another should be evidence that the preferred way is a way that answers more completely his needs and desires.

* *Psychology of Adolescence*, vol. II, 59, 60.

An examination of primitive culture lends weight to the latter supposition. We should not let the romanticism of those who plead in various ways for a "back to nature" lead us to regard the life of man in primitive culture as ideal. There is a popular fancy which pictures the life of primitive man as free from restraints. In a sense he is free from many of the restraints that bind us. His limited feelings of personality find adequate expression in the customs of his tribe. His interests are limited to his group. He has no feeling of humanity.* Naturally, then, he is spared many of the moral conflicts and feelings of restraint that we experience. We should not conclude, however, that the lack of moral conflicts or restraints is due to the perfection of primitive man or to the perfection of his environment and adjustments. We need to guard ourselves against this, for there is always a tendency to regard the absence of moral restraint as evidence of moral perfection. It is thus that the modern Shintoist concludes that the first inhabitants of the world were pure and holy because they are represented as a people who had no moral commandments.

Absence of moral restraint is not necessarily an indication of moral perfection or of an ideal adjustment.

* "Neither primitive nor totemic man shows the faintest trace of what we should strictly speaking call humanity. He gives evidence merely of attachment to the nearest associates, of horde or tribe, such as is foreshadowed even among animals of social habits. In addition, he exhibits a friendly readiness to render assistance when danger threatens at the hands of strangers." (Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, 471.)

It may as well be an indication of the absence of moral feelings. This is probably most often the case. Nowhere do we find such a complete absence of moral restraint as among the non-gregarious animals; yet no one would maintain that the moral life of a tiger is better suited to the needs of man than the moral life of man. Also, the lack of moral conflicts in man may often be due to the fact that he has not reached a stage of culture in which his good is identified with the good of the group. It is beyond doubt often due to the fact that the environment, both social and physical, in which he is placed presents so few possibilities for varied action that the necessary material for conflicts, that is, the balancing of one good against another, is not provided.

Primitive man may, then, for various reasons be free from feelings of moral restraint and from moral conflicts, and yet be none the better for the freedom. But, however much one may be inclined to value this freedom, it is more than offset in primitive culture by superstitious fears which make necessary suffering and tortures of all kinds. These fears seem to indicate that after all the primitive is not perfectly adapted or adjusted to his environment. If he were, why should he feel the necessity of subjecting youth to the cruel rites of initiation? Or why the cruel piacular rites? Or why do men inflict upon themselves unbelievable tortures? Why also the frequency of suicide? Why the selection of the insane to act as priests, shamans, or medicine-men?

The more deeply we penetrate into the life of primitive man, the darker and gloomier it becomes. We see there pictures of suffering voluntarily endured that seem beyond the power of man to bear. Yet the sufferings they inflict upon themselves, the rites they observe, and their horrifying fears of the world of spirits are no doubt the *natural* responses of human nature when subjected to the conditions in which these phenomena take place. But in spite of this these responses seem no less undesirable and disastrous than the *natural* response of the moth to the flame.

It is hard to understand how any one can hold that man is better adapted to a life of savagery than he is to the comforts, plenty, and freedom from fears of evil spirits that obtain in modern culture. Surely no one would have been inclined to think so, had it not been for the conception of instincts as hard-and-fast entities craving for a particular mode of expression or activity. Without such a conception we should have made without hesitation the obvious inference that man with his increase in knowledge and power has made the world more nearly to suit him than it was when he was engaged in a desperate struggle for existence.

There is no reason to suppose, then, that the evils of modern society will be eliminated or made less by the *natural* expression of instincts, if by the *natural* is meant the primitive. As a matter of fact, there is no reason to suppose that the responses made in our

culture are less *natural* than those made by the savage. For instance, what would be less *natural* than the discarding of a gun for a club? Or what could be more unnatural than discarding our training in manners, æsthetic appreciations, and in other preferred ways of living for the manners and tastes of primitive man. Regarded in this way, we see there is no need to worry regarding the *artificiality* of our culture or to fear that we are leaving behind our instincts. The responses we make are the *natural* responses man makes when subjected to the conditions of modern life, and there is no reason to suppose that these responses are less *natural* than the responses man made in a state of savagery.

Closely akin to the conception which exalts the primitive as the *natural* is the conception which exalts the fundamental as the *natural*. A response or activity is regarded as good because it is fundamental. The more fundamental the greater the value of the act.

This assumption underlies Veblen's criticism of sports. Veblen recognizes that if an activity is a response of an instinct it has a good claim to be valued. The life of sports, he admits, meets this requirement, and hence should be valued. Yet he hesitates to do so. He does not fully approve of sports. He bases his disapproval on the ground that they are counter to the more *fundamental* instinct of workmanship. Hence they cannot be justified. Thus he writes:

“The ultimate norm to which appeal is taken is the instinct of workmanship, which is an instinct more fundamental, of more ancient prescription, than the propensity to predatory emulation. The latter is but a special development of the instinct of workmanship, a variant relatively late and ephemeral in spite of its absolute antiquity. . . . Tested by this ulterior norm of life, predatory emulation, and therefore the life of sport, falls short.”*

Veblen does not take the trouble to tell us why we should prefer the fundamental and the essential. It is true the instinct of workmanship may be regarded as the necessary condition of survival and therefore of sport itself. In this sense it may well be held that the instinct of workmanship should carry greater weight than the less essential activity involved in the life of sport. We should not forget, however, that the *necessary*, in order to be valued, must be valued for something. We do not value it for being necessary or essential. Nor do we value it for being what may be termed a *necessary* evil. It is only when the necessary is necessary for the realization of something regarded as good that we value it.†

Thus when Veblen prizes the instinct of workmanship

* *Theory of the Leisure Class*, 270.

† It is because Ernest Jones neglects this that he gives as one of the compensations of war the fact that it brings us nearer the essential realities of life. (*Sociological Review*, vol. VIII, pages 179, 180.) Yet why should we prefer the *realities of existence* to the *shams*. The *realities* may be of value only because they make a life of *sham* and convention possible.

as being of a more fundamental nature than the instinct of sportsmanship, and condemns the instinct of sportsmanship because it is less fundamental, he may be condemning the activities for which the activities due to the instinct of workmanship are valued. Apart from the life of sports the life of work may be of no value. It may well be that it is only because of the life of sport that life is of value. Consequently, the instinct of workmanship, the fundamental, the essential, may be a mere means for the life of sports, and without value in its own right.

Trotter only carries further the tendency to prize the fundamental and necessary more highly than the less fundamental and unnecessary when he rejects the human point of view for the *more fundamental* point of view of biology. Indeed, he severely criticises Freud for assuming the human point of view and seems to think that Freud's conclusions are invalidated by this assumption—as if Freud should treat human beings from the point of view of the ox or cow.

“However much one may be impressed,” Trotter says, “with the greatness of the edifice which Freud has built up by the soundness of his architecture, one may scarcely fail, on coming into it from the bracing atmosphere of the biological sciences, to be oppressed by the odor of humanity.” “One finds everywhere a tendency to the acceptance of human standards, and even sometimes to human pretensions, which cannot fail to produce a certain uneasiness as to the validity,

if not of his doctrines, at any rate of the forms in which they are expounded." *

Perhaps Trotter wishes to suggest to Freud that he treat his patients, not as men, but as members of the more fundamental group of primates. To do so would be no more absurd than the moral lessons that are drawn for us from the animal world. Yet writers are not lacking who do this. In fact, Hall states explicitly "that true types of character can be determined only by studying the animal world." †

It would seem from these writers that we should abandon the human point of view and that we should look for our values and ethical guidance in the tendencies and characters that are common to all life. The more wide-spread, the more fundamental the tendency, the greater is its value, and the more to be prized. It is doubtful, however, if it is really possible for us to discard the human point of view in this way. After all, we are human beings and we must value those things which human beings value. Our pleasures and pains are the pleasures and pains of human beings. It is hardly possible that the "bracing atmos-

* *Instinct of the Head in Peace and War*, 77, 78.

† *Psychology of Adolescence*, vol. II, 60. Maeterlinck is more explicit than Hall in his claims regarding the animal types that we carry within us. He is not so convinced, however, that we can get ethical guidance from the fact. On the contrary, he sounds a warning. Thus he writes: "No matter what monsters have defiled or terrified the surface of the globe, we bear them within us. . . . We nourish all their types; they are only awaiting an opportunity to escape from us, to reappear, to reconstitute themselves, to develop, and to plunge us once again into terror." (*Hearst's Magazine*, March, 1920.)

phere of biology" can make us feel "oppressed with the odor of humanity." We cannot have the desires and needs of a bear or lion; nor can we hope to find in observations of their behavior the basis for our moral code. What are good morals for the lion are not good morals for man.*

There is no reason, therefore, that we should prefer the *natural* in the sense of the more *fundamental* or essential. It may be necessary that man act in certain ways in order that he may act in other ways. But this is very different from saying that the fundamental is of greater value. Nor can we infer that a character is of more value or furnishes us a guide for ethics because it is found in a large number of species. For, as has been pointed out, our values are necessarily the values of human beings, and our morals the morals of human beings. Our ethics must, therefore, be based on human needs, desires, and ideals rather than on the codes of conduct of the animal world.

The fundamental is not only identified with the necessary conditions and with characters that are common to a large number of species. It is at times identified with the wants, impulses, and desires which follow most closely the lines laid down by physical

* Moore makes an interesting criticism of the advice to look to the animal world for moral guidance. "Curious advice certainly, but of course there may be something to it. I am not here concerned to inquire under what circumstances some of us might take lessons from the cow. I have really no doubt that such exist." (Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 44.)

structure and needs. The wants that are born of bodily needs are regarded as more fundamental than those that are born of social contacts. This seems to be the criterion Parker has in mind when he says that the "instincts coupled with an obedient body lay down in scientific and exact description the motives which must and will determine human conduct." Hence, to avoid the evils of repression and to insure the good that comes from the natural expression of instincts, we must study physical needs and structure.

This seems marvellously simple. But does the contemplation of the structure and needs of the body give us definite information as to how instincts should function? Do they "lay down in scientific and exact description the motives which should determine human conduct"? The answer must be in the negative. The body and its needs tell us very little. To be sure, there are physiological processes which must be cared for. We must take food, and we may take it for granted that the organs should be used. But how shall they be used? And how much? These are the important questions, and regarding them the structure of the body and its emotions tell us little. Even less do they tell us regarding the value and function of the impulses not born of physical needs, that is, of the impulses that are born of social contacts. How impulses of this nature shall be expressed the emotions and structure of the body have nothing to say. Nor can we infer that such emotions as fear,

anger, and the affections, that follow from bodily needs, are of greater value than the emotions of patriotism and loyalty, or the sentiments that cover lofty ideals.

There is no reason, therefore, to suppose that the *natural* in the sense of being those activities and values that result most directly from bodily needs furnishes us with a key to values or a guide to behavior; for in the first place it is not definite, and in the second place values other than those that are indicated may prove to be of greater value than those that are.*

There is yet another conception of the natural that is exerting a profound influence in our social theories and practices. I refer to the *laissez-faire* attitude regarding the expression of the instincts and impulses, which seems to assume that any employment of intelligent control of behavior or of social movements is *unnatural*. We, especially our intellects, need do nothing. To get the best results, we need simply give our instincts full opportunity to work out their own salvation and that of the race. Given such freedom, social progress, it is held, is sure to result.

Bergson's treatment of the intellect and instinct furnishes the philosophic background on which these conceptions are based.

One very noticeable characteristic of Bergson's writings is his disparaging attitude toward the intellect and his exalting of intuition. The intellect, he

* Cf. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, chap. VI.

tells us, falsifies through its efforts to spatialize the non-spatial. To the cumbersome attempts of the intellect to predict—to peep into the future—Bergson opposes the marvellous insights of intuition, or disinterested instinct. He is greatly impressed with the activities of certain insects, which seem to him the unimpeded manifestations of the *Elan Vital*. He, therefore, urges that we put no longer our trust in the intellect which falsifies, but to look at life intuitively in order to see it as it really is.

The same contrast that Bergson makes between the intellect and instinct has been made by Pope in verse:

“Say, where full instinct is th’ unerring guide,
What Pope or Council can they need beside?
Reason, however able, cool at best
Cares not for service, or but serves when prest,
Stays ’til we call, and then not often near;
But honest instinct comes a volunteer,
Sure never to o’er-shoot, but just to hit:
While still too wide or short is human wit;
Sure by quick nature happiness to gain,
Which heavier reason labors in vain,
This too serves always, reason never long;
One must go right, the other may go wrong.
See then the acting and comparing powers,
One is then nature, which are two in ours
And reason raised o’er instinct as you can,
In this ’tis God directs, in that ’tis man!”

What we need, it may be inferred from Bergson’s writings, as from the above poem, is to give ourselves up to the direction of instinct with the assurance that in so doing we will realize ends and obtain knowledge

that are beyond the reach of the cumbersome and laborious intellectual processes.

I do not say that Bergson advocates this, or even that this is a just inference to draw from his writings as a whole. He does not fail to set forth certain advantages of the intellect, which, after all, he recognizes to be our instrument of knowledge, however unfortunate we may be in having such an instrument. It is, however, possible to draw the above conclusions from his writings. They may be regarded as following from his attack on the intellect in *Time and Free Will* and later in *Creative Evolution*. They also follow from his exalting as free those acts which spring from the wells of our personality undetermined by conscious ends.* They may be drawn from his genuine admiration of the working of instinct and emphasis on intuition in *Creative Evolution* and in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*.

That these consequences may be drawn from Bergson's writings is evinced by the fact that they are drawn by the French Syndicalists, who find in Bergson's philosophy a justification of their own attitude toward intelligent control and prediction.

Scott, who treats at some length the connection between Bergson's philosophy and the Syndicalist movement,† represents the mission of Sorel, the leader of the Syndicalists, as follows:

"The mission of Sorel, as he himself has conceived

* *Time and Free Will*.

† *Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism*.

it, appears to be, not to tell the working classes about the new régime they are to prepare; not to tell them what it is to be and how it is all to come; but to tell them just what it will not be, if they plan it, and to warn them not to have to do with the intellectual bourgeoisie who profess to plan it for them. Mr. Ramsey MacDonald did not overstate the case, when he said in 1912, six years after the appearance of *Reflections on Violence*: 'Sorel says quite candidly, "I cannot tell you what is going to happen, I am mainly interested in getting action."' The reformist syndicalist says, 'act wisely'; the syndicalist revolutionary of which Sorel is the teacher and philosopher, and above all the poet, says, 'Do not bother about the adverb, be quite sure of the verb; you need not necessarily act wisely, but in the name of everything you hold good and dear, act.' "

The Syndicalist seems to feel that if he can only get activity, if he can get the masses to break through the mass of customs, traditions, and institutions that are preventing the natural and complete expression of instincts, the people equipped with their instincts and intuitions will be able to adjust themselves to the new conditions—just as if instincts were mystical guides existing complete in the souls of each of us.

It is not surprising, then, that the Syndicalists should see in Bergson's disparaging attitude toward the intellect a justification of their own. They have no need for programmes. Their contempt for the peeping of

intelligence into the future and for the falsifications of conceptual knowledge is as great as Bergson's. They too wish to let themselves freely move on the onward rush of the *Elan Vital*. They do not care to found their movement on a study of consequences likely to follow from its success. Indeed, it is just this study they hold which has been responsible for the failure of reform movements in the past. Action is the need of the hour. If that can be secured the instincts of the masses may be trusted to take care of the future.

This supreme confidence in instincts to guide the individual is not limited to those radicals who are willing to trust anything that promises to aid them in destroying the existing order. It finds expression also in the schools. The education of the child is to be founded on his instincts in the belief that what the child needs is an opportunity for self-expression. The teacher is not to direct the child. His task is to provide suitable stimuli to bring out *natural* expressions from the child, and to aid the child in the realization of the *ends* which have been thus evoked.

There are, of course, many practical difficulties which prevent the full realization of this programme. But these are considered unavoidable difficulties, which must be taken into consideration. They do not affect the general attitude that the maximum and most satisfactory development of the child will result from its natural and undirected expression of its impulses and desires.

The advocates of this position do not seem to take into consideration that activities are always responses to exciting stimuli, and that by changing the stimuli the response is changed. Hence, there is always the problem what stimuli shall be presented, for it may be taken for granted that the response will always be the *natural* response given the conditions which evoke it.

The use of the *natural* in the sense of undirected may be attacked in another way. We should not be too sure that the *natural* way to rear a child is to leave it alone to act as may be determined by a sort of "mystical" guide within it. The *natural* thing for a child to do is to give heed to instruction, and the *natural* procedure of the interested adult is to give advice and instruction. Without this the child would be compelled to go through a long and laborious process of hit and miss in order to learn the responses and adjustments that are most satisfying. To follow a *laissez-faire* policy would be to convert the advantage of plasticity into a disadvantage.

We may be greatly impressed with the perfection of the responses and adaptations of the lower animals, which are supposed to be determined by the free play of instinct, and the working of intelligence when contrasted to that of instinct may appear in an unfavorable light, but after all intelligence is our instrument of knowledge, and it is therefore *natural* for us to act in an intelligent manner, that is, attempt to predict, to foresee consequences, and direct the factors under

our control so that the end we desire may be accomplished. Hence, nothing would be more *unnatural* than for us to abandon our instrument of control, to cease our efforts to bring about conditions which we desire. The *natural* tendencies of an intelligent being are counter to a *laissez-faire* policy, as well as the interest of the child who needs to be taught.

We thus see that the writers who condemn society for its repressions and urge that we permit a more *natural* expression of our instincts do not give us a clear knowledge of the *natural*; while what they seem to identify with the *natural* turns out upon examination to be undesirable as norms of conduct.

If we take the common tendency to identify the *natural* with the primitive we find no reason to regard the modes of behavior that have been abandoned as more *natural*, or of greater value, than the preferred ones. Nor have we been able to find that the more fundamental is more *natural*, or of greater value, than the less fundamental. If we seek a definition of the *natural* in physical needs and impulses, we find little that is of ethical or moral significance. If the *natural* is regarded as the undirected expression, we find that this turns out to be merely an abandonment of the rôle of intelligence, which is highly *unnatural* to the intelligent being and detrimental to the creature deprived of the control.

If the writers referred to had given greater thought to defining the *natural*, they would have seen that the

natural, like the *fit*, has reference to the setting in which the behavior or phenomena occurs. It is no less natural for a man in our culture to use a rifle than it is for a man in primitive culture to use a club. Both act *naturally*. It would be unnatural if a man in our society went out to hunt tigers with a club when a rifle was at his command. So it is with other cultural contributions. We react to the cultural setting in which we are placed just as it is *natural* for human nature to react given the conditions. Our behavior is no less *natural* than that of the most primitive savage. The fear that our culture is becoming too artificial and the fear that we are leaving behind too far our instincts are unwarranted. The instincts of man are responding as *naturally* in our culture as they have in any culture. The difference in his responses is not due to the fact that man is responding *unnaturally*, but to differences in the exciting stimuli. Whatever our responses may be they are always the *natural* responses of an organism under the given conditions.

Obviously, the *natural* if so regarded cannot furnish ethical guidance, for every act becomes a *natural* act. Whereas it is the task of ethics to furnish us the means by which acts can be evaluated more intelligently. Some acts are good, some are indifferent, some bad. If this were not true there would be no point to ethical discussions. We only engage in ethical discussions when we recognize the existence of good and bad acts.

Hence, if it turns out that all acts are *natural*, the *natural* loses all value as a norm.

On the other hand, we have found that no matter how the *natural* is defined, it cannot be identified with the good, since it is only some *natural* acts that are good. Others are bad. Sufficient proof of this is furnished in the indisputably *natural* behavior of the moth when it flies into the flame, or in the more complex behavior of certain ants that rear the larvæ of beetles, only to see the beetles devour their own young.

Behavior of this sort cannot on any pretext be regarded as good. Yet our romanticists continue to prize the *natural* and to condemn many niceties of culture as *unnatural*. They hold up the *natural* man, and place beside him in scorn the man of culture and polish. In doing this, they must have in mind the *natural* man of Rousseau. They forget that the *natural* man partakes as much of the nature of the Nietzschean ideal. It would be well for those who exalt the *natural* man to have at times before them the *natural* man of Nietzsche. Hocking has made an illuminating contrast of the two types:

"The natural man of the Nietzschean ideal is a very different person from the natural man of Rousseau: he is far more strenuous, far more acquainted with pain and hardness. But like his predecessor he finds his law within himself, and defines his good as the venting of his energies upon the world. He is a hater of Christianity chiefly because Christianity seems to

him to curb the salutary surgical processes of nature—*his* surgery. He has the grim optimism which most rejoices to proclaim the goodness of things when he finds the world red in fang and claw—his fang and claw. . . . We have now . . . an immense demonstration of the working of this type of liberation. And we, who look on, and have made use of that same faith in our own public and economic life, cannot quit ourselves of taking part in the process by which the whole Western world in horror and lamentation shall revise its judgment.” *

The third assumption, namely, that the maximum development should be desired, has a host of adherents who accept it as obvious. To the multitude a defense of it seems unnecessary. But it is defended by the more thoughtful and critical in two ways which are in themselves very different.

For example, it is defended by Hocking on the assumption that we are born with a mass of instincts which have a right to the fullest possible development and expression. One gets the idea from his defense of this position that instincts are “little voices” crying to be heard and longing for a particular goal. Whether he regards them in this way or not, it is certain that he regards them as *forces* or characters which are entitled to the maximum development. Indeed, this is the assumption that underlies his defense of the right of the state. The state, he tells us,

* *Human Nature in Its Remaking*, 22.

is necessary for the full development of the instinct of will to power. Therefore, it is justified.

Justification or defense of the programme of maximum development in the above way is emphatically rejected by Ritchie, who is a severe critic of this revival of the theory of "Natural Rights." Yet he, too, holds that the maximum development is good, and even endows the individual with a "right" to the fullest possible development. This "right" he bases on the assumption that since every individual is *potentially* a sharer in the consciousness of universal reason, he is entitled to the fullest possible development and realization of his potentialities.*

These positions do not seem tenable. Suppose there are, as Hocking seems to think, a mass of innate tendencies or characters longing for expression, it is hard to see why this should endow them with a "right" to expression. Many desires and longings are denied such "rights." We have been able to discover no good reason for supposing that a desire should be endowed with "rights" because it is innate. Nor does it follow that an individual has a right to share *actually* because he shares *potentially*. If this were true, ethics would become hopelessly confused. For here again all distinctions are destroyed. Whatever may be exists potentially, but it is just the task of ethics to determine which of the many and contradictory potentialities shall be actualized.

* Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, 96-97.

It is the position of Hocking, however, that is of interest, for it is based on the assumption of specific instincts with "rights" to expression and development, and he seems committed to the view that the maximum development will be realized through the fullest development possible for each instinct. But can the maximum development be realized in this way?

It is true that the possibility of bringing it about in the above way begins to grow impressive if we accept the explanation Wallas gives of the unsatisfactory condition of children reared in charity schools. Children so reared are denied an expression of their instinct for property. Hence, their poor condition. But we begin to entertain doubts regarding the possibility of realizing maximum development through the fullest expression of all instincts, when this same author accounts for the popularity of aerial railways in terms of the instinct of fear which is being "balked" in modern society by the scarcity of fear arousing situations. One begins to think that maximum development involves the fullest possible expression of our "instinct for grief"; or even that it may include the fullest possible expression of our "instinct for pain." Yet actualization of such instincts and capacities is no guaranty of development. Indeed, their actualization and development can take place only at the expense of other instincts and capacities. For instance, gratification of the "instinct for fear" prevents the gratification of the "instinct for mastery"; to grieve thwarts the "ex-

pansive instinct''; to suffer pain thwarts the instinctive love for ease and comfort.

It therefore becomes apparent that it is the expression of some instincts in some ways that makes for development. If the maximum development is what we wish, we must obtain it through the use of intelligence as a regulator and director of our activities, rather than by allowing the free and unimpeded expression of instincts or innate impulses. Hence, instincts cannot get a sanction on the assumption that the maximum development is realized through the natural expression of our innate tendencies.

The conception just criticised is dangerous for social solidarity. It is true that Hocking used this conception to justify the existence of the state. But this is not the only conclusion to draw. Indeed, it is not the most obvious one. Hocking's conclusion is perhaps an indication of his contentment with present conditions. But people who are profoundly discontented will hardly draw the same conclusion. They will hold rather that the state is a burden to free and natural expression of our instincts, and as such is detrimental to our highest good. Hence, the burden should be made as light as possible; for the hope of progress and better adaptations depends on the opportunity given the individual to develop freely as may be determined by the deep characters that underlie his personality. Hence, the state, instead of being regarded as a means for the development of the instincts, is looked upon as a thwart-

ing and repressive agency. This position is maintained by Russell in his *Principles of Social Reconstruction*. It is the free individual on whom progress depends. All the state can do is to deprive the individual of as little freedom as possible.

However much Russell might take issue with Hocking regarding the state as a necessary agency for the development of all the instincts, he would agree that the maximum development of the individual is good, and should be desired. But, after all, should we desire the maximum development? Why should we assume that the maximum development is good? Let us consider human life in general. The amount of human life can be greatly increased, but are we to follow Ella Wheeler Wilcox in assuming that this is an indication of millions of unborn infants offering one grand lamentation for the light of day? And are we to assume that these lamentations should influence us to bring about the greatest possible amount of life? Maeterlinck seems to have a keener insight when in *The Betrothal* he emphasizes so effectively the right of infants to be well born, rather than to mere birth. The amount of life can no doubt be greatly increased, but are we sure that the increase would make the sum total of life of more value? It is quite possible that a smaller amount of life, lived more intensely and more uniformly pleasant, is of far greater value than a large amount of life that is barely worth the living.

So it is with all development. It is quite possible

that less development in some directions will make the final product of far more worth than it would be if the maximum development of all had been accomplished. It is also quite possible that the development of some at the expense of others, whether we are dealing with individuals, instincts, or tendencies, will make for a more satisfactory development—and possibly even a greater development—than the less though equal development of all.

These possibilities do not seem to be entertained by the directors of our educational policies or by social uplifters. They are so convinced that every man should be educated, that all should develop to the utmost, that they do not stop to pay attention to the ultimate effects such a policy if carried through would have on society at large. Or if they do show a desire to evaluate their programmes in terms of its consequences, they assume at once that an educated man, a man who has developed to the utmost, a man of refined sensibilities and of culture, is of greater value to the community than one not so highly developed. Hence, they strain every resource in order that all may be educated.

In this policy they do not seem to consider the necessity of hewers of wood and drawers of water. Or else they think it possible to actualize the sensibilities of this class and yet have contented the peaceful labor. Whether this is true or not, their attitude indicates that they think it better to have all potentialities realized even if it means only discontent and unhappiness

for the individual and social unrest and strife for the group at large. For is not a Socrates—unhappy and discontented—better than a satisfied pig? Perhaps. But is not labor, satisfied, contented though stolid and insensitive, better than labor, dissatisfied, discontented, wide awake to the appearance of all injustices and for this reason unhappy if not miserable? There is one "Natural Right" we all possess. We have the right to expect that opportunity for the satisfaction of desires and appreciations shall go hand in hand with the rendering actual our capacities for such enjoyments. It is this right that educators should have in mind when they insist on the realization of all capacities for enjoyment, even though they are perfectly well aware that opportunity cannot be given for the enjoyment of the capacity. For it is as a result of their programme that there occur repressions and disintegration of character of the worst kind.

How our own cultural group will be affected if all peoples reach a maximum degree of development should concern us.

Yet social uplifters of broad sympathies would no doubt be inclined to extend their programme of maximum development to include all living forms if it could be shown that other living forms are capable of such development—even if it should be detrimental to the interest of the human race. For why should maximum development be confined to the human race? Since development is good, why should man wish to limit this good by his own interest?

For example, let us suppose that we have discovered a way to make useful laborers out of monkeys, and that it should be discovered later that by education they can be made into creatures of refined sensibilities and our competitive consumers. The policy of maximum development would demand that they be made into competitors; for why should we deny monkeys this development? Is not an educated monkey better than an uneducated one? The fact that we lose the benefit of their labor, and must compete with them for the wealth of the world does not matter. It is the maximum development that we desire. What effect this may have on the human race is not to be considered. To do so would be simply an indication of our selfishness and narrowness. Away with such egoism! We must look at development in a large way.

People who have become so imbued with the bracing atmosphere of the biological sciences that the odor of humanity is oppressive may perhaps feel this way. But to those of us who frankly assume the human point of view, such a programme seems little less than madness. To place the same value on the development of all species ignores the fact that we are human beings with human interests and needs to provide for, which in many cases conflict with the interests of other species.

The assumption that all tendencies, impulses, and capacities in the human being should be developed is equally untenable, as well as the assumption that we

can wish for the development of all. The development of certain capacities and tendencies is incompatible with that of others. It becomes necessary that we choose those tendencies that are to find expression. Nor do we make this choice by an arbitrary act of will. Our choice depends largely on the training and environmental conditions to which we have been subjected. We are no more able to ignore our past training in our evaluations than we are to ignore the fact that we are human beings. As human beings we have the values of human beings. As products of a certain history we have the values that human beings have when subjected to certain conditions. There is no need to assume, then, an air of broadness in reference to the development of all capacities. Such an assumption would seem to indicate that we regard ourselves as speaking for the human race when as a matter of fact each one of us can speak for only that bit of human nature which he represents, as it has been moulded by the various factors that have made each one of us what we are. Our desires are fixed in this process. We cannot desire that all capacities be developed. We can desire only those capacities to be developed that we value. What capacities we value depend on our original nature and the conditions which have affected it.

In this process through which specific desires and values are realized, original nature plays the part of a limiting rather than determining factor. By this I

mean that the same original nature may if treated in one way come to possess one set of values, and if treated in another way another set. This may seem obvious. Yet its obviousness seems to have been missed by a great number of writers, who seem to feel that within one there is a store of innate impulses and desires longing for expression. If the above truth had been grasped this group of writers would have discovered that social evils cannot be regarded as due to the repression of these *forces*, or social goods, to their natural expression or maximum development. In brief, they would have recognized that social programmes cannot be discovered in the supposed will of these hidden entities.

The conception of instincts as creators of psychic tension, of entities longing for expression, is not limited to writers who wish to found their programmes for social reform on the sanction of instinct. It is the conception of many writers who feel that they can interpret culture and social behavior in terms of the various manifestations and thwartings of these *forces*. This is the assumption that students who wish to give a psychological interpretation of culture too often adopt. An examination of these attempts should make all the more obvious the rôle that has been assigned to original nature and the fact that our desires and values are the products of the give-and-take relations we sustain to our environment rather than the expression or unfolding of certain innate characters, which are supposed to possess certain longings and de-

sires irrespective of the situation in which they are placed.

An examination of this order is the task of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER IV

INSTINCT AND CULTURE

In Chapter III, I referred to the claims of many writers that our culture and institutions are rooted in and shaped by our store of innate tendencies and capacities, and to the claims of another group of writers that institutions and culture should be but are not. It was the latter position that I examined in the foregoing chapter. I now wish to examine the claim that our culture, institutions, and customs are rooted in and determined by our innate tendencies.

If this claim is true, then it should follow that the culture of the same race should show striking similarities, and cultural changes should be very slow—since original nature is supposed to vary little, if any, over long periods of time. On the other hand, if, as I have suggested, the behavior and desires of an individual are determined by the relation he sustains to his environment, it should follow that the many variable factors that go to make one's desires and activities should bring about such a variety of customs and institutions that they cannot be regarded as rooted in or determined by any factor supposed to be common to all of them. Under this last view there is no difficulty in accounting for sudden variations in customs or

moral ideas, nor in accounting for wide variations of culture found in the same race.

The most casual observation of human behavior and of customs and institutions reveals wide discrepancies. Any explanation of adult behavior must, therefore, give some account of the great discrepancies in the likes and dislikes of man for the same object, for the great diversity of moral ideas and sentiments, and the variety of customs, taboos, institutions, and social organizations. These facts must be accounted for. The question is: To what extent can they be regarded as determined by our supply of instincts, or profitably rooted in original nature?

I am careful to say *profitably* rooted, for no matter what man does, it may in a sense be regarded as rooted in his original nature, since man cannot act or be affected in a way that is without the range of his capacities.

Before undertaking to answer this question certain principles should be laid down. In the first place, when there is a question regarding the advisability of rooting certain behavior or structures in the original nature of an organism, we should know if the discussion is limited to the species to which the organism belongs or if we are making a comparison of organisms belonging to different species.

The value of this can be shown by reference to a concrete case showing variation in the structure of organisms of the same species. For instance, it has

been found that when certain aphids are raised on the heavy salts of magnesia and sugar they become winged. When raised on other substances they remain wingless.*

The question arises: Shall the wings be regarded as rooted in the original germ-plasm of the aphids? In answering this question we should know if we are discussing aphids only, or if we are comparing aphids with other insects which under no condition can be made to develop wings. In the former case there would be little value in regarding the wings as rooted in original nature, for it is seen that the wings bear a constant relationship to environmental conditions, and are therefore more profitably regarded as due to the particular treatment rather than as an outgrowth of a "capacity to be affected" in the germ-plasm. On the other hand, if we are comparing aphids with other species, which cannot be affected so as to produce wings, then to root the "capacity to be affected" so as to produce wings in the original nature of the aphids would be of value.

The second principle that should guide us in determining the advisability of rooting behavior or structure in original nature is: The greater the degree of uniformity in development, in spite of variations in the environmental conditions, the more profitably can the development be regarded as rooted in original nature. Thus if it should be found that aphids continue

* T. H. Morgan, *Physical Basis of Heredity*, 210.

to have six feet under all environmental conditions, then we can with a good deal of assurance regard the six feet as rooted in the original nature of aphids.

Applying these principles to man, let us consider the advisability of rooting *culture* in man's original nature. On observation we find that all men possess a *culture*. Whatever the environment may be, man possesses a *culture* and is profoundly influenced by it. We may, therefore, without hesitation, regard this capacity to select certain preferred ways of living and to pass them down as rooted in man's original nature.

If we consider, however, the various products of culture the case may not be so clear. These present such a wide diversity in spite of the common factor of race, and the variations bear such a constant relation to variables in the environment, that it may appear of little profit to regard particular cultures, or particular cultural products, as rooted in man's original nature as long as we wish to confine our discussion to man. If, however, we wish to compare man with other animals, which under no conditions possess a culture, then of course the "capacity to be affected" may with profit be regarded as a distinguishing mark of man's original nature.

In a sense, therefore, all cultural products may be regarded with profit as rooted in man's original nature, since man of all animals is the only one to possess a culture. But in another sense, that is, in the discussions regarding the relation of original nature to cul-

ture, we may find it of slight advantage to regard culture as so rooted; for particular cultures vary so much that as long as our discussions are limited to man and his behavior it appears of slight profit to regard so many variables as rooted in or determined by any constant factor.

With these principles in mind, let us consider whether we can profitably root customs, institutions, and cultural products in general in man's original nature. Let us consider first the behavior of man in the state, religion, business, and family. Thorndike states that his behavior in these relations is so rooted. But does the behavior in these relations present a uniformity that invites us to regard it as determined by a single factor?

For instance, what do we find regarding behavior in the state? We find that some men are rulers, some subjects; that some prefer one form of government, some another; that some are pacifists, others militarists; that some are nationalists, others internationalists, and so on.

If we consider man's religious activities and attitudes we find the same. Some men are pantheists, others atheists. Some are believers in Christ, some in Buddha, and still others in Mohammed. Some are pious, others are impious. Some are reverent, others are irreverent. Some are superstitious, others are "scientific," and so on. An examination of cult practices would reveal the same diversity. For instance,

in many groups it has been the custom, and still is in some, to stimulate fertility in nature by wild abandon and orgistic ceremonies of various sorts. While in other groups the planting time is one of complete abstinence from sex life.

If we consider man in his business relations we find the same. Some are capable, others are incapable. Some are successful, others are unsuccessful. Some have a high sense of honor, others are dishonest, and so on.

Such a variety as this indicates that it is of slight value to regard this behavior as rooted in original nature. This becomes all the more apparent when we remember that the behavior and preferences in every case would most likely have been different if the conditions surrounding the individual had been different. Thus no one would claim that the religious beliefs of a man are rooted in his original nature.* But neither are his political ideals. Nor his position in the state. The same is true in business. Original nature is only one factor that makes for success or failure. The same person may be a success or failure depending on external conditions, such as competition, accidents of investments, favorable breaks of the market, etc. And

* McDougall, it is true, attempts to account for the distribution of the various religions as a result of the innate characters of the various races in *The Group Mind*, 158-161. But he would not hold that the beliefs are rooted in original nature, but simply that the original nature favors one type of religion rather than another. He recognizes that one's beliefs are determined by the beliefs of the community in which he happens to be reared.

his success or failure in business has a profound influence on his other activities and even attitudes. Thus, whether he is reverent or irreverent may depend on his success in business, for not only are the objects of reverence determined by one's environment, but the attitude itself is in a great measure a reflection of one's own experiences. The same is true of honesty. It is a common saying that a man is as honest as conditions will allow. This statement may seem rather cynical when examined in the light of American ideals and high regard for honesty. But making all due allowance for this, it is certain that one's regard for the truth is determined by his training rather than by his original nature.

It thus becomes evident that what the man is is determined—not by his original nature, for the same original nature may give rise to hundreds of men quite different in their ideals, values, sentiments, and impulses—but by the variable conditions which have affected his original nature so as to give rise to the particular man that he is.

The family, however, should offer the best field to establish the claim that the behavior of man is rooted in his original nature. This is due to the fact that the family is a more fundamental institution and is in answer to more direct needs than the other institutions considered. It also affords less room for variation. Hence, its organization should show the uniformity, and should be the object of a common regard that is

expected of an institution largely determined by one factor. If we fail to find value in rooting this institution in original nature, then we may well infer that no institution can be profitably regarded in that way.

The dawn of the human family is heralded in the family organization of the higher apes and gorillas. The dependence of the female and young ape or gorilla for protection on the male made necessary an organization of some kind. It is only natural to suppose that along with this necessity went dispositions that made companionship between the sexes pleasant, and that as a consequence the family organization as it exists among apes and gorillas resulted. By the same reasoning we should infer that since the above needs are even greater in the human species, the dispositions just referred to are even stronger in man than they are in the apes and gorillas, and that as a result we have the more permanent family organization as found in the human race.

We should not, however, be too hasty in making a generalization here. We may not have taken into consideration all the factors, or even the determining factors, that make the human family what it is.

As far as we know man is the only animal that possesses a culture. The activities of other animals are so largely the result of unreflection, and so true to the type of their species, that it is hardly profitable to regard their actions as influenced by culture. With man it is quite different. He has a capacity for culture and

of being profoundly influenced by it that sets him off in striking contrast to the other animals. Indeed, one might say that the behavior of man bears the same relation to his culture that the behavior of other animals bears to their original nature. This statement may be extreme, but certainly man's capacity for being profoundly influenced by culture reveals a plasticity in man's original nature that makes a striking contrast to the rigid determinateness found in other animals; for the amount of determinateness is in inverse ratio to the capacity to be influenced.

On account of this capacity and of the modifications that man undergoes as the result of cultural influences, we may be led to hold, in spite of the fact that the family organization is in answer to needs that are common to all men and to many other animals, that the family cannot be regarded with profit as rooted in original nature. The influence of culture may be so profound, and bring about so many variations, that the institution may be regarded with greater profit as largely determined by cultural influences. For if the family is rooted in original nature it should reveal a striking degree of similarity in the relations between the various members of the family, and should be the object of very similar regard by all men. On the other hand, if it is determined largely by cultural influences, we should expect great variety in the forms of the family organization, and variations in the relations between the various members of the family which

should bear a high correlation with certain cultural variables.

It remains then for us to make an examination of the family in various cultures in order to see if its organization presents the uniformity that should characterize an institution determined by a common factor, or whether its organization presents a diversity that we should expect of an organization determined by the many chance factors that go to make up any given culture. The relation of husband to wife will provide suitable material to begin the examination.

Among us it is ordinarily supposed that marriages are founded on mutual respect and consideration, and that husbands shall be kind and even deferential to their wives. This is quite different from what it is among the lower class of Europe. The wives of the lower class Slavs feel hurt if they are not beaten by their husbands. The same is true among the peasant women of Hungary, who do not think that they are loved by their husbands until they have been boxed on the ear. And it is said that among certain strata of Italians the women think their husbands fools if they neglect beating them.*

In America, marriages founded on love are regarded as being of the highest type. Love marriages are not so regarded in the aristocratic circles of Europe. The Crow Indians even prefer to buy their wives. Love

* Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. I, 658.

marriages to these Indians seem too much like the mating of animals. They do not wish to mate like dogs.*

We expect girls to be virgins when they marry. This is regarded by the Wadigo as ridiculous if not disgraceful. Chastity among girls is valued as lightly among the Bororo of Brazil. Among these people girls are betrothed while very young, and are later sent to live in bachelor apartments with some young man until her fiancé is ready to marry.†

Similarly, we expect wives to be chaste, yet among many people it is the part of hospitality to allow the visitor to sleep with the wife.‡ Among us, wives resent unfaithfulness in their husbands, but the Japanese women without the least show of jealousy keep company with their husbands and courtesans, and later without the least show of jealousy leave their husbands to spend the night with the courtesans.§

Among some peoples the wife is punished for adultery. Among others it is the seducer who is punished. While among yet others both are punished.||

We think a man should have only one wife, and are all the more convinced that a woman should have only one husband. Yet both polygamy and polyandry flourish in various parts of the world.

We look with disapproval on the marriages of cou-

* Lowie, *Primitive Society*, 24.

† Westermarck, vol. II, 422; Lowie, 50.

‡ Lowie, 49.

§ Sutherland, *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, vol. I, 264.

|| Westermarck, vol. II, 447-450.

sins. The Blackfoot do not tolerate marriage within the group at all. On the other hand, among the natives of West Australia the marriage of cousins is prescribed.*

It is the usual custom to marry within one's class, yet in the rigidly caste society of the Natchez Indians a member of the Sun, or highest caste, is compelled to marry a Stinkard, or member of the lowest caste. But so hard and fast are the caste regulations in other respects that the caste distinctions are maintained between husband and wife, violation of which means death to the offending party.

For bachelors to live with paramours is considered highly immoral by us, and provision is made in many savage tribes to keep the unmarried men and women apart. But among the Masi suitable quarters are provided for the unmarried men and women, who live together until ready to marry.

Shakespeare held that marriage turned the night into the best part of day. The Bank Islanders feel so differently about it that men neither eat nor sleep with their wives. Among other tribes men sleep with their wives during the winter months only.†

The relations of parent to child reveal the same great diversity.

We take it for granted that parents will take care of their children and provide for them as many advantages as possible. Yet even in this country we find it

* Lowie, 15.

† Lowie, 271, 275, and 306.

necessary to have laws compelling parents to send their children to school and laws against child labor and infanticide.

We also take it for granted that children will respect their parents. This is demanded to a much greater extent by the Chinese and Japanese parents. But, on the other hand, among various Mexican tribes children are permitted to strike their parents, to insult them with abusive language, and to disobey at their pleasure.*

When parents are old we expect the children to take care of them. But among the North American Indians and the Hottentots about one-half of them were left to die of exposure. It is quite possible that aged parents a few centuries ago were not treated with the same consideration among us which they now receive. This may be inferred from the old legend regarding the "holy Mawle," or of a club placed behind the church doors in various parts of England and Scotland with which a son might kill his father when he became of no more use.†

We can think of no way more horrible to show love and respect for parents than to eat them or to bury them alive. Yet strange as it may seem, the old among the Botocudos at their urgent requests are killed and eaten by their tribe; and the old among the Fijians insist as earnestly that they be buried alive.‡

* Westermarck, vol. I, 600.

† Westermarck, vol. I, 386-388.

‡ Westermarck, vol. II, 568; Sutherland, vol. I, 389.

What a contrast these prayers of the old among the Botocudos and Fijians are to the tenacity with which the old among us cling to life, even though it means but a few more days of suffering to themselves and care to their friends!

To eat dead children or friends out of love seems to us a horrible practice. Yet this is the motive which underlies cannibalism in a number of tribes.*

We think it highly important that a father should know his children, and that the relationship of father to child should be one founded on biological relationship. Yet among the Toda fatherhood is determined by a purely conventional rite.

And in some societies in which there is no knowledge of the connection between sexual intercourse and reproduction, kinship is none the less reckoned through the males—fatherhood being determined by conventional rites or by adoption.

Children with us do not seem so valuable; for it is commonly regarded as a burden for a man to take care of a child that is not his own.

A variety of relationships and attitudes as great as this within an organization or institution that presents as few possibilities for variation as the family suggests that the behavior of man within the family is the product of a number of chance factors, which have brought out all the responses of which his original nature is capable, rather than that his behavior has been de-

* Westermarck, vol. II, 566-568.

terminated by a factor common to the wide range of variation. Certainly this variety cannot be taken as indicating that there is any great value in regarding the behavior of man within the family as rooted in his original nature; for to do so would make necessary the positing of "roots" of such contradictory natures as would make possible: The care of parents; the desertion of parents. High valuation placed on virginity and chastity; no valuation placed on it. Tenacious struggle to prolong life; desire to leave it before decay sets in, and so on. In other words, the variety seems to indicate that the possibilities for varied response inherent in the situation are exhausted, and that original nature acts in all the ways that are possible for it to act, rather than as showing any decided preference for a definite expression.

To root this great diversity in original nature is to load it with a mass of contradictory tendencies and impulses, without greatly aiding us in getting an understanding of the behavior. For after we have so "rooted" them, we are left in complete darkness regarding the conditions which brought about the expression of one tendency or impulse rather than its opposite. This knowledge can be obtained only through a knowledge of the cultural situation in which the behavior occurs, that is, through a knowledge of the factors that affect the "capacities" rather than through a knowledge of the "capacities" themselves. Whatever a man does we may be sure that he has the ca-

capacity to do. This, however, is seen to be quite unilluminating in the effort to understand man's domestic relations.

It should be pointed out that in all this variety and diversity there can be discerned at least three common characteristics: (1) The need of companionship, (2) sex life, and (3) care of children. These characteristics may very well be regarded as rooted in original nature, for, as I have pointed out, the survival of the race is dependent on some care shown children, and it is reasonable to suppose that with the necessity there should go the tendency and disposition to take care of them. The same may be said regarding the necessity of sex life. When two necessary conditions of survival draw the sexes together, we may with a good deal of assurance expect that with this necessity there should go a disposition to crave the companionship of each other. Otherwise the race would inevitably disappear. Hence, the pleasure the sexes find in each other's company.

While we may, therefore, root with assurance these characters in human nature, yet the inadequacy of these characters to account for the family as we have it is seen in the wide diversity in the family organization, and in the fact that while these characters are possessed by other gregarious animals, the family life of these animals is in many respects quite different from our own. But confining our attention to the human race. It is only by abstracting all differences found

in the behavior of man that we reach certain common characteristics, which may be rooted in original nature. It is not, however, common characteristics robbed of all that makes them real and concrete that we deal with in behavior. It is always behavior of a certain kind, a certain kind of companionship, a definite regard for children, and so on, that we observe. When behavior is viewed in its concreteness, or as it occurs, the diversity assumes such proportions that we begin to entertain doubts regarding the existence of common characteristics that are supposed to largely determine and shape the behavior. We then recognize that the determinants of the behavior which interest us are many and variable.

Thus the family, while answering the need of companionship, cannot be regarded as determined by this need, as is seen in the fact that it is only in recent times, and in certain countries, that there has existed the degree of intimate companionship between husband and wife we observe to-day. So true is this that even to-day in some societies it is a disgrace for a man to eat with his wife. Nor do husband and wife among these people occupy the same quarters. The need of companionship is satisfied by other means.

The same may be said regarding the sex impulse or need. The family, though administering to this need, cannot be regarded as the result of sex need. It may as well be regarded as due to restrictions placed on sex life; for the satisfaction of sex needs does not neces-

sitate a family organization. Nor can this need when combined with jealousy account for the family, for among many people there seems to be a complete lack of jealousy in both husbands and wives. This latter fact would seem to throw doubt on the existence of jealousy as an innate character in human nature. In another connection it may be found that the satisfaction of the sex impulse takes so many forms, which bear such a striking correlation to the variable factors in the career of the individual, that we may be led to regard this impulse itself as due to the psychological development of the individual rather than as an innate character that unfolds itself regardless of the individual's experience.

The foregoing criticism applies to the variations in the care of children. It is true that the mother's care of her child may be regarded as determined by original nature. No doubt nature provides a mother with a love for her child as surely as it provides her with the organic changes that make the care of the infant possible. That these provisions of nature are inadequate to account for the care taken of children, however, is seen in the fact that infanticide is no rare occurrence; while within the family the treatment accorded children varies so greatly that it is unprofitable to regard the behavior as determined by any one factor.

In this there is a striking contrast with the uniformity of the treatment accorded by other animals to

their young. This is what we should expect, for man is not only influenced by his own experience, as are other animals, but perhaps even more profoundly by the experience of others. In other words, his behavior is largely determined by impressions from the group and varies with the ideals and knowledge of the group. The variation that is thus brought about in the care shown by the human mother to her young is clearly seen in the foregoing account of the various attitudes of parents toward their children. For example, one mother out of love for her dead child eats it. Yet there can be no doubt but that she with the same cultural setting that we have would look with horror upon such a practice.

Both attitudes, then, may equally well be regarded as rooted in original nature. But with the rooting of such contradictory feelings in original nature, we begin to lose interest in what is rooted. What we wish to know is what is actualized.

No one can deny that in a sense all the variations in social practices and behavior are rooted in original nature, for if original nature did not have the capacity to be affected so as to give rise to the observed behavior, the behavior could not exist. But to root in original nature the tendency to care for aged parents, to abandon them, to bury them alive, to eat them is certainly not illuminating. The same may be said regarding the solicitude of the male in some societies to know that he is the father of the child he protects and the indif-

ference regarding this in others; and the tenacity with which the old in some societies cling to life, and the desire to abandon it in others. Variations or diversity of this sort exhaust the possibility for varied response. Certainly they cannot be regarded as determined to any marked degree a factor common to all. As far as the common factor of original nature is concerned, it throws as much light on one mode of behavior as on another, since all must be rooted in it.

This diversity, however, may be regarded as due to innate differences in original nature. If this were assumed, it would be no longer necessary to root all this diversity in the same original nature. Thus the original nature of each tribe or race would become much more definite, and consequently should throw greater light on the forces or factors underlying each social practice or custom.

This is a popular method of explaining differences in culture. This is the method that accounts for culture in terms of race. Westermarck, who cites many of the facts which I have mentioned to show the diversity in the family, bases his interpretation of the differences between the moral ideas of the various peoples on this assumption.

According to Westermarck, the moral ideas and judgments are based on the emotions. He takes this view because our feelings determine whether we judge an act moral or immoral. He is keenly aware that the moral judgments show great variation. To account

for this he postulates innate differences in the emotions, which are the bases of the feelings. Thus he writes:

"While certain phenomena will almost of necessity arouse similar moral emotions in every mind which perceives them clearly, there are others with which the case is different. The emotional constitution does not present the same uniformity as the human intellect." In support of this thesis he points to differences in bravery and sympathy that seem to be innate.*

The emphasis that he puts on custom as the determiner of the *moral* and the *immoral* he realizes is liable to cause the reader to regard custom as the basis of the moral and immoral rather than the emotions. In order that there be no mistake regarding his position he writes as follows: "It will be argued that by deriving the characteristics of moral indignation from its connection with custom we implicitly contradict our initial assumption that moral emotions lie at the bottom of all moral judgments. But it is not so. Custom is a moral rule only on account of the indignation called forth by its transgression. In the ethical aspect it is nothing but a generalization of the emotional tendencies, applied to certain modes of conduct and transmitted from generation to generation. Public indignation lies at the bottom of it. In its capacity of a rule of duty, custom, *mos*, is derived from the emotion to which it gave its name." †

* Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. I, 11.

† *Ibid.*, vol. I, 121.

Here it is pointed out that the violation arouses moral indignation. This, however, is explained as due to the fact that custom is the result of the emotions aroused by certain activities. In other words, it is held that customs are moral guides and arouse the moral emotions because the activities connected with them arouse the emotions. It could thus be held that the variety of customs reflect innate differences between the various races.

If, however, the various customs and moral ideas are the reflections of innate differences, then the moral ideas of each race should show great uniformity, and changes in the moral ideas of a race should be accompanied by changes in the innate characters of the race. It should, therefore, follow that the moral evolution of the last one thousand years in Europe should be accompanied by corresponding changes in the innate characters of the peoples concerned. There are not lacking defenders of this position. It finds an elaborate defense in the writings of Sutherland.

According to Sutherland, the increase in conjugal sympathy, the increase in kindness, the growing respect for law and order are the results of biological modifications.

"I had also written a chapter describing the mitigation of criminal treatment, showing how radically different must have been the nervous organization of the crowds of former days, who gathered in eager zeal to watch the torture of men and women, from that of the

cultured lady or gentleman of our own time, who would shrink with horror from the thought of witnessing a scene so agonizing, and would give a fortune rather than be compelled to take any part in what our ancestors undoubtedly enjoyed." *

"It is, I am convinced, an actual systemic change which has been the cause of the great development of sympathy in the past. A man fairly typical of the modern standard of sympathy would rather have a hand cut off than that any person should be killed by his fault. One of our ancestors a thousand years ago would without compunction have slaughtered thirty persons to save his hand. . . . The Roman emperor, Valentinian, had two bears whose cage was always kept near his bedroom, so that without trouble he could daily see them devour the limbs of men who had just been executed, thus losing before his meals nothing of an appetizing spectacle. Can we conceive that a modern emperor of Germany would feel anything but deep loathing and disgust in such a scene? Yet fully half the Roman emperors found more or less pleasure in the sight of mutilation and death. So greatly has the nerve susceptibility of the race been altered in the interval." †

Sutherland is convinced that this evolution will continue and that five hundred years more of progress at the present rate will see all marital problems solved. "The time will doubtless come," he says, "when it will

* Vol. II, 1.

† *Ibid.*, 4.

be held a monstrous thing to keep in chains of bondage those who have ceased to love or respect each other, to compel to the daily contact of common housekeeping those who have come to despise each other. Then it will be open to such couples to separate as freely as they united; but when that time comes, scarce a couple will wish to separate; for if the world can only continue for five centuries more that progress in conjugal sympathy which has characterized the last two centuries, marriage will naturally be indissoluble." *

A similar interpretation of variations in social behavior is offered by Veblen in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*. Veblen's concern is to give a biological interpretation of the fact that some men work and some do not.

According to Veblen, at the dawn of human society all men worked on account of the scarcity of wealth. With improved methods of production a surplus of wealth was acquired. This made it possible for some men to survive who did not work. Since life possesses a tendency to realize all possibilities, there came into existence a type of man in whom the predatory instinct usurped the place of the instinct of workmanship. Men of the predatory or emulative type, in whom the instinct of pugnacity is strong, compose the leisure class. Men in whom the instinct of workmanship retains its strength belong to the laboring classes.

It is because of this biological difference between

* *Ibid.*, vol. I, 289.

men of the leisure class and men of the laboring class that the former take so much delight in games of chance and sports of all kinds, while the latter seem to care little for such diversions. Veblen does not fail to take into account the fact that occasionally men of the leisure class show a desire to work and to bear their part of the social burden. Such behavior as this he interprets as a case of sporadic reversion to the more primitive type. As the position of the leisure class becomes more and more secure, the pugnacious instinct will become less and less valuable, and we may, therefore, expect the frequency of the above reversions to increase. It is for this reason that such reversions occur more frequently in women than in men of the leisure class.*

The extravagancies of Veblen are equalled, if not excelled, by Trotter's interpretation of the differences between the English and Germans.

In spite of the close kinship of the English to the Germans, and of the excellent account of the observed differences between the English and Germans in terms of social causes, Trotter feels that the differences must be really a result of biological differences. In fact, he tells us that it is only by regarding the differences in this way that he is able to understand the inability of the English to understand the Germans. He accordingly reaches the conclusion that there are innate differences between these peoples, in terms of which he

* Introduction, p. 215-217, 338 ff.

can account for the difference between their songs, their methods of attack, and their discipline.

He is evidently afraid that no one will take him seriously. He, therefore, warns us that he is: "When I compare German society with the wolf pack, and the feelings, desires, and impulses of the individual German with those of the wolf or dog, I am not intending to use a vague analogy, but to call attention to a real and gross identity. . . . The psychical necessity that makes the wolf brave in mass attack is the same that makes the German brave in mass attack; the psychical necessity that makes the dog submit to the whip of his master and profit by it makes the German soldier submit to the whip of his officer and profit by it. The instinctive process which makes the dog among his fellows irritable, suspicious, ceremonious, sensitive about his honor, and immediately ready to fight for it is identical with the German and produces identical effects." *

Trotter seems to have returned from "the bracing atmosphere of the biological sciences" with the discovery of a new species, embracing wolves, dogs, and Germans. Such extravagancies may well be dismissed as due to the intoxicating effects of an overdose of patriotism. The adherents of race interpretation of culture are unfortunate in having champions who reduce their position to an absurdity. We shall have no more to say regarding them.

* *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, 191.

The more modest claims of champions of the view that differences in moral ideas, sentiments, customs, and institutions are due to innate differences are also difficult to maintain. If differences in moral ideas are founded on differences in the emotions, regarded as innate characters, to what are we to attribute the change in moral ideas following changes in environment? The high correlation between the customs of a community and the moral judgments of the individual invites us to regard the moral ideas as contributions of society. We are strongly inclined to accept this invitation when we observe the radical changes in one's character following new contacts and changes in social position; for so great are the changes induced in this way that we hardly exaggerate this influence in saying that the constancy of character itself is dependent upon a constancy in the environmental conditions affecting the individual.

There is no need to suppose, then, that the moral evolution of the past two thousand years has been accompanied by or caused by corresponding changes in the innate characters of the race. Indeed, we should have no hesitancy in saying that if the conditions under which we live were reversed with the conditions under which people lived two thousand years ago, our moral ideas would be identical with those of people who lived two thousand years ago. If this be denied, the person making the denial is confronted with the difficulty of explaining the sudden change in attitude

of the Fijian of to-day and the Fijian of seventy years ago regarding cannibalism. Sutherland himself might well hesitate to hold that this change has been brought about by a change in the innate characters of the race.

In the absence of proof of such changes in original nature during the past few thousand years, to say the least, and with the weight of opinion of biologists and anthropologists against such an assumption, we should look for the causes of the evolution of the moral ideas and of culture in other factors. These factors are not hard to find. The growth of culture, like the growth of invention, is cumulative. One bit of culture acts as a new stimulus to man, and thus brings about new growth. In an isolated group we should expect some slight changes in its culture. But in a group that has wide and intensive contacts with many other peoples the process is greatly accelerated. It also gathers momentum from improved methods of intercommunication within the group and by rendering available new sources of wealth.

It is in terms of this sort that we are to account for the spectacular advance in Western Civilization, and the even more spectacular advance in the civilization of Japan. These changes were not due to innate modifications of the peoples concerned. They took place as the result of new conditions introduced into the environment, by increased knowledge, by contacts with other cultures, by making available new resources,

and by greater degree of intercommunication within the group.

It is for this reason that we find backward communities within all racial groups. Communities of this sort are not necessarily composed of a degenerate stock. Their lack of progress and artistic and creative fruitfulness may be due to lack of contacts; for as contact of mind with mind makes for mental development, so contact of culture with culture makes for cultural development. It is in light of this principle that we understand what brought about the Renaissance. It is the same principle that enables us to account for the backwardness of isolated groups.* Thus we see that even when we restrict original nature to the original nature of a single race or tribe, little light is thrown by it on the culture of the people. Customs and institutions change, but original nature remains the same. A knowledge, therefore, of original nature can tell us very little regarding the culture of a people. If this is true, then we cannot hope to explain cultural phenomena in terms of the innate characters of a group no matter how restricted we make the group or the cultural phenomena.

The above truth can be made all the more apparent

* There is, of course, a certain draining off of young men and women from isolated groups. They seek a larger world. The bad effect of this on the group has by many been overrated. It is generally assumed that the superior leave. It is as often true that the superior establish themselves as leaders, and thus have no desire to leave. Those who are unable to make satisfactory adjustments leave.

through a consideration of the fact that when we know the institution, we cannot tell the psychological principles, or innate characters, that are supposed to underlie it. This may be clearly illustrated through a consideration of the various interpretations of the origin of religion.

According to Spencer and Tylor, primitive man in his efforts to understand his dreams, faintings, and apoplexies regarded himself as having a "double." If a person dreamed that he was in a far country, he accounted for the phenomenon as due to the fact that his "double" had taken a journey while he was asleep. The same sort of explanation was given for fainting spells, coma, and even death. In each case his "double" had left him. In death the "double" took permanent leave of him, and became a spirit who helped or injured the living. The power attributed to these spirits constantly increased until they were finally regarded as the rulers not only of men but of the powers of nature also. *

Opposed to this animistic interpretation of the origin of religious concepts, or belief in spirits, is the naturalistic interpretation. This view is championed by Max Müller. According to this view, it is nature that arouses in man the feelings of wonder and sublimity through its changes and the greatness of its power and forces. Nature is full of surprises for primitive man, and its changes must arouse within him feelings of

* Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. I, 134 ff.

fear, wonder, and even admiration, for it is only through reducing natural phenomena to general laws that nature has come to assume the air of uniformity commonly ascribed to it. For instance, the spontaneous generation of fire as the result of the friction of branches, or as the result of lightning, has an air of mystery. So has the ease of its extinction. Coming in such a mysterious way, disappearing so easily, and yet withal so useful to man, it is well calculated to arouse in him feelings of wonder and awe. The same is true of the other works of nature. Its vastness arouses the feelings of infinitude. The grandeur of the mountains overwhelms him, and the beauty of the heavens impresses upon him the emotion of the sublime. But nature has for him another side. Its mighty rivers and destructive tornadoes are terrors which cause him to feel insignificant and helpless—the puppet of a mighty power.

The forces of nature, however, must become personalized before they can become the object of cult. This is brought about as the inevitable consequence of the crudities of language. When it thunders, it is *something* that thunders. This is soon converted in the absence of nicety of expression and scientific knowledge into *some one* that thunders. When the transition from the impersonal to the personal has taken place, there is provided all that is necessary as the basis of religion. Concepts thus acquired are later extended to the spirits of ancestors who are deified. But it must be

remembered that before the deification of ancestors can take place, the concept of deity is necessary. This concept arose, according to Müller, in the above manner.*

Durkheim, in his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*,† gives an excellent statement of the above theories, only to reject them. After directing against them a destructive criticism, he advances his own theory of the origin of belief in spirits. His theory may well be regarded as a social interpretation of the religious concepts.

According to Spencer and Müller, the sacred results from a belief in spirits. According to Durkheim, the reverse is true. Spirits result from the sacred. The sacred itself results from the difference between the individual alone and the individual inspired and ennobled by contact with his fellows. The concept of the sacred is born of the intensification of life that results from contacts with one's fellows. Society, the collective force of the group, exists in each individual, and as a result the individual feels a power or force greater and more noble than those that he holds to be purely his own, helping him to do noble and praiseworthy acts. To this power he attaches a veneration and reverence that distinguish it from the profane. How else is he to regard it save as of spiritual nature. Concepts having thus been brought to light, it is a mere matter of chance association what objects will be

* Müller, *Physical Religion*.

† 44-54.

regarded as sacred, or as the source of the superior power. Religion in this way is thus founded on a reality, and its permanence and influence are thus accounted for.*

We have here three theories of the origin of religion.† Which one is correct, or whether all are correct, we cannot tell from a knowledge of original nature. As far as original nature is concerned, religion may have originated through either one of these processes. It is true that in speculations of this nature, psychological principles are valuable in ruling out improbable hypotheses. But in this case the interpretations cannot be rejected through psychological considerations. To understand the origin of religion, therefore, it is necessary to know the facts, or the factors, that brought to light the religious emotions in man. This is a matter of history, and not of psychology; for whatever the findings may be, psychology will be under equal obligation to reconcile with them its principles.

The practice of cannibalism affords another illustration of cultural phenomena which cannot be accounted for in terms of psychological principles. In virtue of what psychological principle did the practice of cannibalism originate? Or how shall we root it in original nature? Shall we regard it as a result of hunger? Or is it the result of belief in magic? Or is it the result of hatred? Or of love? Here again knowledge of

* *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.*

† Marshall, *Instinct and Reason*, 206, 217, regards religion as the result of an instinct of recent development.

original nature fails to indicate from what root it sprang. It may be practised for any of the above reasons, and has been. The facts alone can tell what are the determining causes in each case. Obviously, there can be little value in rooting it in original nature. Here again the determining causes must be discovered in the factors that affect human nature rather than in original nature itself.

The same is true regarding practically all customs and taboos. The custom may be the same in separate instances, and yet the reasons for it may be quite different. Thus it may be observed that two tribes have a taboo against basket-making. But one cannot infer from this that the taboo is the result of the same psychological principles. In one case it may be due to the fact that lightning killed a man who undertook to make baskets. This event was taken as evidence of the disapproval of the spirits. Hence the taboo. In another tribe the taboo may have arisen because the art of basket-making was practised by a neighboring tribe that was regarded as inferior. To make baskets would therefore be a blow to the tribe's self-esteem. Hence the taboo.

If original nature is able to throw light on cultural phenomena, it should be able to throw considerable light on the division of labor between the sexes, for the marked physiological differences between the sexes should provide a clear-cut principle for such division of labor. Yet, according to Lowie, "this division is

largely conventional, *i. e.*, in no way connected with the physiological characteristics of the sexes, as may often be proved by contrasting the regulations of different and even neighboring tribes. Thus the Southern Bantu rigorously exclude women from their herds, while the Hottentot women regularly milk the cows."

"Each people has its traditional conceptions of masculine and feminine employment. . . . A polygamous Thonga becomes a parasite supported by his gardener wives; a Kirgiz wife performs the household tasks, while her husband not only tends the herds but also supplies the fire-wood, tills the soil, and manufactures all household vessels—the Toda woman has hardly any duties besides pounding and sifting grain, cleaning the hut, and decorating clothing."*

Illustrations of this point need not be limited to remote and isolated peoples: the peasant women of Europe are accustomed to work for which we employ only men. Even when we confine our observation to a single community we find that the work the women do depends largely on the economic well-being of their husbands. Some women whose husbands are poor work long hours at almost anything; while others whose husbands are well off spend a large part of their time in idleness. Yet we know, Veblen to the contrary, that the activities of practically all these women could have been reversed if they had married different men.

* *Primitive Society*, 74-76.

In spite of the many difficulties and inadequacies of psychological, or rather biological, interpretations of social behavior and cultural phenomena, the attempt to apply them is often made. In fact, some writers seem to feel that, however satisfactory their account may be in terms of social factors, they must give a biological account of social behavior.

Thus, for example, if one is discussing the rise and fall in constructive and commercial enterprises, the explanation must be set in biological terms. A good illustration of this is found in an article by G. R. Davis in *The American Journal of Sociology* of 1920.

According to Davis, every conspicuous advance in civilization is a consequence of "instinctive energies thrown into new channels by increasing mentality. Just what, in the primary sense, is responsible for the awakening powers is a baffling problem."* In the same way he accounts for the cessation of the constructive activities. It does not serve his purpose to regard as sufficient an explanation in terms of natural obstacles, scarcity of resources, and barriers to further trade contacts. The real cause is the depression of *the constructive instinct*. The factors just referred to only served to bring about the depression of the instinct; as a consequence of this depression constructive activities decrease. Certainly an heroic attempt is here made to employ psychology in the interpretation of social behavior. Yet it is extremely doubtful if

* 212.

additional light is thrown on the situation by saying that certain factors depressed the instinct for construction, and that this in turn depressed constructive activities; for the factors that brought about the change are what interest us. We are willing to neglect the nexus between the two variables which seem to stand in relation of cause to effect.

Perhaps, however, the *instinct of construction* means more to Davis than a nexus to connect stimulus and response. Perhaps he feels a necessity similar to that felt by Veblen, viz.: If men work, it must be in virtue of an instinct to work. If men engage in constructive enterprises, it must be due to a corresponding instinct. Yet why should these writers feel that activities require corresponding instincts?

Is work the result of an instinct? That work is the result of conditions under which one lives seems to be recognized by Veblen himself in accounting for the universality of work at the dawn of human society. Change the conditions and one's attitude toward work undergoes a profound change. And instinct that is thus dependent for its expression on environmental conditions might well surrender its rôle as a motivator of activity; for the real motivator seems to be the total situation. That there is no need for an instinct of this sort becomes apparent through the consideration that work is always for the purpose of realizing some desire.

We work, not because we have an instinct to work,

but because we live in a world that makes it necessary that we have purposes and make provision for the future. Place man in a world in which all his future wants are provided for, there would be little work. We work because we live in a world in which work is necessary. The attractiveness of the Garden of Eden lies to a great extent in the fact that there men lived in a world in which work was unnecessary. Men in such a world would not work if the habits of those living in the tropics may be taken as sufficient evidence of what men in general would do in a world freed of the necessity of work. In the tropics little work is necessary and little work is done.

There is no necessity of confining our illustrations to remote tribes. Great numbers of men in our own communities, provided with ample means, do no work. This class of men is not confined to the wealthy. Men of moderate means prefer to live on a small income rather than work for a larger one. Even laborers show this disposition. It is a common complaint in the South that high wages for cotton-picking makes it difficult to get the cotton picked, as this only affords the pickers a living for less work, and consequently they do less work. On the other hand, we have all observed many men of wealth hard at work. Are we to follow Veblen in regarding these men as cases of sporadic reversion to the primitive instinct? They can be much better accounted for in terms of the ideals and purposes that have been impressed on these indi-

viduals than in terms of a biological difference between them and other men of wealth.

We may safely assume then that men work, not because of an innate urge to work, but because of necessity and of the ideals impressed on them. The necessities of men differ. What is a necessity to one man is gladly dispensed with by another, if he can save himself from working. On the other hand, men who have no need to work and yet do work are animated by high and big purposes. They are ambitious to become great. It is for this reason that we find men in all classes hard at work. But work in no case should be regarded as due to an innate urge to work. When it is not due to necessity it is due rather to the dynamic character of purposes, ideals, and ambitions which have arisen in the individual as a result of his contacts and training.

In denying that work is due to an innate urge to work and insisting that we work because we live in a world which makes work necessary, I do not wish to convey the impression that work is unpleasant. Much work is decidedly pleasant. It may be rendered so by the fact that the activity itself is pleasant, but more often, by the fact that we enjoy realizing our ideals and giving an expression to purposes we have long entertained.

It is thus with the boy, full of energy as he is. When he runs eagerly on some errand, it is not because he is thus afforded a release to his instinct of work. It is more often due to his anticipation of some gift, or

the desire to win the approval and praise of his parent, or perhaps, in some instances, to please his parent. In the same way, when the adult works, it is not because of the instinct to work. It is in order to achieve certain ends and to be true to his ideals and values. To work under such conditions is pleasurable. To be prevented from working, and thus prevented from the realization of one's ends and ideals, is decidedly unpleasant. For these reasons pleasure is experienced in working, and pain in being prevented from working.

In order to account for social behavior, or cultural phenomena, in terms of biological or innate characters, it is necessary that the innate character be found wherever the cultural phenomena are. It is also necessary, if this explanation is to be of any value, that wherever there are found cultural differences a corresponding difference in the innate characters of the people be discovered. Veblen recognizes the obviousness of this logic. Wherever men work there is the instinct of workmanship. Wherever men fail to work the instinct of workmanship is weak, and in its place there are predatory instincts.

But in spite of the obviousness of this logic it is not always followed. For example, McDougall attempts to explain the warlike preparations of Europe as due to the instinct of pugnacity, thus accounting for a cultural development, confined, certainly in its most aggravated form, to one group, in terms of an instinct

that is supposed to be common to all groups of men. "In our own age," says McDougall, "the same instinct (*i. e.*, pugnacity) makes Europe an armed camp of twelve million soldiers." *

Evidently in giving this explanation he forgot the negative cases of America, China, and other unprepared peoples, or else he abandoned his conception of instinct as an innate urge or tendency common to all members of a species. The negative cases referred to, and the fact that instincts are supposed to be common to the species, should have shown him the worthlessness of such an explanation, while the degree of America's pugnacity when she was once aroused, after her long calm, suggests that this phenomenon should be regarded as due to a force generated by changed conditions instead of to the release of an innate force or instinct.

It must be admitted, of course, that unless America and Europe were capable of warlike activities they would never indulge in these activities. But, on the other hand, we know that the capacity is actualized only under certain conditions. It remains dormant under others. Consequently, war cannot be interpreted in terms of a capacity which exists at all times whether there be war or peace. The capacity is merely a necessary condition. An adequate interpretation of war must be in terms of the variables, which determine whether the capacity shall be actualized or remain

* *Social Psychology*, 281.

dormant. The capacity or the instinct of pugnacity cannot serve as an explanation, since it as a constant cannot be used to explain variables.

In fairness to McDougall, however, it must be pointed out that he would hardly maintain, as I have heard a professor at Teachers College do, that the instinct of pugnacity is aroused and that we then go out to look for some one to fight. He could quite readily admit that the causes which lead to war are social. That is to say, owing to certain social developments we find ourselves in an unbearable situation. A readjustment becomes necessary. But then the question arises: Why under these conditions do we go to war? Why not resort to arbitration? Or to debates as the Scholastics did? Or to a game of chance? These are possible methods of affecting a readjustment. The reason for pushing them aside is because we are pugnacious.

This argument, however, falls beneath its own weight. As is pointed out, there are other methods of settling difficulties than by war. But war is only one of the forms the instinct of pugnacity may take, as is seen in the number of civil cases, the keenness of business competition, rivalry in sports, and in the debates of the Scholastics referred to. Also there is in man, according to Veblen, a strong instinct of workmanship, and according to Trotter a strong instinct of gregariousness. Also it is apparent that man takes great delight in games of chance. Why are the instincts of workmanship and gregariousness and the delight in

games of chance pushed aside in order that the instinct of pugnacity may be indulged? And why does pugnacity take the form of war rather than some other?

Man is capable of all these responses and he indulges in first one and then the other. But we can never hope to explain why a particular one is indulged in terms of the capacities themselves. For the determiners we must look outside of original nature itself to the variable factors, which determine whether the capacities shall remain dormant or be actualized.

McDougall offers an explanation of the recent growth of cities quite similar to his explanation of the warlike preparations in Europe. The cities have grown because people on account of their strong gregarious instinct have been drawn into crowded centres. If the question should be asked why did not this instinct affect the growth of cities in the past in the same degree, McDougall would reply: On account of custom, people had grown accustomed to living in rural communities, but now with certain changed conditions the old instinct has been able to assert itself, and as a consequence people are flocking to the cities.

This assertion of instinct is not regarded as due to a new force created in man on account of economic changes and new contacts. These latter factors have served only to break down custom, which had held in bondage the gregarious instinct: "Custom, the great controller of individual impulses, being weakened, the deep-seated instincts, especially the gregarious instinct,

have found the opportunity to determine the choice of men."

It is this conception of desires and impulses as innate forces in the organism that social writers have in mind when they warn us against the inversion and thwarting of our instincts. It is this that is in mind when social evils are regarded as due to the repression of instinct, and when the *natural* expression of instinct is regarded as the panacea of all evils.

Yet why should desires and impulses be regarded as pent-up forces in man under all conditions? This conception Jung quite aptly compares to the conception of luminosity existing in the iron because when it is heated sufficiently it will glow. Such a view of our motives and impulses would seem to imply that we are unaffected by the environment in which we live, other than as an opportunity is given, now for the satisfaction of one desire and now for another. Instead of regarding our desires and impulses in this static way, we should hold that our desires are born of definite situations, and that with changes in our environment there come into existence a world of new desires and impulses, which begin to show their influence in social and cultural phenomena.

That the conception of desires and impulses existing as innate forces longing for a particular mode of expression is without value in explanations of institutions and customs should be apparent from a consideration of the great diversity in institutions and customs,

and the variety of likes and dislikes relative to the same object. It is for this reason that institutions and customs cannot be regarded as expressions of innate or pent-up forces inherited from generation to generation. Indeed, the forces that we experience in behavior are more largely due to our institutions and customs than the reverse.

As for the origin of our customs and institutions, we are in the dark. We can no more explain their origin than the biologist can explain the origin of life. What we know is that we have institutions and customs which exert a profound influence on us, and that their changes follow upon new conditions introduced into their setting. It is useless to attempt to account for these changes in terms of an unknown entity that remains a constant in all culture. To do so is a strange reversal of method; for it consists largely in abandoning the known and variable factors as explanations for a factor that is not only a constant but which is only known as a sort of nexus between one known and another known. A nexus of this sort is quite unnecessary, and throws no great light on cultural phenomena. Indeed, such a force is detrimental to the study of social phenomena, for either it is rendered unnecessary by the adequacy of the explanation in terms of social causes, or if these causes are not adequate to account for the phenomenon the use of this force invites us to abandon further investigation by regarding the phenomenon as due to the operation of a hidden entity.

In the study of culture and social behavior the most that can be assigned to instincts or to original nature is to regard original nature as endowing man with various capacities to be affected, and, above all, the capacity to be profoundly influenced by the environment in which he is placed. If original nature is assigned this rôle, the variety of social practices can be understood without difficulty. This variety, however, presents numerous difficulties if we regard the social behavior of man as rooted in or determined by his supply of innate instincts or impulses.

This conception of instincts is a relic of the discarded Faculty Psychology, which split the mind into various faculties in terms of which the activities of the individual were explained. The will, for instance, was supposed to exist independently of the intellect. Now we know that the mind is a unit in this respect. Our knowledge and our will are both largely products of our experience. Given a certain mass of experience and a certain setting, the individual will make certain cognitions, and at the time of making these cognitions will have certain impulses, or a *will* of a certain sort. Neither his cognition nor his impulse can be explained by reference to his original nature, for if his past experience had been different, or if the needs and interest of the moment had been different, both his cognition and impulse would have been different.

Thus the peasant women of Europe wish to be scolded, slapped, and beaten. How different are the

women in America or in higher European circles! Thus our old cling to life with terrible desperation, while the Fijian desires to be buried alive before his manhood is impaired! The roots of original nature throw little light on such diversity. Biology, or the psychology built of biology, can tell us little regarding cultural developments of this sort. The inadequacy of explanations in these terms has been clearly pointed out by Lowie:

"All that psychologists tell us of ethical feelings and the will leaves the problem before us untouched. Why this particular curious feeling developed, what place it occupies in mental life, the psychologist fails to explain. We get simply general formulæ about feeling and will that are equally applicable to the case of the man's beating his wife, or to a boy's resisting the temptations of a lollypop. . . . Psychology, then, fails throughout to supply us with the interpretation we want. It is as impotent to reduce to really interpretative psychological principles the subjective aspect of cultural phenomena as it is to explain the historical sequence of events." *

The justness of this criticism becomes apparent when we recall that the same objective behavior, such as, for example, cannibalism, religion, or the various taboos, may be due to diverse psychological principles. On the other hand, when we know the psychological attitude and the feelings underlying the treatment ac-

* *Culture and Ethnology*, 15.

corded a person, we have no way of knowing that the treatment will be the same. Thus, for example, the love for parents may be expressed by the tender care shown them, or by eating them, or by burying them alive.*

Or the love of one parent may cause him to demand from his child exact obedience, or to imprison him in a temple; while love of another may cause him to grant every whim of the child.

In the face of the profound influence of environmental conditions on the behavior of the individual, it would not have occurred to students to attempt to explain the diversity of social behavior and of culture in terms of innate characters had it not been for the conception of instincts as creators of psychic tension, and as entities that are either being expressed in our institutions or being thwarted by them, as can be seen in the fact that this is the assumption that is common to all the writers whom I have criticised. Indeed, it is around this assumption that the social philosophy of instinct has been built.

Enough has been said to make it apparent that this philosophy has its roots deep in the psychology founded on the theory of evolution. This philosophy rests on the assumption that the individual, as a result of

* For a touching description of this last-named ceremony, see Westermarck, vol. I, 389. More significant, perhaps, than the treatment accorded the old are the expectations and desires of the old. Thus the old in certain cultures wish to live as long as possible and cling to life; in another culture they wish to die before they become senile.

phylogeny, brings with him into this world a mass of tendencies and ancestral memories which must leave their mark on the individual and influence in some way his behavior. It finds its basis in the treatment of instincts as creators of tension, or as innate *forces*, which crave for *natural* expression. It finds its basis in certain vitalistic conceptions which regard the development and behavior of the individual as watched over by a Vital Principle, which has in mind a definite end, that must be realized if the individual is to be spared the feeling of being thwarted from the realization of his own preordained end or maximum development. It rests on the assumption that the individual is a self-sufficient being, who needs only to be freed from all restrictions and repressions in order to realize his greatest and highest development.

In the foregoing I have been interested in criticising the use of this conception in ethics and in sociology. I have shown that this conception in ethics fails to point out the course to the moral life, and that its use in this science makes for certain undesirable and anti-social tendencies; and in sociology that it fails to give an interpretation of culture and social behavior. In the following chapter I wish to raise a more fundamental objection to this use of instinct, namely, that it is not only the use that is unwarranted but that the conception itself is unnecessary and raises a great many problems that we escape entirely if the behavior of an individual is regarded as determined by the relation he

sustains to his environment, rather than as due to *forces*, endowed with a sort of existence that makes them independent of the situation in which they are supposed to function.

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CHAPTER V

INSTINCT IN PSYCHOLOGY

As can be seen from reference to Chapter II, there is a general recognition that behavior must be interpreted in terms of experience. The mistake, however, is often made of extending the field of experience beyond the experience of the individual to include the experience of the species, or experience acquired in other incarnations, or perhaps it is made to embrace the wisdom of wonderful ancestors, or of God. Closely akin to this mistake is the tendency to regard the behavior of an organism as due to a *force* or power supposed to exist outside of the situation in which it appears or manifests itself.

There is in Modern Psychology a strong desire to get beyond these primitive interpretations. This desire is the underlying cause of the present strong tendency toward behaviorism, which seeks to interpret the behavior of an organism frankly in terms of the conditions which give rise to the act, and on the basis of observed behavior to predict future behavior under different conditions. This interpretation of behavior does not concern itself with underlying causes of behavior or with the agencies which connect certain stimuli with certain responses. Indeed, it is the claim

of many modern psychologists that speculations regarding the nexus between certain conditions and certain responses may well be abandoned and that a purely factual study of behavior may be attempted without reference to the usually assumed underlying forces. The task that these men have set for themselves is so to correlate behavior with the variable determinants of behavior, and the behavior of one individual with the behavior of others, that the prediction and control of behavior shall become possible.

Naturally, men who have set for themselves this task can have but little patience with the barren speculations regarding the motive *forces* back of behavior. These men rightly hold that just as we are content to explain the precipitation of a chemical from the solution in terms of the antecedent conditions that brought about the precipitation, so we should be content to explain the behavior of an organism in terms of the antecedent conditions that brought about the response. C. Lloyd Morgan may be regarded as a champion of this position. He has stated the argument so clearly that it seems well to quote him:

"Now when one is dealing not with a crystal which is differentiated within a solution, but with a percept which is differentiated within experience, I conceive that the same limitations should be imposed on scientific treatment. The metaphysician, no doubt, may explain it by reference to an underlying cause, the conscious ego, the agency of self-activity by which it

is produced; but the man of science can only explain it by reference to the antecedent and accompanying conditions in relation to the generalizations which have been found to hold good in such cases." *

It is this behavioristic interpretation of behavior that furnishes a sure basis for all measurements of intelligence which no speculation regarding the nature of intelligence or of the *intelligent principle* can shake. It is true that doubt regarding the nature of intelligence, or what it is that makes intelligent behavior possible, may be entertained. There can be no doubt, however, that on the basis of the observed behavior of an individual under certain conditions his behavior under different conditions can with a good deal of assurance be predicted. This prediction is made possible by correlating one act under one set of conditions with other acts under other conditions. On the basis of this correlation an intelligence rating is passed, which no speculation regarding the nature of intelligence can shake; for there is no question regarding the nature of intelligence. It is simply a matter of correlations between activities, and the person passing on the capacity of the subject is not puzzled with questions regarding the nature of the agency in virtue of which the activity takes place.

It is true that examinations of this nature reveal innate differences between different people. One in-

* *The Natural History of Experience* in vol. III, *The British Journal of Psychology*, 3.

dividual when subjected to one situation will respond in one way. Another individual subjected to the same conditions will respond in a different way. This difference may be due to an innate difference or to a difference in training. The true cause must be determined. But this does not involve a discussion regarding the nature of the agency in virtue of which the organism acts intelligently. It merely introduces another variable. As a consequence the prediction of future behavior is not based entirely on the behavior as observed at any one time. It is necessary that the past experiences be taken into consideration. Thus we say, when an individual of a certain age, with a certain mass of experience, acts in a certain way when confronted with a certain situation, he will respond or be able to respond in a certain way when he reaches a certain age. With another individual the prediction would be quite different. As a result of these observations it is predicted that one boy will be able to follow successfully a certain profession, and that the other boy had better choose another. In neither judgment is there raised a question regarding the nature of intelligence. It is frankly behavioristic. On the basis of observed acts future behavior is predicted.

It should be pointed out that one of the values supposed to result from the use of instinct is its aid in making predictions. That is to say, it can be predicted of any human being that he will have certain interests, desires, etc. It is quite easy, however, to overrate

this value. This can be seen in the fact that when differences in behavior are pointed out between individuals under the same circumstances, the difference is in many cases regarded as due to differences between the instincts of the individuals in question. Behavior, then, is not interpreted in terms of common characters, and this is the usual way instincts are regarded, but in terms of innate characters which may or may not be the same that they are in other individuals.

The position of those who hold that instinct is a valuable concept for prediction may be reduced to the dilemma: Either instincts are common traits found in all members of a species, or they are not. If they are common, they can throw little light on the wide diversity of behavior relative to any instinct that may be selected. If they are not common, or if they are regarded as varying in strength to such an extent that they can be used to account for differences in behavior, the only way we have of determining the strength of an instinct is by observing the behavior of individuals in various circumstances. After having determined the strength of the instinct in this way we can undoubtedly make predictions. But in this case our predictions are really based on our observations of behavior instead of on the assumption of instincts. We are thus once more driven back to our behavioristic attitude.

It is, however, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to maintain this air of isolation from all speculations

regarding the underlying determinants of behavior. We are not content to say that this act results from these conditions. We wish to know "why" the organism responds as it does to the conditions. "Why" do children under certain conditions tease each other? "Why" do men under certain conditions fight? "Why" do they under other conditions flock to the cities? "Why" do they find certain kinds of activities satisfying?

Nor is this question limited to inquiries regarding specific activities. The fact that organisms are active seems to require an explanation. "Why" are organisms active? It seems that they should be inert, like rocks and stones. Yet they are intensely active. "Why" or in virtue of what forces do organisms act? Surely there must be deep underlying causes for this activity, which should be discovered.

We should not be greatly surprised, therefore, that psychologists are unable to maintain their frankly behavioristic attitude, or that this attitude should prove unacceptable to a great number of psychologists. They are driven away from it by the necessity they feel of accounting for "why" an organism responds as it does when confronted with certain conditions, and by the necessity many feel of accounting for the fact that organisms are active. In their efforts to answer these questions they have invoked the use of instinct in three different senses, which are supplementary to each other and which follow each other when the question

"why" is repeated. The more often the "why" is raised the further from behaviorism do we get.

It is only a short step from behaviorism to say that the organism acts as it does on account of its structure, or the fact that it is ready to act. We are a little further removed when we supplement this explanation of the "why" by saying that the act is due to an impulse inherited as a result of the adaptations of the species. And we are still further removed when we explain the ability of the species to make the adaptation by assuming the existence of certain vital forces. These are the three uses of instinct that are made to supplement behaviorism. How one use follows inevitably from another may be clearly seen through a consideration of these usages beginning with instincts regarded as functional correlatives of structure, then as adaptations of the species, and then as forces in virtue of which the organisms made the adaptations.

The conception of instincts as functional correlatives of structure assumes that with the presence of an organ or of structure in a certain state there is the aptitude and tendency to use it in a certain way. This is the conception that furnishes the basis of Thorndike's explanation of pleasure and pain in terms of readiness and unreadiness of neurones to act. This is the position that James vigorously champions.

James furnishes us with a clear illustration of this interpretation of behavior in his explanation of the behavior of the cat with reference to the rat. The cat,

we are told, is "so framed that when that particular running thing called a mouse appears in his field of vision he *must* pursue." * Nervous systems, James goes on to say, are bundles of such action patterns which are as fated to respond as the sneezing mechanism when properly excited.

The illustrations James uses to impress upon us the definiteness of instinctive responses are admirably chosen. He is not unmindful, however, of the great variety of conflicting tendencies manifested by the same organism. To account for this he assumes that organisms possess contrary impulses to act on many classes of things, and that many impulses are transient unless properly exercised at the opportune moment.†

The admission that the same organism may possess contrary impulses and the illustrations he uses to show that certain instincts are transient cast considerable doubt on the value of the conception of instincts as functional correlatives of structure; for if the same structure may act in opposite and various ways, structure becomes a limiting factor of behavior, but not the determining one. If this is true, it becomes necessary for us to look to factors other than those of structure for the determinants of behavior. The illustrations of transitoriness, which James uses, will make this clear.

A calf, James is informed, when dropped in the wilds of the mountains becomes as wild and as timid as a

* *Psychology*, Briefer Course, 391.

† *Ibid.*, 398, 402.

deer unless caught during the first week after birth. If, however, calves are cared for by man from birth they are very docile and gentle. The same difference is to be found between the behavior of chicks cared for by man from the first and those that are cared for only after they are several days old.

If chicks when first hatched are cared for by man they are very gentle and will follow him about. But if they are hooded for a few days, and unhooded when three or four days old in the presence of a man, they show the greatest terror and run about wildly in the utmost fright.*

How can such behavior be interpreted in terms of structure? The structure is presumably the same whether the calf is born in the farmyard or in the wilds of the mountains. Yet the behavior within a week after birth becomes radically different.

The gentleness in one case certainly seems transient. It is this very fact that we find hard to reconcile with the view that instincts are functional correlatives of structure. In one case it is transient; in the other it is permanent; in both cases the structure is presumably the same. Yet if the behavior is due to a definite instinct, regarded as the functional correlative of structure, we cannot escape the conclusion that the radical difference between the behavior of the two calves should demand a corresponding difference between their structures. No one, however, would be willing to defend such a thesis.

* *Ibid.*, 400-401.

No wonder then, in view of the many responses of a contradictory nature the same structure may make, it has been found necessary to supplement the conception of instinct as the functional correlative of structure. Organisms do not respond to certain stimuli as they do merely because they have a certain structure; nor do they find pleasure in the response merely because their nervous systems are in a state of readiness. To understand fully why a certain situation provokes a certain response or emotion, we must know the history of the species.

✱ When we know the history of the species, we then know "why" the structure responds in one way rather than another. It is by knowing that men formerly captured their wives that we can understand the roughness of lovers to-day. It is by knowing that men formerly lived in forest and caves that we understand that children should love to play hide-and-seek. It is by knowing that men had severe competition to overcome in the struggle for existence that we can understand war to-day. It is by knowing that men formerly found it necessary to hunt and kill that we can understand teasing, bullying, and other forms of cruelty that exist to-day.

Thus explanations in terms of structure are supplemented by the use of instinct regarded as adaptations or habits of the species!

The prevalence of this use of instinct makes it imperative that we examine it closely. In what way can

instinct regarded as impulses that arose as a result of past conditions be used as an interpretation of present behavior?

Unless psychology is to abandon its hope of interpreting behavior in terms of causes that are acting here and now, it should be apparent that appeals of the above sort to phylogeny are quite worthless. This may be clearly shown through a simple consideration: Either the behavior in question is the result of similar conditions that aroused it in the ancestors, or it is not. If the behavior is due to the same conditions in both cases, obviously there is no need to make an appeal to phylogeny, since the conditions which excited the behavior in phylogeny may be regarded as amply sufficient to arouse it in ontogeny. That is to say, living organisms react to the same situation in the same way and for the same reason that their ancestors did. Hence, the ancestors' responses may well be neglected.

On the other hand, if the response is aroused by a different situation, or if the behavior is not the same, it is obvious that we cannot explain the present behavior in terms of the different behavior of our ancestry, caused by different stimuli from those that now act on us. If explanations of this sort were allowed, there would be no limit to the range of their application. Soon we would be explaining the fact that men now build sky-scrapers by the fact that their ancestors went hunting!

This may seem absurd. Yet the sublimation here involved is no greater than that assumed by Thorndike in the use he makes of the hunting activities of our ancestors to account for teasing of children to-day. In the one case there is an economic drive common to both; in the other cruelty is involved. But the process of this change is entirely ignored. What are the factors that have brought about such a transformation in a highly qualitative drive like the hunting instinct that it now expresses itself in the teasing of children? In the one case the activity is undertaken to secure food; in the other there is the malicious desire to annoy, or to win recognition, or simply to win notice. Factors which are able to bring about this transformation may with a good deal of confidence be trusted as amply sufficient to account for the behavior without recourse to the ancestors' experience.

As obvious as it should seem that the behavior of living organisms cannot be interpreted in terms of conditions which confronted their ancestors, or in terms of the adaptations of their ancestors, there is the general hope that many seemingly "irrational" responses can be "rationalized" when viewed in the light of the experience of the species. The futility of efforts of this sort, however, should be apparent from the above considerations. If the behavior occurred in phylogeny as "rational" adaptations to certain conditions, these adaptations cannot be used to account for the "irrational" responses to different situations.

On the other hand, if the "irrational" responses did occur in phylogeny, then the same question may be asked regarding their occurrence that are asked regarding the behavior to-day. Nor does it seem reasonable to suppose that we shall find it easier to answer these questions when raised regarding the behavior of organisms that lived in the remote past than when raised regarding the behavior of living organisms. In both cases the hope is to interpret the behavior in the light of the needs and setting of the agent, for we should take it as axiomatic that the only conditions which can be used to interpret the behavior of an organism are the conditions that affect the organism. When once this is realized we shall no longer be burdened with explanations of behavior in terms of impulses acquired by our ancestors.

The worthlessness of explanations in these terms may be shown in another way. If our behavior is to be regarded as due to the adaptations of our ancestry to the conditions that existed in the remote past, how is the behavior of our ancestors to be explained? Was the past a wonderful age which possessed such an efficiency that during it organisms acquired impulses and emotions? And is the present so devoid of efficiency that acting causes can serve only to arouse the contributions of the past? Whence the superior efficiency of the past? *

* For criticism of tendency to assign superior efficiency to the past see Woodbridge's article on *Evolution*.

For the wonderful ancestors imagined by primitive man the modern has substituted a period of wonderful efficiency! Organisms that lived in the remote past are no longer regarded as more wonderful than the living. But they lived in a wonderful age when impulses, emotions, and other characters which come to us as innate were to be acquired.

Unless we are to assume that the past possessed this superior efficiency, there can be no advantage in regarding the behavior of living organisms as due to the adaptations of the species. If our impulses arose as the result of the adaptations of the species, organisms must at one time have acted without them. If organisms in the past could act without them there is no reason to suppose that they are necessary for activity to-day. On the other hand, if instincts resulted from the adaptations of organisms in the past, we should look to the present adaptations of organisms for the existing instincts.

When this is done we are again confronted with the problem of activity. We can no longer explain the activity of living organism by saying they act because their ancestors did; for the activity of ancestors requires an explanation. In virtue of what did organisms act before the present instincts had been evolved? In the effort to answer this question the use of instinct, the third degree removed from the attitude of behaviorism, is invoked. Instincts are no longer regarded as simply adaptations of the species. They are the fundamental

forces that underlie all life, and it is due to these *forces* that organisms are active. This is the conception that McDougall employs when he regards instincts as "differentiations of the *Elan Vital*" and as "obscure directive forces" that watch over the development of the individual, in order to direct him and the group to certain ends.

There is little need of entering into a discussion of this use of instinct. Vitalism is generally discredited;—and rightly so, for granting that the vitalist can point to certain phenomena that cannot be adequately explained by science, in as far as they are explained, they are explained in terms other than those of vitalism, which can serve at most only as a label of our ignorance. One has no difficulty in showing this.

In what way, for instance, can the tortuous course of development found in many species be illuminated by the conception of a vital principle, or *Elan Vital*, watching over and directing behavior? For example, how can the reversed adaptations of the existing leatherback turtles be accounted for in terms of a vital principle? Formerly these marine animals were land-turtles with a firm bony carapace. Later they became sea-turtles and lost their armature. Still later they returned to land and developed a bony armature quite distinct in design from their former one. Later yet they returned to the sea, lost their armature, and acquired their present leathery covering, on account of which they are known as "leatherbacks." Similar

reversed adaptations found to have taken place in the kangaroos present difficulties as great.*

Of what use is an *Elan Vital* in accounting for adaptations of this order? Or what further light than that afforded by mechanical principles can be thrown on the phenomena? Certainly little is added by saying that they are caused by the workings of a vital principle. What we wish is an explanation in terms that will enable us to control and predict the processes. Obviously our control is not helped by the assumption of a vital principle or an "obscure directive power" which directs development according to some internal principle. For whatever takes place may equally well be attributed to the influence of some hidden force.

On the other hand, the relation of the course or end of development to the known factors in the situation invites us to explain the development in terms of known causes; for what does take place, and the *end* that is reached, bears such a striking correlation to variable factors in the situation that we may well hold that the *end* is determined by these rather than by a hidden force. As a consequence, it seems that we would do well to neglect the "obscure directive power" or any other vital principle, and look for the determinants of development and adaptations in the factors that are not only known but can be controlled.

The same criticism applies to the *force* of the *Elan Vital* in virtue of which it is supposed that organisms

* Osborn, *Origin and Evolution of Life*, 201, 242.

act. For it should be remembered that even such a *force* must be made definite and concrete in actual situations before it can be effective. Whenever we experience a force it is due to a certain structural situation or relation. The equilibrium of certain relations is destroyed, and there are brought into existence forces. We experience no forces other than those brought into existence in this way. Outside of such forces there are no *forces* to affect us, and these forces bear such a striking correlation to the variable factors in the situation that it becomes futile to view them as "differentiations of the Elan Vital." They are more satisfactorily and profitably accounted for as generated in the situation and as products or aspects of the total situation than as *forces* giving rise, or desiring to give rise, to the situation in which they are experienced.

We reach the same conclusion if we try to follow the lead of the "differentiations of the Elan Vital." We may assume that they control and determine development, but we can never tell from this just what the course of development will be. For the lead and control of these "directive powers" are such that they seem always to follow the lead of environmental conditions, and this to such an extent that we are totally in the dark regarding *the end* the "obscure directive power" has in mind. The ends are many, but whatever end is reached is *the end* as far as we can tell that the vital principle had in mind. It is for this reason

that we find ourselves unable to follow its lead and to know whether it is *expressing* itself in the developmental process, or whether it is being *repressed*. Hence, it may well be neglected in an account of behavior.

Vitalism in the above form is generally discredited. It survives, however, in a slightly different one. It is no longer held that the development of the individual or species is determined and directed by a *force* external to the organism. The guide has been assigned an abode within the cell. The cell is supposed to contain in majestic isolation the determinants of its development—development being regarded as determined not by the give-and-take relations the organism sustains to its environment, but by certain physiological units or characters within the cell.

According to this view, development becomes a mere unfolding of what was already determined by the nature of the germ. The conception is essentially vitalistic throughout, for, as Child says,* when we consider the problems connected with the orderly unfolding of innate characters, we realize that something very near akin to a vital principle is necessary to direct the process. Indeed, there is not a great deal of difference between this conception and the more out-and-out forms of vitalism. The same objections apply to both. In one case, no matter what profound changes may be brought about in development they are regarded as due to the guidance of the Vital Principle.

* Child, *Individuality in Organisms*, 22.

In the other case, no matter what profound changes may occur they are regarded as due to the unfolding of an innate character in the germ. In neither case are we able to prove or disprove the interpretation. Hence, both are subject to the very serious objection of explaining behavior in terms of inscrutables in a way that does not provide us with the means of checking up the interpretation or with the means of controlling or predicting the course of development.

The reversed adaptations of the "leatherbacks" and the equally tortuous course of the evolution of the existing tree kangaroos have been referred to in order to show the impossibility of accounting for the course of evolution in terms of a "directive agency." But these reversed adaptations should serve equally well to make apparent the impossibility of accounting for the development of a species in terms of an internal perfecting tendency or predetermination of the heredity-chromatin. Adaptations of this sort can be made intelligible only by viewing them as a result of the activities called forth by changed conditions. The course of development is to be regarded as determined by the give-and-take relations of the organism to its environment. This is the explanation Osborn advances.*

If one finds it hard to regard development in this way and finds it necessary to fall back on the view that what the individual is must have been *potentially*

* Osborn, *Origin and Evolution of Life*, 242-243.

contained in the germ, he must admit the germs must have contained also a mass of other *potentialities*, which would have been actualized if conditions had been favorable. He is then faced with the problem of explaining what brought about the actualization of certain *potentialities*, and with the further problem of explaining what it is that converts *potentialities* into *actualities*. In answering these problems he must admit that development is not an unfolding of innate characters, but a process of acquisition or addition; for it must be recognized that *potentialities* can become *actual* only by the addition of something. The indefinite and potential can become definite and actual only by additions. Hence, the adult structure can in no sense be regarded as contained in the germ or as due to an unfolding of the germ. Development always implies additions. Hence, at most, the character of the germ can only set limitations to development, but it cannot be rightly regarded as determining the course of development.

The common attempt to root all that the individual becomes or does in the germ has been severely criticised by C. M. Child. Attempts of this sort, he rightly charges, merely change the terms of the problem without attempting to solve it. Of what use, he asks, are such theories in accounting for the facts of reproduction and regeneration as discovered by him among the *Tubularia*, *Corymorpha*, and the *Harenactis*? As a result of his observations on the processes of reproduc-

tion and regeneration in these organisms, Child reaches the conclusion that the processes and courses of development are largely determined by external conditions. Variations in the external conditions produce variations in the organic forms. Hence, the development that actually takes place is only one of the many possibilities contained in the germ. This he illustrates by reference to the changes in the head development in the *Planaria* induced by variations in the external conditions. Thus he writes:

“The head of the *Planaria* will serve to illustrate the point. I have shown that a series of different forms of head occurs in reconstruction, ranging from the normal to the headless condition. These different forms represent various degrees of inhibitions and they result, not only from the inhibitory influences of other parts, but can be produced experimentally by a great variety of conditions. In a lot of similar pieces from animals of similar physiological condition a decrease in head frequency or a shift toward the headless condition can be induced by low temperature, narcotics, carbon dioxide, etc., although in certain cases, as we have seen, the results are complicated by the metabolic relations between the head-forming regions and other parts of the piece. On the other hand, conditions that accelerate metabolism, such as high temperature or increase in motor activity, increase the head frequency or shift it toward the normal end of the series. We cannot believe that differences in tem-

perature or motor activity alter the fundamental "organization" in the head-forming regions, but it is a fact that such conditions according to their degree may determine any or all of various kinds of head between the normal and headless extremes.*

Other facts regarding development and regeneration could be cited from Child's work to show that the course of these processes is the result of the relations of the organism to its environment. This should not be regarded as an attempt to minimize the importance of heredity, for the conditions that produce one result in one kind of an organism will produce a different result in another. The point that is to be emphasized is that various results can be gotten from the same germ by altering the conditions under which it develops, and that the results bear such a relation to the environmental factors that they had best be interpreted in terms of these factors rather than in terms of determinants placed in the cell in such quantities as to serve to account for whatever development may take place; for since no matter what takes place may be regarded equally well as determined by the germ, obviously no light can be thrown on what does take place by reference merely to the innate character of the germ, or by regarding the adult as contained potentially in the germ.

Such a position may be taken as a denial of the importance of heredity. In reality, however, it is not,

* *Individuality in Organisms*, 184.

though it does serve to correct mistaken ideas regarding the rôle of heredity. The facts connected with heredity and development, when rightly understood, lend the strongest possible support to the thesis that the behavior of an organism is determined by the relation of the organism to the environment, that is, by the selective influence of the environment on the mass of possibilities presented by the organism. A consideration of the facts regarding development and adaptation will make this apparent.

The moment in the life of each of us when the ovum and the spermatazoon united, and thus gave rise to that being whom we call ourselves, was one of infinite importance to us. Then and there we came into existence as a being of definite structure with characteristic responses to presented stimuli. At that moment we were our heredity. Our heredity and ourselves were one.* As human beings we had those characters that are common to human beings at that stage. As offsprings of our parents we combined in one the streams of protoplasm represented by them. In addition to this the particular ovum and spermatazoon which produced us had an individuality of their own, which has exerted a powerful influence in determining our individual traits of character and physiology. At the moment when we and our heredity were one, all our possibilities for action and reaction were, in a sense, fixed. We can never get beyond the limits

* See Thomson, *Heredity*, 1-7.

there set. More than this, it was determined by our heredity that if we develop at all we must develop along somewhat definite lines, with an inevitable expression of characters that were unrevealed in the germ.

It is good that these facts are generally recognized. No doubt in time this knowledge will lead to the production of a race far superior to any that has yet lived. The importance that is being placed on heredity is not misplaced. But our emphasis on this should not cause us to neglect other factors that form as integral a part of the adult as the heredity, nor should we regard the original cell as containing in majestic isolation the determinants of our future. It is true that the initial structure of an organism plays an important part in the subsequent structures and activities, yet it should be borne in mind that the activity of the initial structure is determined in the same way that the activities of all other organic structures are determined. It furnishes no exception to the rule that behavior is determined by the selective influence of environment on the mass of possible acts presented by structures. Placed in one environment, it will respond in one way. Placed in another environment, it will respond in a different way. More important yet, it should be recognized that however it acts, the act permanently affects the organism, and that as a consequence the organism after the first moment is always a product of its initial structure and its past experi-

ences. For this reason it is quite possible that the infant at birth may be abnormal as the result of abnormal factors in its environment as well as on account of an abnormal heredity.

The rôle of the hereditary factors may profitably be regarded in this way: At the first moment, the structure of an organism is its heredity. The organism, in virtue of the fact that it is an organism, is active, but the form of its activity, which is one of the many possible acts it performs, is the result of the stimuli that happen to be presented. Its activities are always reactions. Hence, its behavior is the result of its structure in relation to its environment. Changes in either affect the result.* The organism always faces multiple possibilities of development and activity in the sense that its development would be different were different stimuli presented. To get abnormal development, it is only necessary to introduce abnormal factors in the environment.

The influence of abnormal factors is generally recognized. If abnormal factors are introduced into the environment and an abnormal product results, we do not hesitate to regard the abnormality as due to the

* Conklin is so impressed with the contributions of the environment or the importance of the acquisitions of the organism that he says: "Each of us may say with Ulysses: 'I am a part of all that I have met.' So great is the power of the environment that it may outweigh inheritance. . . . Of course no sort of environment can do more than to bring out the hereditary possibilities, but, on the other hand, the possibilities must remain latent and undeveloped unless they are stimulated into activity by the environment." (*Heredity and Environment*, 456.)

abnormal factors in the environment. It is the normal factors in the environment that are not duly recognized. Yet we should remember that the influence of environment is not diminished by reason of the fact that the environment is the normal one. It is in recognition of this that Osborn writes:

"In the course of a normal physicochemical environment, a normal life environment, and of normal selection and competition, an organism will tend more or less closely to reproduce its normal ancestral characters. But a new and abnormal psychochemical intruder, either into the environment, the developing individual, the heredity-chromatin, or the life environment may produce a new and abnormal visible character type. This quadruple nature of the physicochemical energies directed upon each and every character is tetrakinetic in the sense that it represents four complexes of energy; it is tetraplastic in the sense that it moulds the bodily development from four complexes of courses. This law largely underlies what we call variation of types." *

It is hard for us to regard development in this way. Our thought is so under the influence of conceptions of the *potential* that we find it difficult to refrain from regarding the adult as contained in the germ. The complex, we are inclined to hold, must exist in its elements. A concrete case of development will help us to get over our metaphysical difficulties regarding the creation of the new and novel.

* *Origin and Evolution of Life*, 147.

The development of wings by aphids, referred to in the last chapter, will serve as an excellent illustration. Morgan has found, it is to be recalled, that when he raises aphids on the heavy salts of magnesia and sugar they become winged. When raised on other substances they remain wingless. The question at once arises: What is the relation of the wings to the heredity of the aphids? Certainly it must be admitted that the germ-cells of aphids are capable, when treated in a certain way, of giving rise to creatures with wings. Indeed, it is quite possible that if the usual diet of aphids had been the salt of magnesia and sugar, we would have regarded the cells as containing definite determinants for wings. Or if it had been the usual thing for some aphids to be so reared, and others differently, it is probable that Mendelian characters in the proper proportion would have been posited in the cells to account for the number of winged and wingless forms. So prone are we to regard development as a mere unfolding.

Such interpretations, however, are seen to be quite inapplicable, for here we have possibilities and capacities of quite different sorts in the same germ-plasm. Which possibility or capacity is realized depends on the environmental conditions. As Morgan says: "Here we have an excellent example of how a given germ-plasm produces one result in a given environment and in another environment a different one without intermediate forms. The change from wing-

less aphids to winged aphids is far greater than most mutational changes that we know, yet it must involve a different change because the result is reversible, while a mutation having once taken place is relatively irreversible.” †

In a process of this sort there is no need to regard structures or activities as “preformed” in the original cell. They arise as the result of the development of the organism, and this development, instead of being regarded as the unfolding of innate characters, or as determined by a directive power either in or out side of the germ, is seen to be determined by the action of external factors on the possibilities of development contained in the germ.

In spite of observations of this nature it is difficult for us to regard development in this way. If wings arise, it seems to us that they must have existed in a latent form in the cell. Or if we make a certain response, we seem to think that the response is due to a “preformed bond” existing from the beginning of the career of the individual. Yet the difficulty of understanding how structure, bonds, interests, and impulses arise as a result of the activities seems small when compared with the difficulty of understanding how these could have been “preformed” in the cell. How shall we conceive the existence of bonds, structural determinants, and impulses that become manifest only after a long course of development? Shall we dismiss

† T. H. Morgan, *Physical Basis of Heredity*, 210.

with Bonnett these difficulties as simply difficulties of the imagination? And shall we hold with him that the germ contains in miniature the adult, development being simply a process of rendering visible the invisible?

It is the difficulty of understanding how the new and novel can arise, or how genuine development can take place, that makes it hard for us to get a true conception of the relation of the adult to the germ. It is this difficulty that causes us to read back all that the adult is into the germ. That is to say, when we see what the man is, and recognize that he is connected to the ovum by a continuous process of development, we are apt to read back all that he is into the cell; we neglect the fact that there has been development, that new structures, desires, and emotions have arisen in the course of the development in the shape of positive additions; all of which might have been very different if the development had taken place under different conditions.

If the problem is viewed phylogenetically, it seems absurd to place in the unicellular organism all the forms of life that have appeared. For who will contend that the unicellular forms of life from which, perhaps, all other forms have evolved, contained the higher? We recognize that the eye, for example, is a positive addition, which arose in the course of development, and that with it organisms had opened to them a world of new tendencies, activities, and impulses. The same is true regarding the origin of the brain. It began somewhere on the evolutionary course,

and with it the psychic life of the organisms possessing it became immeasurably enriched. We have no difficulty, then, in recognizing the creation of the new in the phylogenetic development of the species. We should have no greater difficulty in understanding that in the development of the individual there is also a creation of the new; for the same process takes place in ontogeny that took place in phylogeny, and there is no greater absurdity in reading back all forms of life into unicellular organisms than there is in regarding the adult as contained in any way in the unicellular organism to which he is connected.

We must, therefore, recognize once for all that development is a process of acquisition; that "bonds," impulses, and emotions arise out of definite situations. These are the results of development, rather than development being an outgrowth of certain innate characters. At the most the cell can contain only potentialities, that is to say, various possibilities which may become actualized if properly treated. What actually develops is the result of the environmental conditions and the multitude of reactions and interactions that are inaugurated as a result of the contacts of the organism.

This should be apparent, for it is the nature of the *potential* to be indefinite and unformed. Its essence is lack of determinateness. In so far as it is determinate it is not *potential*; it is actual. Yet the emphasis that is put on the *potential*, when development is discussed,

would seem to indicate that it is regarded as a formative principle. The question does not seem to be raised regarding the ability of the indefinite and unformed to act as a determinative and formative factor. This whole usage of *potentiality* might well be dismissed; for it consists largely in inviting our attention to one aspect or factor, an essential one, no doubt, and in inviting us to ignore all the rest, likewise essential, through telling us that the selected factor contains *potentially* the organism in question.

This discussion of *potentiality* and development was rendered necessary in order that we might clear up certain misconceptions regarding the relation of the innate characters of man to the man as we see him, and to culture in general. It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that development is, above all things, a process of real creation of the new and the novel, and that the course of development of an organism is determined by the play of environmental conditions on the potentialities of the organism. The organism constantly acquires. What it acquires must be determined largely by what is given it to acquire. In this process there is little occasion to make use of innate characters or determinants, for these are more of the nature of blank forms which serve equally well to account for whatever occurs than determiners of a particular course. The true determiners are the factors that actualize the particular capacities that happened to be actualized rather than others.

With adequate knowledge of the variable factors which affect the organism we should have no great difficulty in recognizing the real determiners of development without the assumption of hypothetical and hidden entities in the cell.

The same sort of determinants are operative in the postnatal career of organisms. The course of development, the interests, emotions, and impulses of the individual are determined in the same way that the development of the embryo was determined. Therefore, instead of looking for the determinants of the adult's career in certain supposedly innate characters, instincts, impulses, or dispositions, we should look for the determinants in the conditions which affect him and make him the particular man he is rather than one of a hundred others.

This view of development and of the relation of the adult to heredity forms the underlying assumption of the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. It is the assumption of this science that mental disorders are the results of the experiences of the individual, rather than to certain innate characters. In making this assumption there is no intention on the part of the psychoanalysts to deny that there are individual differences, for they are well aware that the same objective facts will not give rise to disease in all. What they insist on is that the disease is the result of certain painful experiences. For this to be true it is not necessary that the same objective facts should give rise to disease in

all men. Without the painful experience, however, disease would not occur.

It is necessary that psychoanalysts make this assumption, for if mental disorders were the results of innate characters making for degeneracy, there would be little opportunity of relieving the disorder by the introduction of new psychic factors. If, however, mental disorders are due to certain experiences of the patient, they can be relieved by the introduction of new psychic characters or outlooks, which cause the patient to regard the "painful experiences" differently. It is this that the psychoanalyst wishes to do, and his success is largely due to his ability to do this. For, obviously, procedure of this sort would be quite ineffective if the disease were due to innate characters in the heredity-chromatin.

Through the emphasis of the psychoanalyst on the importance of *appropriate nurture* in bringing on disease, as well as by emphasizing the fact that by withholding it disease can be prevented, psychoanalysts have provided us with a true method of accounting for behavior psychologically, instead of barren speculations regarding capacities and other innate characters which may or may not be actualized. That is to say, admitting that innate differences are to be found between individuals, and recognizing that the same objective facts of experience may affect different individuals differently, the behavior, however, that occurs is in every case the result of actualized capacities,

which are actualized only as a result of the experiences of the individual. Hence, what the psychologist should seek to know are the conditions that actualize or that make effective capacities in order that they may explain behavior in these terms rather than in terms of innate characters, which would have remained latent but for the actualizing conditions.

Support for this view of behavior can be found through a consideration of sex behavior. For even sex behavior cannot be regarded as the unfolding or expression of an innate urge seeking a particular mode of expression, as can be abundantly seen from a consideration of sexual aberrations.

For example, it has been found that passenger-pigeons ordinarily will not mate with ring-doves. Yet, if they are hatched by ring-doves, they will not only mate with ring-doves but will actually refuse to mate with pigeons. This difference in behavior cannot be regarded as due to innate differences between the pigeons that mate with pigeons and those that mate with ring-doves. The difference is clearly due to differences in their early experiences, or their psychological development.

This truth may be further illustrated by a consideration of pigeons with reference to sex preferences. For instance, if male pigeons are raised with males only, they, at mating season, are attracted to the males, but they treat them as females. On the other hand, if a male is raised with females only, he will act toward

the males at mating season as the females do. Here it is again obvious that innate tendencies throw little light on the behavior; for in these cases we have behavior that is quite different, and yet the innate characters are presumably the same. Nor is light thrown on this behavior by regarding it as due to the passing away of certain transient instincts and to the awakening of others. Such speculations are quite unnecessary, for the behavior is more intelligibly accounted for in terms of the known and observed experiences of the agents.

Sex aberrations in man may be used to illustrate the same truth. The impressive fact that comes out in a study of the psychology of sex is that normal sex behavior and interest are as much a product of normal and favorable conditions as abnormal and objectionable sex behavior is the result of unfortunate and abnormal sex experiences.*

As a result of a *shock* the sex life of an individual may be permanently colored and rendered pathological. As a result of the absence of proper stimuli the individual may never feel the full strength of the sex urge. As a result of early environment the male may never be able to exercise the full initiative and aggressiveness commonly ascribed to the male. As a result of an unfortunate love affair a person of heterosexual tendencies may become a homosexualist.

To be sure, there must be a favorable soil for these

*Ellis, H., *Psychology of Sex*.

experiences to effect such changes. But the important thing to consider here is that the deviation in the sex behavior from the normal, in the above instances at least, is the result of certain accidental experiences of the individual.

That the sex interest and behavior of an individual should be regarded in this way becomes apparent from a consideration of a certain practice among the Eskimos and the prevalence of homosexuality among the Spartans. It is the custom among the Eskimos to rear effeminate boys with the girls and women.

As a result of their companionship and training they come to possess to such an extent the attitude of women toward men that they are sold as "wives" to wealthy men in the tribe. The prevalence of homosexuality in Sparta likewise was beyond doubt brought about by the social conditions and educational practices in Sparta, rather than by the possession of innate characters that distinguished the Spartans from other peoples.*

However much one may be inclined to criticise this interpretation of homosexuality, it is apparent that the various manifestations of sex behavior cannot be regarded as due to different innate tendencies in the organism. It is equally as apparent that what takes place is the result of certain tendencies that are developed in the career of the individual, and that the

* Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. II, 457-470.

tendencies and impulses vary with the experiences and psychological development of the individual.

By one determined to regard behavior as an expression of instinct the above facts may be regarded as simply indicating that in one case one instinct is aroused, and that in another case another is aroused. But what a galaxy of opposing instincts there must then be! What is the nature of their existence? They seem to serve merely as connections between certain stimuli and certain responses. Yet they are regarded as existing apart from these situations. A connection with nothing connected!

There is no wonder, then, that Jung has been led to abandon the conception of a multiplicity of instincts for other than descriptive purposes.* The idea of an instinct being latent he ridicules as similar to the conception of luminosity existing *in nuce* in iron because when it is heated sufficiently it will glow. For the conception of a multiplicity of instincts he substitutes the conception of an undifferentiated *libido*, or Ur-Instinct, which manifests itself in all possible ways, and which becomes definite only in the course of the individual's development. But even the *libido*, he warns us, is nothing real, but simply a convenient concept in terms of which the various interests and energies of the organism may be expressed.†

If this conception, which Jung finds helpful in his work as a psychoanalyst, is a true one, it follows that

* *Theory of Psycho-Analysis.*

† *Ibid.*, 28, 40.

the psychic energies arise in the course of the development of the individual, and that apart from these there are no psychic forces. Unexpressed energies denote only possibilities that are no more real than the luminosity of a cold piece of iron. Impulses or instincts that are latent are but convenient terms to indicate activities of which the organism is capable.

An analysis of the behavior of calves and chicks as described by James will serve to show the advantage of regarding impulses and tendencies as arising as a result of the psychological development of the organism.

The fact that calves and chicks are gentle if cared for by man from the beginning, and wild if left alone for a few days, it is to be remembered, James interprets as due to an instinct to be gentle which disappears if not stimulated at the proper time, and in its place there arise the opposite tendencies of fear and flight. This assumption of definite instincts can be shown to be quite unnecessary, as an examination of the calf's behavior will show.

At birth the calf possessed, we are told, an instinct to be gentle. This instinct persists if the calf is cared for by man, and the result is the formation of gentle habits. On the other hand, if it is not cared for by man, this instinct dies and in its place there arises the instinct to fear man. If, however, at some future day the calf is caught and by kind treatment is made gentle, we must assume that the instinct to be gentle is

born again. In this case the dead is brought to life. Now if dead instincts can be resurrected in this way by a change in environmental conditions, we should be very careful to exhaust the possibilities of accounting for the behavior of an organism in terms of its adaptations before making an appeal to supposedly innate characters or tendencies. For it should seem that the conditions that bring to life a dead instinct may, with a good deal of assurance, be regarded as amply sufficient to account for the behavior in the first place without the assumption of a definite impulse.

The behavior of the calf becomes quite simple when it is interpreted in the light of its own adaptations. There is no need to suppose that the calf at birth possessed a specific tendency to be gentle. All that is necessary is to assume that the calf is an adaptative mechanism, which is affected by its experience. At birth the calf is capable of manifesting fear under proper stimulation. The attention of the farmer, however, does not excite it. It accordingly adjusts itself to the care of the farmer. The habit of dependence is thus instilled in the calf and becomes an integral part of its motivating disposition.

The same process takes place if the calf is born in the wilds of the mountains. The calf at birth has the same capacities and tendencies that it would have had had it been born in the farmyard. If, however, it survives in the wilds of the mountains it must adjust itself as best it can to its environment. This adapta-

tion becomes, like the other, a part of its motivating disposition, and whatever tends to break the habits thus formed arouses in it an emotional disturbance and the impulse of fear.

The process is the same in both cases. The difference in behavior is not due to any structural differences that may be discovered, or to the fading away of instincts. The difference is due to the fact that the psychological development of the calf in one case is different from what it is in the other. In the one case it adapts itself to the attentions of man; in the other it adapts itself to the wilds of the mountains.

The strength of habits and the difficulty of breaking them need not be regarded as lending support to James's thesis. The facts can be accounted for equally well without the assumption of specific instincts which are transient unless exercised. The strength of habits can be accounted for more simply by assuming that the past adaptations of the organism become an integral part of its motivating disposition. Hence, whatever tends to destroy habits arouses an emotional opposition, since it is a part of personality that is being destroyed. Before adaptations have given rise to habits, adjustments of an organism are made without the emotional set which results from the acquisition of impulses and emotions. Thus it is very easy to impress upon the very young a wide variety of emotions and impulses. Subsequent impressions must, however, encounter the emotional set that has

been acquired, as well as the purely physical modifications of habits or structure. Hence, the emotional resistance which novel experiences provoke and the difficulty of instilling new habits in one whose character has been formed.

This process takes place in all development. One of the very best illustrations of it is afforded in the account Jennings gives of the development of definite impulses or preferences in the lower organisms. According to Jennings, when certain lower organisms are subjected to certain stimuli they tend to respond in all the ways that they can respond until they find a satisfying response. They show no impulse of a definite sort or preference for a particular line of activity. They respond as they are able to respond.

If, however, the stimulus is again presented within a certain interval, the lower organism will tend to respond in the way previously found satisfying. As a result of its past experience there has been born a definite impulse or decided preference for a particular response. And we may imagine that should anything tend to prevent the organism from responding in the favored way, there would be aroused all the emotional opposition a simple organism is capable of.*

We need not limit our illustrations, however, to lower animals. Nowhere do we find a better illustration of the fact that impulses and emotions are the products of experience than in the mental development

* *Behavior of the Lower Organisms*, 283-313.

of man. The fact that man has a limited number of emotions should not mislead us. Man is a finite being and his modes of reaction are limited. No doubt, therefore, it is possible to class any emotional response he may make under one of a few heads. But this is quite different from regarding the response as due to an "emotion" under which the particular act or response is classed.

To do so would be to close our eyes to the facts. It is as a result always of very definite situations that emotions are born. They are merely one aspect of our activities determined by the situation in which they occur. Having come into existence in this way, they, like all activities, leave their mark on the individual and influence his future responses. More than the other organisms we have considered, man possesses, in virtue of the plasticity of his structure, the capacity for a great diversity of interests, preferences, or drives. These may be grouped into a few classes, but what drive or emotion man experiences is determined by the conditions to which he has been or is being subjected. In other words, they are products of his psychological development.

The influence, then, of our experience and training is quite similar to the influence of experience on the behavior and preferences of the other organisms that we have considered. It is as a result of our adaptations that we acquire preferences or emotional sets. It thus becomes easy for us to understand that in spite

of the great variety of attitudes and moral ideas that may be impressed on us, the ones that are impressed on us deeply color our ideas of morality and are clung to tenaciously. As Boas says: "We cannot remodel, without serious emotional resistance, any of the fundamental lines of thought and action, which are determined by our early education, and which form the subconscious basis of all our activities. This is evinced by the attitude of civilized communities toward religion, politics, art, and the fundamental concepts of science." * It is also true, as he says, that any mode of behavior that does not conform to the customs of the group, that is, to the adaptations and habits that have been impressed on us, arouses within us unpleasant emotions.

When preferences, emotional sets, or drives to conduct are thus viewed we should have no difficulty in understanding the ineffectiveness of logic to bring about changes in our preferences or to appreciably influence our conduct. Our activities leave their mark on our motivating disposition. These effects cannot be destroyed merely by logic. Like all that exists, they cling to existence tenaciously. Only another activity of a different kind, which generates an opposing preference, can replace them, and even then there is a certain feeling of deprivation as if something has gone out of our lives, as essentially there has. And at times there is a longing for the return of the old and tried,

* *Mind of Primitive Man*, 240.

even though the new may have been found more satisfactory, for the new has not yet become as deeply a part of our personality as the old.

It is true that this does not apply to the individual in whom the scientific tradition has become strong. In individuals of this sort there is an experimental attitude, which has itself become a value. This attitude makes for a fairer evaluation of acts. This disposition is no doubt due in a large degree to the value attached to science. "Science" comes to be a name, which causes at once a presumption in favor of what is called "scientific," and the new, if it bears this label, tends to find ready acceptance, since it is thus subsumed under an old value or attitude. There is thus a bond between the new and the old which enables the old to assimilate easily the new.

Our emotional attitudes, therefore, cannot be regarded as expressions of innate characters. They vary with the situations in which the organism has been placed. Given certain situations, the organism will possess certain emotional sets, preferences, or drives. Given other conditions, the same organism would have possessed different drives. These drives should be regarded as genuine acquisitions of the individual. Something more than *time* was needed to render actual what was already potential in the germ. There have been positive additions, for, as has been pointed out, it is only by these that the potential or the indefinite can become actual and definite.

This process of acquisition is generally admitted in so far as intellectual interests, knowledge, moral ideas, and many desires are concerned. If, for example, we were to arrange on a line the mental content of an adult beginning with instincts, emotions, impulses, dispositions, æsthetic appreciations, moral ideas, knowledge, on up to intellectual interests, there would be agreement that the upper end of the line is determined and acquired in the development of the individual. Yet why should the acquisitions be limited to the upper end? The individual as we see him is constantly making acquisitions as a result of his activities and the situations in which he is placed. The questions naturally arise: At what stage in the individual's career did he begin to make acquisitions? Did he begin only after the instincts and impulses came into existence? And do these latter have an existence irrespective of the experience of the individual?

That many writers would have us except the instincts and impulses from this process of acquisition has already been shown. Not only is this true, but they hold that it is only for the innate impulses and tendencies, or for the instincts, that activities are inaugurated, and that however varied one's activities may be they are simply elaborations of means to achieve instinctive ends. In accordance with this position it is held that the instincts are necessary to provide the motive power necessary for activity.

Hence, instincts and impulses cannot be regarded as acquisitions, for it is only in virtue of these that the organism is active and able to make acquisitions.

The conception of instincts and emotions as innate characters, which determine our activities, is a very arbitrary assumption and one which goes counter to all the facts of development and adaptation we have considered. For it has been shown that the development and activity of an organism are determined by its initial structure, its experience, physiological condition, and the presented stimuli. There is no room in such explanations for instincts regarded as determiners of activity. Instincts are not to be regarded as determiners of behavior but simply as names for characterizing certain activities; at the same time it should be recognized that emotions are not determiners but simply accompaniments of activity.

This view of behavior is gaining adherents among educators. On what do the *Problem* and *Project* methods rest? Is one concerned in the application of these methods with arousing definite instincts? Far from it. They rest on a purely mechanical assumption of interest. Perplex the mind with problem. Its tension is increased. It must find some outlet. And far from touching some hidden source of energy, the energy is created by the presentation and realization of the problem. The energy that thus comes into existence is used to carry out the various projects. It is the same with all mental energy. Stimuli do not

simply unlock stores of energy. Nor is there a store of energy or impulses in the organism seeking to find expression in various outlets. The energy or impulse comes into existence when there is a certain situation in the same way that iron glows when treated in a certain way, or that a certain explosive force comes into existence when the various elements composing nitroglycerine are combined in a certain way and then set off. It would be a mistake to regard the explosive force as existing in the nitrogen, carbon, and other elements. It exists only in the combination, and then only when the combination is treated in a certain way.

When instincts and emotions are so regarded we have no difficulty in understanding that they are acquisitions determined by the experience of the individual. As long as they are regarded, however, as *forces* manifesting themselves in the activity, difficulty will be experienced in regarding them as acquired, or in accounting for their existence by any means. If we would only recognize that an instinctive response is simply a response determined, like all responses, by the nature of the organism and the stimulus, we would see that there is no class of activities to be separated from other activities as being due to an Instinct. In the same way if we would only recognize that emotions are always connected with definite activities and objects, which have arisen, or have been experienced, in the course of the individual's career, much of the dif-

difficulty we have regarding the nature and origin of the emotions would be removed. It is when we look upon emotions as existing apart as innate characters in the organism, which need only to be excited in order for them to reveal themselves, that we experience difficulty in accounting for them. Regarded as the color or tone of activities, their origin becomes clear. We see them arise naturally as a result of the activities of the organism.

Consequently, if as an adult we find ourselves in the possession of certain impulses, we should not regard them as the expression of an instinct which existed prior to the expression of the emotion or impulse; we should regard them rather as products of our past training and of the habits that have been impressed on us. That is to say, what we had to begin with was an organism of a certain structure, which responded in characteristic ways to the stimuli which happened to affect it. The responses at every stage were determined by the structure, physiological condition, experience of the organism, and by the confronting stimuli. The responses which we make may be viewed in two ways. They have a motor aspect and a psychical aspect. The psychical aspect is the way our activity appears to us as conscious and evaluating organisms. They are then what may be called the affections. Some of these affections are pleasant, some are unpleasant. All leave their mark, and as a consequence we come in time to be negatively adapted to the ex-

citing stimuli, or to react to them with a strong emotional set, either of pleasure or pain. Habits, both motor and emotional, are thus formed as a result of activities.

We should let no difficulty regarding the fact of *activity* prevent us from viewing behavior in this way. Organisms are by nature active. Active organisms are the data with which we deal. What we wish to know are the conditions that bring about particular activities. These we have found to be the variable factors in the environment and in the organism. As for the *force* that makes activity possible, we may without hesitation state that whatever destroys the equilibrium in the tension between the environment and the organism produces a readjustment or an act. If we should wish to call the response of an organism *instinctive*, there is no objection. Indeed, this may be of value to call attention to the fact that all members of a species, other things being equal, will tend to respond in the same way to the same stimuli. But we should be careful to understand exactly what is meant, and thus avoid hypostasizing purely descriptive terms into *forces* manifesting themselves in the activities. If we do not avoid this we may be sure that we shall be puzzled regarding the origin of our hypostasizations.

The universality of acts characterized as instinctive need not be regarded as an objection to this point of view. It is not necessary that an activity be an expression of an innate *force* in order that it be uni-

versal. Under any view of behavior it is natural to suppose that there should be a great number of activities common to all members of the same species, possessing as they do structures so nearly alike and subjected as they are to practically the same needs and conditions of living. If organisms act as they do on account of their structure, physiological condition, experience, and the confronting situation, we should naturally expect great similarity in their behavior.

It was formerly held that the universality of the religious emotions indicated that they were innate. There is felt no longer a need of accounting for their supposed universality in this way. They are seen to be emotions and attitudes that are born as the result of contact with one's fellows. It is for this reason that we can understand that as the contacts change the emotions undergo a constant modification and change. The same is found to be true regarding the moral emotions and ideas. They are born as the result of the experience of the individual. They should not be regarded as less real for not being innate, but the fact that they thus come into existence makes intelligible the profound growth of the moral emotions and the evolution of religions.

If the moral emotions were innate, and *time* only were necessary for their unfolding, it would be hard to understand their dynamic character and the effect of environment on them. It is because they result from the contacts of the individual and from his activities

that they have a dynamic aspect, and constantly reflect the nature of the environment from which they spring. It is because they are acquired, that is, born of the relations of the individual to his environment, that we can understand the great variety of moral emotions within the same race, and understand that the moral ideas of the individual conform very closely to those of the group in which he is reared.

Culture itself is dynamic for the same reason. If our culture were but the unfolding of innate characters, or an expression of them, it would necessarily be static. Yet culture is highly dynamic, and it is dynamic because as a result of the interaction of existing ideas, and of the individual with his environment, new impulses, desires, inspirations, enthusiasms, and motives are born, which express themselves in new cultural outlets. Thus appreciations are born. Thus also ideas of right and wrong, the various sentiments and religious enthusiasms are born.

To recognize this truth one need but make a comparison of the political ideals of Germany in 1914 and her ideals of to-day. Even more illuminating is a comparison of the religious emotions of the Christian and non-Christian Fijian; new experiences have brought into existence new ideals, sentiments, and impulses. It is for this reason that it has been held with a great deal of plausibility that stability of character depends on stability of environment. This is made apparent during every war. In such emergencies

the virtues of peace disappear and in their place a world of new and formerly abhorred virtues arise.*

It is due to the fact that we are constantly acquiring new emotions, impulses, and dispositions as a result of our activities, or from influences which surround us, that we can understand *adaptation*. Adaptation is not due to the fact that innate characters *are modified* in a certain way by the environment. Modification of what innate character arouses in us reverence for the cross? The emotion that attends that reverence is an emotion that is born as the result of social contacts, and is no more a modification of an innate character than water is a modification of oxygen. Oxygen when subjected to certain contacts gives rise to water. Human beings when subjected to certain contacts manifest a reverence for certain objects. Just as in the case of water something is added to oxygen, so in the case of the religious emotions something positive is added, which prevents us from regarding the emotion as simply the actualization of a latent emotion.

There is no need of saying that unless man were capable of being so affected as to give rise to the re-

* The influence of behavior on mind is expressed in more general terms by Professor Dewey. According to him: "What we call 'mind' means essentially the working of certain beliefs and desires; and that these in the concrete—in the only sense in which mind may be said to exist—are functions of associated behavior, varying with the structure and operation of the social groups. A certain kind of associated behavior or joint life . . . has an unexpected by-product—the formation of those peculiar acquired dispositions, sets, attitudes which are termed mind." (*Psychological Review*, 1917, 272.)

ligious feelings he could not experience them. The same is true regarding all modifications and changes wherever found. Unless the marble were capable of being affected in certain ways, we could not have the beautiful work of art. Unless the materials in the building had been capable of being affected in certain ways, we could not have the house. Unless the acorn were capable of being affected in certain ways, we could not have the oak, and so on. Wherever there is change the various elements that constitute the final product must be capable of being affected so as to give rise to it. But it would be quite absurd to regard the final product as due to the unfolding of any one element. To each constituent there has been an addition.

It is to this that adaptation is due. Activities leave their marks on the motivating dispositions of organisms; since, however, activities are largely determined by the environment, the environment exerts a profound influence on the mental make-up of the organism. In fact, its influence becomes an integral part of the organism. Consequently, organisms are necessarily adaptable, since they are in a large degree products of the environment.

Adaptation, then, is not to be regarded as due to modifications of innate characters, or to the fact that certain instincts are finding expression in modified ways. This could not be; for the *expression* of instincts follows in exact detail the plan laid down by the situations which bring forth the expression. Hence, they

“express themselves” in the only way that is possible for them to do, given the determining factors. What is ordinarily taken as the “modified response of an instinct” is really the only response the organism can make under the “modified” conditions. In other words, “modified instincts” are products of “modified activity,” instead of *forces* that “modify” their responses to meet the demands of the situation.

The relation of our interest and attention to past experience shows this. Our interest and attention are determined by our past experience and the needs of the moment largely. It is as the result of what innate character that I now regard the walking-stick as a sign of gentlemanly leisure? or now as a weapon? What innate character determines that I shall revere the cross? what that my neighbor shall abhor it? What innate character determines that one shall regard the work of art as beautiful? and that another shall see in it only immodesty? These perceptions, impulses, or sentiments are not *forces* or entities that existed prior to the experiences in which they occur. They are not due to modifications of anything. They arise as the characteristics of a certain organism treated in the way necessary to bring about their existence.

If difficulty is experienced in accounting for the existence of the various attitudes and impulses in this way, the question should be asked: In what way can they be accounted for? We are familiar with a number of possible explanations. The explanations based

on metempsychosis and impressions from ancestors are no longer prevalent in Western Thought. The most popular attempts with us are to regard the instincts as functional correlatives of structure, or as differentiations of the *Elan Vital*, or as impulses that are inherited as a result of the adaptations and experience of the species in the course of its development.

Objections to these conceptions have been pointed out. The conception of instincts as functional correlatives is good as far it as goes. But it stops short of adequate recognition of multiple response of the same structure, and in explaining what it is that determines that the structure shall respond in the way it does, when as far as the structure is concerned another response could have taken place equally well. What structure does is to present a number of possibilities for action. It leaves to other factors the rôle of determining which one of the many possible responses shall be made. Explanations in terms of structure then must be supplemented by an account of the experience or psychological development of the individual, the physiological condition of the organism, and the stimuli.

That the part played by structure is a limiting factor rather than a determining one has been indicated by the facts connected with embryonic development, the behavior of lower organisms, calves, chicks, and human beings. It has been shown that the rôle of structure is to present a number of possibilities for activity or development. Other factors play the part of

determining which possibility shall be realized. It is because we do not give adequate recognition to the rôle of experience that we are inclined to overwork or overemphasize the part played by structure. When once it is recognized that there are no *forces* impelling us to act other than the forces that are born in our own experience as a result or aspect of our own activities, we will have freed ourselves from the need now so commonly felt of accounting for activity or behavior in terms of factors that are common to all behavior no matter how diverse.

If it is yet insisted that behavior can be interpreted in terms of instincts regarded as functional correlatives of structure, it must be admitted by every one that instincts, even when so regarded, can become definite and effective only as a result of activities that are determined by factors other than those of structure itself. As a consequence, in our explanations of behavior we need to consider only the instincts that have been actualized, or are being actualized, by the conditions to which the individual is subjected. Hence, as far as we are concerned, the only origin of instincts that is of importance is the origin of the effective and definite instincts that come into existence as a result of the responses and activities of the individual. Instinct regarded as functional correlatives of structure need never concern us—unless they are made definite and concrete by the experience of the organism.

We reach the same conclusion if we consider the

conception of instincts which regards them as differentiations of the *Elan Vital*, for even vital principles must be made definite and concrete before they can become effective, and there is no possibility of this taking place other than by the effect of known and variable conditions on the undifferentiated Vital Force. The only forces that need concern us, therefore, are those that are experienced, and the ones that are experienced are definitely determined by the conditions in which they appear. Hence, the only forces that can be used in interpreting behavior are the forces that are formed as a result of the individual's experience. Since this is true, we may well neglect all speculations regarding the hidden *Elan Vital* and account for the impulses and other drives in terms of the relation the organism sustains to the variable factors in its environment.

The conception, however, of the origin of instincts and impulses that is most widely held, and therefore of chief interest, holds that instincts and impulses are acquisitions of the species brought about by its adaptations to past conditions. Accordingly, it is held that the individual comes into existence with a rich psychical disposition as a result of the experience of the race.

This conception places a very arbitrary limitation on the rôle of the individual's experience with no great illumination regarding the determiners of behavior. For under this conception behavior is eventually re-

garded as determined by the relation of the organism to its environment. The difference is that in this case it is the relation remote ancestors sustained instead of the relation living organisms sustain. Yet there seems no great advantage in making this substitution. It would seem more reasonable to suppose that just as our ancestors' behavior was determined by their relations and by the needs imposed on them, so our behavior is determined. Yet this is not recognized. On the contrary, it is insisted that we act as we do, not because of the conditions which confront us, but because of the conditions which confronted our ancestors.

This arbitrary limitation on the rôle of the individual's experiences would not have been imposed had instincts not been regarded as *forces* apart from the behavior in which they are experienced. But since we insist on hypostasizing activities into *forces* to account for the activities, we inevitably incur the liability of accounting for the existence of the *forces*.

A somewhat similar difficulty was formerly felt regarding the existence of innate ideas. No one could understand how certain ideas arose as a result of the experience of the individual, since the nature of experience itself was dependent on the existence of the ideas. Hence, the numerous hypotheses to account for the existence of innate ideas. These are now discarded, and we no longer experience a difficulty in accounting for our ideas as a result of *our* experience.

The abandonment of innate ideas has in many cases

led to the substitution of other innate characters to account for the nature of experience. Indeed, instincts are not only called on to account for the nature of experience, that is, for the nature of particular activities, but they are even called on to account for the possibility of activity or experience itself. How is it possible for organisms to act? How can they become experiential beings? The fact that they act is taken as clear proof that they possess certain innate *forces* as gifts from wonderful ancestors or from a wonderful age!

The Theory of Recapitulation has had a great deal to do with the transference of the problem regarding the source of our impulses from ontogeny to phylogeny. Yet this theory rightly understood should be an invitation to account for the origin of all impulses and instincts in terms of the development of the individual. For, according to this theory, the individual goes through the same stages of development that the species did in its evolution. Since this is true, we should expect that the factors that determine the development of the individual should give rise to impulses and instincts of the individual in the same way that the factors that determined the course of phylogeny should have given rise to instincts and impulses in our ancestors. In both cases the desires, impulses, and instincts were brought into existence by the conditions under which the organism lived. We should never, therefore, be content with explanations of behavior in

terms of the race's experience. We should always look for the factors that have given rise to the observed behavior within the career of the individual.

It is because we feel a necessity to explain "in virtue of what" an organism acts that we posit within the organism various innate *forces*, somewhere acquired, which by various manipulations are supposed to account for the behavior as we observe it. This need would disappear if we would only recognize that activity does not need to be accounted for. Activity is the starting-point for science. All we can hope to know is what determines the particular acts or forms of activity. In seeking to learn these it would be well to clear our minds of all expectation of greatly increasing our knowledge of the determinants of behavior by hypostasizing certain activities or responses into *forces* that are used as explanations of the various activities.

We need to recognize that the activities of an organism are determined by variations in the relation of the organism to its environment. Other than activities so determined there are no activities. When this is recognized we will cease to puzzle ourselves regarding the existence of an agency in virtue of which *activity* (a mere abstraction when considered apart from particular acts) may take place. We will then feel no need of *innate forces*, for the forces that are effective are the forces that result from the give-and-take relations of the organism to its environment. These

forces are strictly determined by the situations in which they appear, and there are no *forces* other than these that can serve as explanations of behavior.

It follows, as a necessary consequence of this, that it is futile to attempt to interpret social phenomena as an expression or repression of an instinct. There are repressions the nature of which I shall point out later. But there are no repressions of innate forces, for the only forces that are experienced are the forces that come into existence as a result of the activities of the organism, and these, as we have seen, are strictly determined by the situation in which the activity occurs. It is therefore futile to attempt to evaluate acts as expressions or thwartings of instincts, for one act is as much an expression of an instinct as any other, since an instinct is simply a term to indicate the characteristic responses of an organism. All responses, however, are characteristic, as they are the only responses of which the organism is capable, given the conditions under which they are made.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

It is possible to summarize the results of the foregoing very briefly. At all levels of culture certain of man's activities have excited his wonder and called for an explanation. The acts which seem to arouse this wonder most often are the acts that seem to be beyond the natural powers of man, *i. e.*, the activities which cannot be adequately explained in terms of the experience and natural powers of the individual. Such activities require an explanation.

This requirement for the primitive was satisfied by a world of spirits and other hidden forces that stood ever ready to provide an explanation for any phenomenon. When the world of spirits gave place to a world ruled by God, explanations of strange activities were no longer regarded as due to an influence from a spirit, or as an impression from an ancestor. For such influences and impressions were substituted influences and impressions from God. Thus the strange and wonderful behavior of lower animals got a ready explanation in the assertion: "God, Himself, is the soul of brutes." A somewhat similar explanation was given for the sublimity of the moral laws of man and for the existence of certain of his *innate* ideas.

In such ways all difficulties of accounting for ac-

tivities that seemed beyond the capacity of man were solved. More than this, the activities that man performed, which were beyond his capacities, were valued as an indication and evidence of the controlling hand of Deity in all his works and it was regarded as impiety to question this dictum of faith.

The problem has slightly shifted for the evolutionist. It is no longer felt that man acts beyond his capacities. Whatever man does, it is held, he must have the capacity of doing. Consequently, his activities are no longer regarded as determined by impressions from a transcendental source. But in closing the door on such explanations, the need is felt all the more keenly of accounting for the existence of the marvellous capacities in virtue of which man is able to act as he does. The problem now is to account for the fact that man possesses the capacities and tendencies to act as he does.

To account for this appeals are made to phylogeny. Here a supply of explanations for the existence of capacities and tendencies is furnished that is no less ample than the supply of explanations furnished by the spirit world of the primitive. The behavior of the individual, no matter how strange and irrational, becomes for many writers perfectly intelligible when viewed from the history of the species—for the tendency which gave rise to the observed act is the result of the rational behavior of the species to conditions of living under which it evolved.

At first glance it may seem that the modern inter-

pretation of behavior is a considerable advance over primitive explanations. For surely it is better to account for one's activities as the result of one's own capacities and tendencies than as the result of capacities and tendencies of spirits and other hidden entities. No doubt interpretations of the latter sort are absolutely undesirable, for they not only fail to make behavior intelligible by this transference of the problems of psychology to a sort of psychology of spirits, but they tend to make life miserable for man by filling him with superstitious fears of all kinds.

In spite of this, however, there are certain features of the explanations of the primitive that might serve to teach us a lesson. The primitive recognized in an unmistakable way that the activities of man are not always within his capacities or the results of powers purely his own. He recognized that man is profoundly influenced by a power and force external to the individual. Man's activities cannot be regarded as due to his capacities—unless we mean by *capacity* that vague and indefinite conception *capacity to be affected*. The primitive was right in so far as he held that the behavior of man in many cases is to be interpreted in terms of a power affecting man, or in terms of the actualizer of the capacity, rather than in terms of a *capacity to be affected*.

The modern writer in his emphasis on the fact that whatever man does is within his capacity, and his desire to avoid in his explanations all trace of the super-

natural, has tended to view the behavior of man as interpretable in terms of the capacities and innate tendencies of man. No doubt man could not act as he does unless he had the capacity to be affected so that he acts as he does. It is this truth that is to-day over-emphasized, and which tends to cause us to view behavior as the mere unfolding of innate characters or capacities—as if *time* alone were necessary for the realization of a capacity.

The primitive man emphasized the other side of the activity, and frankly considered behavior at times as being beyond the capacity of man. His explanations were full of errors. But his mistakes did not lie in the emphasis put on the necessity of an actualizer or an influence and power which must make concrete and effective the mass of capacities. His great mistake was made in regard to the source of the influences and powers. For in reality man's behavior is not the result of his innate capacities, but of the influences that are brought to bear on these capacities, and which are necessary to make capacities definite and effective. More than this, the behavior of man at times seems to lie beyond his capacities, for within him at times is the collective strength of the group and the power of an inspiring ideal. He thus transcends the limits of time and space, and as a consequence he feels an intensification of life, which ennobles him and gives him a power that he does not ordinarily possess and which cannot be regarded as wholly his own.

The necessity of an actualizer is, in many cases, overlooked. No doubt, as I have said, the moments of inspiration just referred to could not be experienced unless man had the capacity of experiencing them. But this obvious truth is not very illuminating. It is more profitable to know the facts that bring about such moments of inspiration than to know that man has the *capacity to be inspired*.

Modern writers not only neglect this, but through their emphasis on innate capacities they make these latter such realities that their existence requires an explanation. Numerous hypotheses are advanced. They are regarded as vital forces, functional correlatives of structure, or as habits of the species. This last may be regarded as an effort to explain our behavior in terms of conditions that affected our ancestors rather than in terms of conditions that affect us. Criticism of this effort has occupied a large part of this essay, but in reality the criticism can be briefly stated. In fact, it is possible to reduce it to the dilemma: Either the behavior in the individual is caused by the same conditions that aroused the behavior in his ancestors, or it is not. If it is caused by the same conditions, there is no need to make an appeal to phylogeny. If it is not caused by the same conditions, it is hard to understand how the behavior of remote ancestors under one set of conditions can be used as an explanation of the behavior of the individual under another set of conditions.

In spite of all difficulties, however, it is popular to attempt to account for the individual's behavior in terms of similar behavior on the part of his ancestors. At other times the behavior of the ancestors is used as an explanation of different behavior in the individual. But no adequate account has yet been given of the process of sublimation, or of the factors determining the process by which an activity, like hunting, for example, can be used to account for an activity so different from hunting as teasing. Such explanations have in common with primitive explanations an appeal from the unknown to the yet more unknown.

There is another similarity. The activities which the primitive regards as due to impressions from an ancestor or spirit are regarded as being of greater merit than ordinary acts. The modern, likewise, regards the activities which are interpreted in terms of the experience of the race as being of greater worth and value than the activities that seem adequately accounted for in terms of the individual's experience. It is not necessary to recount the history of the sources of the sanction of instinct before evolutionary thought became generally accepted. It is only necessary to remind the reader that instinct before Darwin was deeply dyed in religious feeling, and was regarded as a guaranty of the moral worth and the personality of man. To this popular regard for the instinctive, science and philosophy have added a powerful sanction through the conception of instinct as the best that has

survived of the past, and the genuine admiration expressed regarding the workings of pure instinct as found in the insects.

As a consequence, writers from the evolutionary point of view have placed great emphasis on the necessity or advisability of allowing the innate tendencies, or instincts, free and unimpeded expression. It is only in this way, many tell us, that we can hope to realize that well-developed and complete life for which we have been so admirably suited by the supply of instincts and capacities which the evolutionary process has given us. Thus, religion, popular philosophy, and science have united to throw around the instinctive a sanction which gives justification to any activity—provided it is an *expression of an instinct*.

It is this tendency to evaluate an activity as an expression of an instinct, rather than in terms of its consequences, that causes the use of instinct as a sanction to share the evils found in all categorical imperatives or commands that are obeyed irrespective of their consequences. In addition to the evil that is common to all sanctions, the use of instinct as a sanction is especially undesirable, for instead of being an expression of what may be regarded as the highest moral feelings of the age, the use of instinct is too often a mere exalting of characters that are common to man and the higher animals. Their ambiguity and indefiniteness are also a source of evil. For though they are ambiguous, and no one seems to know just how they

should function, it is urged generally that they should function in a *natural* manner. This lack of definiteness and the importance that is attached to their expression give complete justification to the democratic man of Plato in satisfying his every whim. More serious yet, through the exalting of the innate and the individual, we have been led to regard all the evils of society as due to the thwarting of the innate and to condemn society for practising such repressions. As a consequence of this there is little inclination to consider the duties of the individual to the state. It is more popular to exalt the assertion of individualism and egoism in the fatuous belief that nature has provided us with a mass of ready-made tendencies and impulses which need only to be released for us to live most satisfactorily.

This belief rests on the assumption that only those impulses and tendencies which have abundantly shown their fitness as moral guides through the fact that they have survived in the long evolutionary process are inherited. The unfit, it is held, have been eliminated. In regard to this, it should be pointed out that granting that the instincts of our ancestors were formerly of use, this is not proof that they are of use to-day. As a matter of fact, for an instinct to survive it need never have been of use. Tendencies may persist even though they are harmful. It is only necessary that they be not sufficiently harmful to bring about the extinction of the species. Therefore there is no reason to suppose

that because an activity is an expression of an instinct that it is good. There is even less reason to suppose that *the natural* expression of an instinct is good, for it is reasonable to suppose that a *good* expression of an instinct will be more likely found within all the possible modes of expression than in the one *natural* way. This becomes apparent when it is recalled that the natural response may be a disastrous one, as, for example, the flying of the moth to the flame.

The criticisms that I have directed against instinct as a sanction were more far-reaching than the above, for I have denied the assumptions on which the sanction is built. Man does not inherit a mass of impulses as the result of the experiences of his ancestors. Nor can his behavior be so interpreted, or interpreted in terms of innate characters, no matter how acquired. His behavior can be interpreted only in terms of the varying relations that obtain between the individual and his environment. Man is by nature active. The particular form of activity is always interpretable in terms of the variable factors that go to make up the total situation in which his activity occurs, namely, the structure, physiological condition, and experience of the individual and the exciting stimuli.

In interpreting behavior in this way the difficulties involved in accounting for the existence of the specific innate impulses are avoided. In fact, such impulses are found to be quite unnecessary; for if it be granted that they exist, it is necessary in every case of their

effectiveness that they be actualized by affecting conditions before they can become efficient or influence the behavior. More than this, the nature of the actualized force and its expression bears such a striking relation to the variable factors that actualized it that the *force* or *impulse* as an innate character may well be neglected. For these reasons I have held that they should be regarded as accompaniments of activity rather than as *forces* in terms of which behavior can be explained, and that behavior can be explained only in terms of the exciting stimuli and the nature of the organism. In explanations of this sort there is no use for a store of "mystic potencies" to connect various stimuli with a multitude of diverse responses.

When behavior is so understood, we have no difficulty in understanding the adaptability of man and the diversity of his moral emotions and impulses; for it is as the result of activities that we experience emotions and impulses, rather than the reverse. It is as a result of the situation in which the individual is placed that he comes to possess a certain emotion. It is not meant by this that the same situation will arouse the same emotion or impulse in every one. The same stimuli will not arouse in the same individual at all times the same emotion. What is meant is that all emotions and impulses are definite emotions and impulses which have resulted from the total situation in which they are experienced.

If impulses and emotions are regarded in this way,

we have no difficulty in agreeing with Westermarck that the moral judgments are based on the emotions, and at the same time we are able to give adequate recognition to the rôle of custom in determining the moral ideas and judgments. For the emotions are not innate characters that determine the judgment of the individual. They are rather products of activity and vary with activity. That they should be regarded in this way is sufficiently shown by the difficulties that confront us in accounting for the diversity of moral ideas within the same race if moral ideas are regarded as expressions of innate characters. These difficulties disappear immediately when we recognize that it is as a result of activities that emotions are born, and that the nature of the activity is largely determined by the customs and culture of the group.

Hence, customs are not founded on the emotions, as Westermarck holds. It is rather true that the customary becomes an integral part of our personality, and when the customary is violated, there is aroused an emotional opposition, simply because we feel that our own characters, as built up by our habits and sentiments, are violated. Customs, then, not only determine what we judge moral and immoral, but they determine in a large way the emotions, which lie as a basis to the judgment. It is in this way that we account for the fact generally recognized that the moral ideas of an individual are reflections of the moral ideas of the community in which he lives.

If the activities of an organism are determined by the relations of the organism to its environment, and if out of activities so determined are born our impulses and emotions, it follows that the psychological assumptions on which the sanction of instinct is based are groundless. Hence, conservatives need not attempt to justify the existing as an expression of instinct. Nor need radicals attempt to condemn it because it represses instinct. Institutions and culture are not to be explained as expressions or repressions of instinct, for culture is not built on the restraint or release of instinct. Institutions are neither expressions nor repressions of original nature. They are the responses original nature has made when confronted with certain conditions. Given one set of conditions, we have one set of institutions and customs; given another set of conditions, and we have different institutions. There need, then, be no fear that our culture is getting far removed from our original nature. There is no reason to regard our culture as less securely built on original nature than the most primitive. Our culture, like all cultures, no matter how primitive, is determined by the give-and-take relations of the group to its environment. Changes in these relations have brought about changes in culture and institutions. The conservative, therefore, who sits back in the calm assurance that our institutions are securely rooted in human nature might well get from this a lesson of caution, which should become deeply im-

pressed on him by observation of the great diversity of institutions to which original nature may become accustomed and which it may enjoy. Nevertheless, in so far as he has the welfare of his group at heart, instead of institutions, he may find comfort in the truth pointed out by Sumner, that while our institutions change in an endless flux, they change so as to satisfy to a greater extent human needs and wishes.

Neither should the radical condemn society for repressing the innate, for the innate turns out to consist more in the capacity to be affected than in drives of a definite character. Drives of a definite character, impulses, and emotions are the acquisitions of the individual, that are determined largely by the nature of the society in which he is reared. The repressions are then the repressions of social products rather than of innate characters. One should not infer from this that no repression is evil, for the evil of repression is not dependent on the fact that the repression is the repression of an innate character. The repression is none the less real, and at times none the less disastrous, because it is the repression of a social contribution. On the other hand, many repressions are desirable. It may, therefore, be asked, does society make contributions or bring to light impulses which should be crushed? In a sense it does. Society, however, is not to be condemned altogether for this; for in many cases such repressions are the liabilities of a rich culture. The richer the culture the more likely repressions of

this nature will occur, since it is in such cultures that incompatible contributions are most frequently made.

If an individual, for example, is placed in a simple environment, in which few capacities are actualized, he should be comparatively free from all repressions. But in a society of a rich culture, in which many contributions are offered the individual, some of which are incompatible with others, repressions become almost inevitable, for in such a society it becomes increasingly difficult to integrate all interests and desires into a well-rounded personality. Yet unless this is done, repressions become inevitable. Society should, therefore, not be condemned on account of the repressions that are practised in it; for repressions are conflicts waged between social products of a contradictory nature. It is for one social contribution that we repress another.

This is admirably illustrated by the young lady of Puritanical training Holt speaks of in *The Freudian Wish*.^{*} This young lady on going to the city is attracted to the theatre. From her friends she learns that it is an attractive place. She wishes to go all the more because she is afraid if she does not she will be regarded as an outsider by her new friends, whom she naturally wishes to cultivate. The theatre, therefore, in spite of the fact that she has been taught to regard it as a wicked place, exerts a strong attraction. On the other hand, her ideas of morality early acquired exert

^{*} 118 ff.

a profound influence. She thus becomes tormented with conflicting desires. She wishes to go. At the same time she cannot forsake the early acquired ideals of purity and godliness that give a deep color to her ideals of morality and values. If she goes to the theatre, thinking it wrong, her past training and the values of a pure life are repressed. If she stays away, the desire to go is repressed. A repression of one or the other becomes necessary.

This conflict is clearly one between social contributions. Her ideals of a good life, her fears of the consequences of an evil one, have been provided in her early training determined by the society in which she lived. Likewise, the theatre is a social contribution. The conflict that is waged is thus between social products—religious training and the theatre. There is not here a conflict between original impulses or emotions and society. Nor is it a matter of expressing one innate tendency and repressing another. The impulses are not pent up in the organism awaiting an opportunity for expression denied by a repressive society. The conflict is between two sets of values given by society. The repression comes from inability to integrate the contributions into a larger whole in which the whole of her personality can find expression.

The repressions that have been given great prominence by the work of the psychoanalysts is the repression of the sex impulse. Many sociologists, following this lead, hold that evils of society come largely

from this repression, which, contrary to the view just stated, seems clearly a repression of an innate impulse by society. An examination of this conflict, however, fails to show that the repression is the repression of an innate force. It is rather the repression of impulses that are born of and determined by social contacts, and the repression occurs on account of other contributions by society.

This position may be regarded as unwarranted, if not positively invalidated, on account of the universality of the sex impulse, its intimate connection with physiological processes, and its persistence. These objections should be examined.

In regard to the tendency to regard an impulse as innate because universal, it should be pointed out that universality may be brought about by the world in which man lives and the inevitableness of certain experiences. Universality, then, need not be regarded as proof of innateness. For example, if it should be found that all living beings are at times afraid, this should not be taken as an indication that there is within all organisms a definite mass of the fear impulse awaiting an outlet. It would be simpler to regard this as due to the fact that conditions of living are uncertain for all living beings, who are at times afraid on account of the world of uncertainty and of painful experiences in which they live. In the same way, if all men should work, this should not be taken as proof of the claim that within man there is a definite impulse

to work. It may as well be taken as indicating that man lives in a world in which work is necessary.

The universality of the sex impulse should be regarded in the same way. Its universality does not indicate necessarily the existence of a sex impulse that exists irrespective of the situations the individual faces, or has faced. It may as well be taken as indicating the fact that the experiences out of which the impulse is born are so many and so wide-spread that every individual in his career encounters them. That the universality could easily be caused in this way becomes apparent from a consideration of the many stimuli that arouse the impulse.

According to Freud, children hold in their systems as long as possible waste matter in order that in voiding it they may experience a sort of friction which gives sexual pleasure. Freud seems to regard this as due to the promptings of the sex urge. Perhaps it is, after the pleasure has been experienced. But experience of this pleasure must have preceded knowledge of the pleasure; for no one would endow the child with foreknowledge of the effect of holding back waste matter. After the pleasure is experienced on account of chance conditions, it may be persisted in for the reason that Freud gives. If this be true, then it becomes clear that the sex impulse comes into existence at the very dawn of life as a result of purely physiological processes affected by certain chance conditions.

It is also quite possible that the impulse is early aroused in infants as the result of friction that is necessarily involved in the care of the infant. Think also of the inevitableness of variation in the temperature of certain parts of the body and the effect of this on the sex impulse. Think also of the influence of older boys and girls, and even men and women, on the young. Think of the insinuations and suggestions regarding the delights of sex presented on all occasions. It is out of these experiences that the sex impulse is born.

Similarly, out of the experiences of the individual are born the forces which contend with the sex impulse for mastery. The disapprobation shown by parents and teachers of anything suggestive of sex deeply affects the child. Ideals of chastity are impressed on all by the group morality. It is on account of attitudes and values so impressed that the individual fights against his sex impulse.

It is because these experiences are the normal experiences of the individual that their rôle is unappreciated. It is only when abnormal experience deeply affects the character of the individual that the rôle of experience is properly appreciated. It is because it is abnormal for aphids to be reared on the salts of magnesia and sugar that we recognize the importance of this diet in the formation of its wings. If it had been the normal diet, we would never have recognized it as the determining factor in the aphid's wings. Per-

haps other foods would have been regarded as responsible for the development of such abnormal creatures as wingless aphids.

The same method of thinking is characteristic of our attitude regarding the rôle played by the psychological development of man. If certain experiences inevitably occur, and as a result all individuals possess a certain trait, the rôle of the experience is neglected, and the trait is regarded as an unfolding or expression of an innate character. Thus, because the experiences which bring about the sex conflict are the normal experiences, they are neglected. If, however, an individual should escape these experiences, and as a result should have an abnormal sex life, we would not hesitate to regard the abnormality as due to his abnormal experiences. We would not assume that his innate characters were different from those of normal people. Why then do we hesitate to regard the sex conflict that results when an individual is subjected to *normal* conditions as due to the *normal* conditions?

That *normal* sex life should be regarded as due to a *normal* psychological development acquires considerable plausibility from a consideration of sex aberrations induced by an *abnormal* environment. For homosexuality in both man and lower animals seems beyond doubt the result of abnormal environmental conditions rather than the result of an innate character making for this abnormality.

For example, it should be recalled that male pigeons

that are raised with males only are attracted at mating season to the males, which they treat as females. On the other hand, if a male pigeon is raised with females only, at mating season it is attracted to males, but will act the part of a female. This latter principle seems to have been observed by the Eskimos, for they use it in inducing effeminate boys to become homosexuals.

If abnormal sex manifestations can thus be abundantly shown to be due to abnormal experiences, there is no good reason to hesitate in assuming that the normal sex life of the individual is the result of the normal experiences in his career. It is here as Brooks points out regarding the normal coloring of certain insects. The "normal" coloring, he holds, may well be due to "normal feeding and temperature."* This is but an illustration of the views commonly held by biologists. The "normal" is the result of a "normal" structure acting in a "normal" situation. Hence, if either is changed, the product becomes "abnormal."

So it is with the sex impulse of an individual. If the individual begins his career with a normal structure, and is subjected to normal influences, he will react in the usual manner, and the usual impulses and emotions will be experienced. But the fact that the "normal" stimuli are the ones that are usually presented, and the consequent fact that the response is usually a "normal" response, should not cause us to

* Brooks, *Foundation of Zoology*, 59.

regard the "normal" response as any more inherent in original nature than the "abnormal"; for whatever the response may be it is the natural or normal response for original nature to make, given the antecedent and exciting conditions.

When the sex impulse is so regarded, we have no difficulty in seeing that it, like all other interests and impulses, arises as the result of the experiences of the individual, and is to be regarded as such rather than the experiences regarded as the result of the impulse. When once, however, the impulse has come into existence it may persist and lend coloring to future activities. Yet the persistency and permanency of the impulse are not to be taken as indications that the impulse is an innate store of energy manifesting itself in various ways.

The persistence and permanence of the impulse, like its universality, may better be regarded as due to the number of exciting stimuli, and the pleasure that accompanies the excitation. As a result of the pleasure attending the excitation, there are in the mind various ideas and suggestions capable of producing it. The mind, in brief, may be regarded as carrying with it the stimuli necessary for its arousal. It is the persistence of the mass of stimuli that accounts for the persistence of the impulse. In this the sex impulse is not different from other impulses. Who has not experienced shame on remembering a humiliating situation? Likewise, anger and the pugnacious instinct

are often aroused by memory of an insult or by insinuations in the same way that other memories and insinuations may arouse the sex impulse.

The intimate connection between the sex impulse and the secretions of certain glands may be regarded as invalidating the above position. Yet it need not. It is true that there are certain internal secretions, among which are secretions from the sex organs, which flow irrespective, it seems, of the physiological condition of the organism or external stimulation. It would seem, therefore, that these processes may well be regarded as due to the structure of the organism rather than to the experiences of the organism. This is no doubt true. But this flow need not give rise necessarily to the sex impulse.

Indeed, the relation of the sex impulse to the flow of secretions is like the relation of other impulses to the flow of secretions. Thus, for example, when the pugnacious impulse is excited the flow of certain secretions increases, and the organism is prepared for the matter in hand. But the activity cannot be regarded as a result of the flow of secretions. This latter is simply one aspect of the organism's activity determined by variable conditions. Likewise, when the sex impulse is aroused the flow of certain secretions may be affected. But the flow of secretion is not the cause of the impulse, for an excess of secretion may be relieved without the arousal of the impulse. The impulse is the result of various experiences the organism has un-

dergone, and when it is experienced there are brought into existence new stimuli for arousing a greater activity in the physiological processes, which, at the same time, acquires a definiteness and orientation which give to it much of its color and force.

There are, then, no valid objections to the thesis that the sex conflict is a conflict of social contributions on account of the universality, permanency, or physiological basis of the sex impulse. On the other hand, the great variation in the strength and expression of the impulse should cause us to see that the impulse is a product of the experiences of the individual, generated out of certain very definite situations. Yet this variation is commonly regarded as due to the fact that part of the strength is drained off into other forms of activity. But is there a store of energy that expresses itself in various ways? And by what means do such transformations take place?

If we assume that there is a store of energy of various kinds manifesting itself in various ways, then we should expect that following periods of great emotional excitement there should be periods of great lassitude. Yet this is not true. A nation that has been at a high tension of excitement does not find it easy to settle down. The same is true of the individual. Excitement feeds on excitement. We should not expect, therefore, the rustic to possess a greater store of psychic energy simply because his energy has not been drained off than the man who lives in a complex environment

and on whom constant demands for nervous energy are being made. The reverse is rather true. The rustic does not have the stimuli that are necessary to bring into existence various tensions and thus nervous energy. As a consequence he leads a dull, monotonous life at a very low level. His emotions have not been supplied with the stuff on which they feed. The man in a complex environment has had many demands made on him, but his psychic energy is kept at a high tension for this very reason. We thus come back to the truth stated by Aristotle: "A man becomes brave by doing brave deeds."

It therefore seems unreasonable to hold that there is a mass of energy existing independently of the various situations in which energy may be expressed, or to hold that this energy may be drained off in various channels. It seems more reasonable to hold that the factors, that are at all events necessary to bring about the variation in the expression of the energy, are the real sources and creators of the energy that is expressed. We would thus have a clear explanation of the great variations in the strength of an impulse following changes in the interests and environment of the individual.

Under this view it is natural that the strength of the sex impulse should vary with the amount of interest shown sex stimuli, for it is out of such concrete experiences that the impulse is born. The changes in its expression, therefore, should not be regarded as a

result of changes in a constant *force* within the organism. There is not a force of this sort within one. The truth of this should be obvious if we only reflect on the commonly observed variations in the strength of the impulse in the same individual following changes in his environment, and on the sex aberrations already referred to.

Sex behavior, therefore, presents no exception to the general rule that the behavior of an organism is determined by its structure, experience, and physiological condition, and the exciting factors in the environment. When behavior is so regarded the common error of attributing the evils of society to the repressions of innate tendencies or impulses will become apparent. There is not a mass of such impulses within the individual. All impulses arise as a result of the experience of the individual. What is given innately is a tendency to react in a certain way—provided a certain stimulus is presented. Unless the stimulus is presented, there is no craving or impulse for the activity. Innate tendencies are, therefore, hypothetical. They are capacities that are realized *if definite situations are presented*. Hence, strange as it may sound, an instinct must be *expressed* before it can be *repressed*.

If this statement, obvious as it may seem, were generally recognized as true, the old conception of "Natural Rights" would not have been revived on the assumption that the individual comes into this world with a mass of tendencies or impulses longing for ex-

pression, and the present emphasis on the right of all capacities to be realized would loose much of its force. The same may be said of educational theories, which emphasize the desirability of following the *natural* inclination of children. Instead of exalting in this way the innate and contemning the social, we would recognize that social contacts are the real sources of our values, desires, and impulses. We accordingly would recognize that the work of intelligence is so to arrange these contacts that the desires and impulses which we value shall come into existence. We would also recognize that we cannot take a *laissez-faire* attitude regarding institutions or our values. What we wish we must strive for. What we value we must maintain. It will not do to assume that the perpetuation of our cherished ideals or institutions is guaranteed by their *roots* in original nature; for original nature has been found to contain many other *roots* of an opposing nature, which at any time may strangle the *roots* of our institutions—and will, if environmental conditions warrant.

The one great difficulty that prevents us from seeing that the behavior of an organism is determined by the conditions that affect it is the need felt of accounting for the fact that there is activity. It is taken almost as axiomatic that if there is activity there must be a force or agency in virtue of which the activity occurs. It is this need that leads to the hypostatization of processes or activities into *forces*, that are supposed to

furnish the motive power for the activity. But such forces *need* to be accounted for, and it is this necessity that has led to the various appeals to phylogeny. It is the failure to see that these forces arise in the individual's career, as a result of his activities, that causes one to turn to the history of the species to find their origin.

We should, however, not feel a need to account for the fact that organisms are active. It is the nature of organisms to be active. What we wish to know are the determinants of the particular acts of an organism, and these we have found to be the structure, physiological condition, and experience of the organism and the confronting situation. There is no need to supplement explanations in these terms with the statement that the activity occurs in virtue of or on account of an instinct. In this connection we should remember that activity is made up of definite acts. When the definite acts are accounted for activity is; for activity separated from activities is a mere abstraction, which has no existence in reality, and hence requires no explanation.

Our interpretations of behavior may well be freed, then, from the conception of inherited forces, and our evaluations of conduct from the thought that some acts are the *natural expression* while others are the *unnatural expression* of these forces. It should thus become apparent that it is idle to attempt to justify existing conventions, customs, and institutions on the

ground that they are rooted in original nature. As far as original nature is concerned, they are merely the chance actualizations of innate capacities. Other actualizations might have taken place just as well. The ones that occurred did so on account of the conditions under which original nature happened to be placed. If it had been affected differently, different institutions would have resulted.

On the other hand, it is equally idle to condemn existing institutions on the ground that they are counter to original nature, or repressive of innate tendencies. For whatever our activities may be, they are the responses of original nature when influenced in a certain way. We may dislike existing institutions for various reasons, but we must base our dislike on some reason other than the charge that they repress and thwart our instincts, for the only energy or *force* in behavior is the force that results from the contacts of the individual with his environment, and this *force*, as a perfectly definite and determinate one, manifests itself always in the one *natural* way.

Instincts thus become the characteristic responses of an organism to certain conditions. To regard the response as determined by innate *forces* driving us to make the response is to close the avenue of a fruitful study of the true determiners of human behavior, and the possibility of correlating variations in behavior with the variable factors in the environment. In brief, to regard instincts as innate characters within

us that determine our activities and evaluations is to make of instinct a blind to our ignorance on one hand and a shade to soften the disheartening glare of problems to be solved on the other.

Since our behavior, desires, and impulses are the results of our activities, determined by the give-and-take relations of the individual to his environment, the duty and rôle of intelligence become clear. It is not to sit by in idle leisure in the hope that there is within us a guide fully competent and willing to direct and guide us. Its duty is rather to take an active part in the ordering of our behavior by varying the conditions that confront the individual so that the responses, impulses, and sentiments that are preferred shall dominate the characters of men.

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